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Abstract
Security policies are widely used across the IT industry in order to secure envi-
ronments. Firewalls, routers, enterprise application or even operating systems like
Windows and Unix are all using security policies to some extent in order to secure
certain components.
In order to automate enforcement of security policies, security policy languages
have been introduced. Security policy languages that are classified as computer
software, like many other programming languages have been revolutionised during
the last decade. A number of security policy languages have been introduced in the
industry in order to tackle a specific business requirements. Not to mention each
of these security policy languages themselves evolved and enhanced during the last
few years.
Having said that, a quick research on security policy languages shows that the
industry suffers from the lack of a framework for security policy languages. Such
a framework would facilitate the management of security policies from an abstract
point. In order to achieve that specific goal, the framework utilises an abstract
security policy language that is independent of existing security policy languages
yet capable of expressing policies written in those languages.
Usage of interoperability framework for security policy languages as described
above comes with major benefits that are categorised into two levels: short and
long-term benefits. In short-term, industry and in particular multi-dimensional or-
ganisations that make use of multiple domains for different purposes would lower
their security related costs by managing their security policies that are stretched
across their environment and often managed locally. In the long term, usage of ab-
stract security policy language that is independent of any existing security policy
languages, gradually paves the way for standardising security policy languages. A
goal that seems unreachable at this moment of time.
Taking the above facts into account, the aim of this research is to introduce and
develop a novel framework for security policy languages. Using such a framework
i
would allow multi-dimensional organisations to use an abstract policy language to
orchestrate all security policies from a single point, which could then be propagated
across their environment. In addition, using such a framework would help secu-
rity administrators to learn and use only one single, common abstract language to
describe and model their environment(s).
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Chapter 1
Introduction
This introductory chapter presents:
• The research motivation,
• The problems statement,
• The research context,
• The thesis statement (Aims and Objectives),
• The research scope and constraints,
• The thesis contribution,
• Related publications,
• The thesis outline.
1.1 Background
There is no doubt that computer networking has been revolutionised during the last
decade. Computer networks, including the internet, are expanding at a rapid pace
that make it almost impossible to predict what will be introduced and added to this
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phenomenon in the future. Less than a decade ago, it would have been inconceivable
that in the near future a user would be able to browse networks using a mobile
phone whilst sitting in a car or that people would seamlessly, but securely, store
their information on the internet without knowing where their information had been
physically stored (i.e. the cloud). The expansion appears to be multi-dimensional.
However, irrespective of the type and directions of the expansion, people always
have had one concern in common; the security of their networks.
Although the expansion of networking is fascinating, there are a number of sce-
narios in which network users would typically decide to restrict access to and from
their networks by other users. For example, when backing up information such as
pictures on a cloud based storage, one might consider who can access that infor-
mation and under what circumstances. Another example is restriction of a personal
network router to block delivery of age-restricted content to the home network in
order to protect the safety of children. In the above-mentioned examples, and in
many other similar scenarios, one is effectively thinking in the same way that a
security architect in a multi-domain organisation thinks in regard to restricting ac-
cess to and from network resources. Whilst on a router, for instance, a few clicks
on a pre-defined admin-page could achieve the goal of restricting access to certain
websites, the same may not be as easily achievable in multi-domain organisations.
Generally speaking, that is why security policies have been introduced.
Very similar to programming languages that facilitate orchestration of a series
of actions to achieve a goal by programmers, security policy languages have been
introduced to allow coders or rather security administrators, to define their goals
to protect a specific domain by taking certain actions in a specific order. Many
access control models and policy languages have been proposed in order to address
the above mentioned concern. These languages, which have evolved during the
past decade, usually come with different specifications and aim to tackle different
business requirements. However, irrespective of their type and specification, all
security policy languages, from a single Role Based Access Control (RBAC) to a
highly sophisticated policy language that is capable of negotiating over the network,
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with their own advantages and disadvantages, have one aim in common, that is to
secure resources.
As with programming languages, it is not easy to distinguish the advantages of
one specific security policy language over another. However, unlike programming
languages that are used to code an unlimited number of scenarios, the majority of
scenarios covered by security policy languages can usually be modelled and de-
scribed at an abstract level. That summation for access request is simply stated as:
’who can access what, under which circumstances?’
1.2 Motivation
The motivation behind this research can be divided into different categories that are
described in the sections below:
1.2.1 Industry Research
Policy-based access control systems are now well established. One way or another,
different devices, applications, system users etc. are all restricted by these security
policies. The management of these security policies across a multi-domain envi-
ronment is a challenging task that would require tools/frameworks to assist system
security administrators to achieve their goals.
There are similar frameworks provided by different vendors to cover differ-
ent aspects of enterprises system securities like Security Authentication Language.
Gluu [21], that provides the industry with a framework for identity and access man-
agement control utilising a single point of management, can be given as an exam-
ple. However, industry suffers from lack of such tools for security policy languages,
hence, this research is focused on security policy languages and aims to fill-in the
identified gaps within the industry.
In other words, very similar to other frameworks such as Gluu [21], this re-
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Figure 1.1: Overview of Gluu, a Framework for Identity Access Management [21]
search’s goal is to provide security policy users with an abstract standard security
policy language, that can be translated to other specific security policy languages.
Indeed, in order to achieve this, an Interoperability Framework for Security Policy
Languages that understands the abstract language and is capable of translating it to
specific security policy languages is needed.
1.2.2 Industry Support
In addition to the above, in order to justify the present research, it is necessary to
focus on two different sets of facts: on one hand, in todays economy, whilst corpo-
rations seek to control costs yet drive productivity, the cost of acquiring and main-
taining a company’s software is closely scrutinised and controlled. IT departments
are under constant pressure to deliver more services in a short span of time with
ever decreasing budgets. Hence, IT departments are willing to choose and invest in
technologies that provide them with more business values at a lower cost.
On the other hand, the high demand of distributed computing and its multi-
dimensional expansion necessitates the increase of security policies and in turn,
4
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security policy language usages in the coming years. As stated above, these policy
languages come with different formalisms, specifications, advantages and disadvan-
tages. Yet, while too many of them may be available within the industry, it seems
that the usability of these languages cannot easily be challenged. Having said that,
and as mentioned before, the majority of the scenarios covered by these languages
can be modelled at an abstract level.
To summarise, on one hand, there are a wide range of security policy languages
available and needed within the industry, while on the other hand, IT departments
are under pressure to control their costs and hence, they are willing to invest in tech-
nologies that helps them to achieve such a goal. A combination of these two could
justify this research intently that provides the industry with one generic security
policy language that helps the industry to manage heterogeneous security policies
from single point of management. As we will see in the coming sections, the frame-
work that is provided by this research will help multi-dimensional organisations to
significantly reduce their costs.
1.2.3 Research Support
As we will review them in great details in the Chapter 2, it was also noted that few
other researches and academic projects aimed to tackle the very same issue, during
last few years. Inspired by these contributions, this research aims to improve their
work and provide other researchers with a more advanced framework for security
policy languages.
1.2.4 Industry Sponsorship/Encouragement
Above all, a series of informal interviews were conducted to obtain more detailed
information in the field of this research. A series of highly professional experts have
been selected to obtain their invaluable insights on the research. In addition to above
it has also been decided to have a mix of expertise from different backgrounds,
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with the hope to cover different aspects of the framework. These expert views and
guidance paved the way to start this research. A list of these experts who constantly
shaped the IT industry is as follows:
• Professor of Security Engineering at the Computer Laboratory of Cambridge
University.
• Chief Security Architect at Capgemini UK.
• Manging Software Architect at Capgemini UK.
• Senior Security Consultant at Capgemini UK.
• Senior Security Consultant at IBM UK.
These individuals are referred to as experts throughout the research and will
reappear in Chapter 3, The framework Overview and Design challenges and in
Chapter 7 Implementation of the Framework.
1.3 Problem Statement
Considering the range of security policy languages that are currently available to
choose from (more than 20 security policy languages recognised by W3C [24]), in-
evitably, multidimensional organisations have to use a collection of these languages
in their environment. Taking the fact into account that these languages are often
used in a single domain, a standard security policy language, in addition to a secu-
rity policy language framework, is needed to help security architects and security
administrators to manage and maintain their secure domains from a single point of
administration.
Lack of such a framework as illustrated in Figure 1.2, which has already been
noted by other researchers in the past and as a result of that, afew studies and re-
searches have already been carried out for the development of a multipurpose secu-
rity policy language such as - SecPAL [44]. These researches, however, aimed to
6
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Figure 1.2: Overview of Interoperability Framework for Security Policy Languages
provide a completely new and enhanced security policy language by analysing and
improving previous security policy languages. Utilising a completely new security
policy language can be considered by new projects within the industry, but this ap-
proach is not always welcomed with regards to legacy applications, especially in a
secured domain.
Taking the above fact into account, the interoperability framework for security
policy language should not only force a legacy system to change or modify the
underlying security infrastructure, but it should also use that to a great extent. The
usage of this framework should help security experts to achieve their goals more
easily and should not impose more constraints on their domains.
Fair and challenging questions can be presented as: Why is such an abstract
language needed? Do policy language users want a standard at all? Can none of
the existing languages be adapted more generally?
In order to answer these questions, the following few facts must be taken into
account:
1. Security policy languages have evolved over the last decade and the process
is still ongoing.
2. Security policy languages are popular but they are not a compulsory com-
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ponent of every infrastructure, hence, they have their own distinctive lists of
users.
3. A handful of well-known organisations that have already implemented their
security infrastructures are using them to the greatest possible extent. Assum-
ing the infrastructure works as expected and is secure enough, there would be
no motivation for the client to change the infrastructure.
Now considering all these facts, these questions can be answered as follows:
Q: Do policy language users want a standard at all ?
A: Probably not at the moment, as the usage of security policy languages is lim-
ited to certain organisations and relatively large companies. However, researchers
need to be able to predict the demand of predictable tools, technologies, products
etc. and to standardise them in order to help both future researchers and industry.
Security policy languages can be one of those tools. At the moment, security policy
languages come with no unique industry-wide standard, but they do have their own
demands in the security arena.
If a standard for security policy languages that provides specific advantages to
its users would be desirable in the future, the development of that standard should
begin in the present day to encourage both new and existing users. Encouragement
of new users could be considered less challenging compared to the existing users. It
is believed that by using the framework, even existing users of security policy lan-
guages would be able to benefit from the security policy standard without changing
their security infrastructure.
Q: Can none of the existing languages be adapted more generally?
A: Generic and academic security policy languages could be considered for such
an approach. However, it must be borne in mind that the framework, in addition
to its advantages that have already been described has to achieve a very specific
goal: to provide future AND current policy language users with an abstract standard
policy language.
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Using an existing policy language and using it more generally would probably
work for new users. However, that would not be acceptable for existing security
policy language users.
1.4 Research Context
Protecting networked resources came to life at the very same time when com-
puter networking was introduced. Many access control models and security policy
languages have been proposed in order to address the above-mentioned concerns.
These languages, which have undergone a revolution during the last decade, usually
come with different specifications aiming to tackle different business requirements.
However, these policy languages have often been designed independently and
are not interoperable. This lack of interoperability of security policy languages on a
distributed network, where different domains use different policy languages, affects
the main benefit of policy-based security management the enabling of resources
and services be controlled and managed at a high-level regardless of the adopted
under-lying policy language.
This research intends to provide security policy language users with a frame-
work to make them interchangeable. The industry would benefit from the usage of
such a framework as outlined below:
1.4.1 Short-Term Benefits
Security policy languages are often used in multidimensional organisations that
have different requirements for different parts of their networks or so-called sub-
domains. These sub-domains often use heterogeneous policy languages because
different policy languages are designed and developed to address different business
requirements. Policy languages, like programming languages, are typically not easy
to learn and understand for occasional users. Thus, the use of different policy lan-
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Figure 1.3: A Typical Secure Distributed Environment
guages in a multidimensional organisation imposes the need for security experts,
who can code security policies in those security policy languages. In addition, the
sub-domains of multi-dimensional organisations are often managed locally. This,
in turn, implies that the management of these security domains from a single point
is not an easy task to achieve.
Figure 1.3, which has been presented for illustration purposes, shows a typical
distributed network that utilises heterogeneous security policy languages across dif-
ferent sub-domains. In such an environment, the management of all sub-domains
at an abstract level is challenging if not impossible, unless an abstract management
policy framework to control the environment from a single point is introduced.
Using such a framework would allow multidimensional organisations to use
an abstract security policy language to orchestrate all the security scenarios at an
abstract level and from a single point, that can then be propagated across the envi-
ronment. In addition, using such a framework would help security administrators
10
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to learn and use a single and common abstract language to describe and model their
environment(s).
1.4.2 Long-Term Benefits
Rapid expansion of computer networks, necessitated the introduction of a set of dif-
ferent security policy languages with different formalisms and models to the market
[24]. Taking the mentioned facts into account, it can be predictable that the future
expansion of computer networks and their requirements will demand even more
new security policy languages to be introduced. As a result, in the near future, there
will be too many policy languages without any intersection and commonality that
are all needed and required within the industry.
Using the proposed framework will help security architects and security admin-
istrators by eliminating the requirement of learning how to code security policies
in different policy languages. The proposed framework, which understands the se-
curity domains, provides users with a much simpler language that maintains the
orthogonality of the security system. The standard security policy language that
works in conjunction with the framework for security policy language will gradu-
ally become more mature and indeed popular and hopefully will lead the industry
to use an abstract standard security policy language in future.
1.5 Thesis Statement (Aims and Objectives)
Aims
As stated in the previous section, security policies are often scattered over different
domains and environments on multidimensional organisations. These security poli-
cies come with their own models and domains of administration. Moreover, some
applications within these organisations often need to cross several of these security
domains. Such a task would be very difficult to accomplish when these policies are
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scattered over the domains. Having the infrastructure of the above organisations
in mind, the primary aim of the present research is to provide an interoperability
framework for management and administration of heterogeneous security policy
languages from a single point, across such an organisation.
The way that users interact with the framework would be via an abstract security
policy language perhaps through a user interface. Hence, the secondary aim of
the research will be defined as to provide security experts with a human-readable
abstract and standard security policy language that is independent of underlying
security infrastructure.
Objectives
The research objectives can be categorised in two sections:
A) Theoretical Objectives:
The diversity of the security policy languages urges to shortlist a handful of
these languages, as candidate languages. Hence, the first set of objectives can
be defined as:
1. To investigate commonalities and differences of security policy languages
from different perspectives and categorising them accordingly.
2. To define the project-specific criteria for shortlisting security policy lan-
guages. The task will be executed following the review of security policy
languages (i.e. task 1 ).
A similar task also has to be performed against algebra for security policy
languages:
3. To provide formalism for the framework and evaluate it against security pol-
icy language candidates. The task will be executed following the literature
review of presented algebra for security policy languages.
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B) Practical Objectives:
1. To design a framework for security policy languages using appropriate soft-
ware development methodologies.
2. To implement a Proof of Concept (PoC) using open source components ac-
cording to software development best practices.
3. To design, develop and enhance an abstract security policy language for the
framework.
4. To evaluate the framework in accordance with well-known test strategies.
1.5.1 Scope and Limitations
As has been mentioned in previous section, this research will provide a framework
for security policy languages. Although security policy language candidates will be
briefly reviewed, their technical details including infrastructure, architecture, for-
malisms and specifications will not be discussed in detail in this paper and indeed,
would be beyond the scope of this research. Existence of these security policy lan-
guages has been assumed in advance.
In addition, various open source software application and frameworks have been
used throughout the design and development of the framework. A complete list of
these components, including their versions used will be provided in Appendix A.
Any improvement or enhancement of these components by their vendors that be-
comes available after the version that was used which directly or indirectly impacts
the performance and/or behaviour of the proposed framework will be excluded from
this research and would be beyond the scope of this study.
Moreover, a great deal of attention has been given to the design and implemen-
tation of the system in accordance with best software development practice. Having
said that, the entire design, implementation and evaluation of the framework was
performed in laboratory strictly for academic purpose. As a result, the framework
should not be used in real world production environments without proper testing
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and perhaps improvement.
1.5.2 Research Methodologies
Throughout this study the following research methodologies have been used:
I. Interview
A series of simple yet effective interviews were conducted before the research
commenced and throughout the research. The majority of interviewees were
well-known individuals within the Information Technology (IT) industry with
invaluable insights on the future of IT. The results of these interviews shaped
the structure of this research from the outset.
II. Literature Study
At an early stage of the research, it was decided to mathematically prove
whether transition/conversion/translation of security policies is doable. Log-
ically, the most appropriate way to translate many-to-many languages is to
translate them to and from an abstract language. Algebra was chosen as the
abstract language, or rather the framework, throughout this research. Hence,
a literature review of existing algebra for security policy languages was per-
formed.
In addition to that, it was necessary to categorise security policy languages.
Accordingly, a literature study of existing security policy languages was also
carried out.
III. Proof of Concept
Proof of concept, which is also known as prototyping, was used to implement
a limited version of the framework in order to evaluate its outcome and its
behaviour against real world scenarios. Proof of concept has also been used to
test the framework with real users.
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IV. Experiment
Real users have been asked to interact with the framework prototype and their
interactions with the system was observed and surveyed. Their suggestions
and comments have also been fed back to the system developers in an iter-
ative manner, in order to improve system performance, behaviour and user-
friendliness
V. Survey
In order to make the users’ feedback procedure easier and indeed more formal,
a simple but effective survey, with a combination of multiple-choices questions
and suggestion box, was designed and distributed to the users.
1.6 Research Contribution
The main contribution of this research, as appears from the title, is to implement an
interoperability framework for security policy languages. However, the following
can also be considered as contributions of this research:
1. A literature review of security policy languages is provided. It includes a com-
plete comparison of security policy languages backed up by up-to-date discus-
sions and references. In addition to that, it was shown how to define a completely
new set of requirements for a customised security policy language comparison.
2. A literature review of algebra for security policy languages and their character-
istics, formalisms and specifications is provided.
3. A new algebra for security policy languages is presented and evaluated against
real world scenarios.
4. A completely new definition for an abstract standard security policy language
is presented. As the abstract language evolves, it will improve the usability of
security policy languages.
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1.7 Related Publications
1.7.1 Conferences
1. Amir Aryanpour, Song Y. Yan, Scott Davies, Andrew Harmel-law. Towards De-
sign an Interoperability Framework for Security Policy Languages. In Proceed-
ings of 12th International Conference on Security and Management(SAM12).
16-19 July 2012, Las Vegas, USA.
2. Amir Aryanpour, Edmond Parakash, Scott Davies, Andrew Harmel-law. An
Interoperability Framework for Security Policy Languages. In Proceedings of
14th International Conference on Security and Management (SAM14). 21-24
July 2014, Las Vegas, USA.
1.7.2 Books
As the result of a successful presentation at SAM14, the respectful representative
of the Elsevier Publication at the conference initiated a negotiation to transform the
outcome of this research to a book (booklet). The task is ongoing and continuous.
1.8 Thesis Outlines
In this thesis, the outline of the remaining chapters is as follows:
• Chapter 2: Related Work and Background
In this chapter, the history of security policies will be examined in detail,
including the history of security policy models and its relation to security
policy languages.
Related work and research in the same area as the present research will be
reviewed and areas for improvements highlighted.
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• Chapter 3: The Framework Overview and Design Challenges
Chapter 3, will outline the high level requirements of the framework. By
providing an architectural overview of the framework it will show how differ-
ent parts of the framework will be tied to each other. A structural overview
of the abstract security policy language will be provided in this chapter. Fi-
nally, readers will be provided with a road-map that the research has taken to
achieve its goals
• Chapter 4: Security Policy Languages
In chapter 4, the necessity for comparison of security policy languages in
detail will be discussed. A literature review of comparisons of security policy
languages will commence, which is leading the research to the requirements
for selecting a small number of security policy languages for the framework.
Applying those requirements to a list of available security policy languages
will truncate the list to a set of three policy languages. The chapter will be
finalised by an overview of each language in turn.
Chapter 5: A New Algebra for Security Policy Languages
This chapter will describe the usefulness of algebra for security policies with
a literature review of algebra made for security policy languages. The chapter
will continue by choosing an algebra for the proposed framework and a step-
by-step evaluation will be provided to challenge the algebra. Finally, it will
provide the way that the algebra can be expanded and proved to be complete.
Chapter 6: Domain-Specific Language
The main aim of the chapter is to justify the usage of domain-specific lan-
guages in the context of this research. That will be achieved by defining the
domain specific language, providing advantages, disadvantages and require-
ments of domain-specific language in detail. Then the chapter will traverse
across different stages of implementing a domain-specific language and map
that to the research. The chapter will also show how the research narrowed
down a number of programming languages to a chosen language.
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Chapter 7: Implementation of the Framework
Chapter 7 will show a step-by-step implementation of the framework. This
will be gained by choosing an appropriate software development methodol-
ogy for the framework, defining the framework requirements, providing a
high-level design of the framework and the iterating through the low-level
designs of the framework. The chapter will be concluded by evaluation of the
framework.
Chapter 8: Summary and Future Work
This chapter will summarise the contribution of the thesis and propose some
future research works.
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Related Work and Background
In this chapter, the research presents:
• The history of the security policies,
• The relation between security policy models and security policy languages,
• The related work and research,
• The research contributions of the chapter.
2.1 Security Policy
Generally, the term secure domain applies to an environment that is dependable in
the face of two different levels of threats, those being Internal and External threats.
Internal threats refer to those activities that are performed within the secure domain.
This level of threats is also referred to as Human Error or just Error in secure do-
main definitions. External threats, however, refer to those activities that are imposed
from outside the boundaries of the secure domain [116].
Taking the above definition into account, performing certain operations or ac-
tions is rigidly restricted within a secure domain in order to protect its addressable
resources against internal and external threats. Hence, performing those activities
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within the boundaries of a secure domain cannot be authorised unless fulfilment of
their pre-requisite conditions is met, approved and validated by the system. The
document that describes these conditions and the way that they get validated or ap-
proved is called the Security Policy. As an example, withdrawal of funds from bank
accounts is strictly prohibited unless it has been approved by the account holder.
The document that describes how funds can be withdrawn from an individual’s
bank accounts, which perhaps describes that such an action requires the authorisa-
tion and approval of the account holder, is a security policy for that specific financial
institute.
To formally define security policies and their possible relation to security policy
languages, how a typical enterprise application or environment is secured should be
examined. Securing enterprise applications or the network of a multidimensional
organisation can be visualised as illustrated in Figure 2.1.
Figure 2.1: Layer of Protection on an Enterprise Application [40]
The security policy, which is located at the highest level of the diagram, usually
is a set of high-level documents (i.e. they do not pay attention to details of process)
which precisely states what rules should be in place in order to achieve reliable
protection. Usually, Security Officers are in charge of documenting security poli-
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cies, which are driven by their understanding of threats, risks and the sensitivity of
the system they are to protect. Security officers are not required to know the exact
details of the content that they protect in the environment. For example, a secu-
rity officer may define how certain confidential documents can be viewed, without
knowing the content of those documents.
Mechanism is located at the lowest level. The main responsibility of the mecha-
nism is to deploy security policies across the system. Usually mechanism comprises
of computer hardware and software such as, the security management platform,
cryptographic primitives, etc.
The security policy and mechanism are connected through the Middleware,
which composes of business tasks that need to be performed in compliance with
the given high-level security policy that has been defined by the security officers.
Application developers are typically in charge of middleware [116].
The security policy is a set of high-level documents that states precisely what
goals the protection mechanisms are to achieve. It is driven by the understand-
ing of threats and in turn drives the present system design. Typical request access
statements in a policy describe which subjects (e.g. users or processes) may access
what objects (e.g. files or peripheral devices) under what circumstances. A security
policy may be part of a system specification and like the specification its primary
function is to communicate [40].
Security policies have a great deal of similarity to the business requirements of
a computerised system in describing how the different parts of an application are to
tie, interact or communicate with each other. In that regard, like computerised sys-
tem that are produced or developed using programming languages, security policies
also need to be coded in order to carry out their functions. Security policy languages
with different levels of functionalities and expressiveness are used to code different
security related scenarios.
In accordance with the above definitions, in a very high-level view and in the
context of this research, the interactions between security policy language and the
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policy server, which are located at the middle and bottom level of the diagram given
above can be represented as Figure 2.2. A more detailed view of layers of protection
will be presented in the next section.
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Figure 2.2: High-Level View of Layers of Protection
2.2 Security Policy Models
It would perhaps be beneficial to understand how security policies were introduced.
Historically, the first modern network security policy, like many other security as-
pects, came from a military background. In response to the US Air Force concerns
over the confidentiality of data in mainframe systems in 1973 [40], the first modern
security policy was introduced. The concern led researchers to devise a simple yet
influential model based on restricting information flow between labelled clearance
levels such as, Confidential and Top Secret. This model of security, which was later
called the Bell-LaPadula [46] was the forerunner for other models like Biba [29].
The second wave of security policy models came from well-established business
practices such as, accountancy and law firms. In 1987, the Clark-Wilson security
policy model [60] was introduced, which was an abstraction of the double entry
bookkeeping system that is used in accountancy firms and banks. Two years later
in 1989, the Chinese Wall model [57] was introduced, which targets concerns over
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the conflict of interest in business practices (e.g. accountancy and law firm) with
different partners serving different customers who are competing in the same fields
[116].
Recent attention on the World Wide Web has necessitated not one, but a se-
ries of new security policy models to be introduced to address different levels of
concern. This can be categorised as the third wave of security policy models ad-
dressing the security vulnerability of the associated applications that are used in
this medium. In order to respond to market demands, a set of these new models was
built from the ground up, enhancing and improving security models that already ex-
isted. For instance, RBAC was introduced by Ferraiolo and R. Kuhn in 1992 [82]. It
is also known as Access Control List (ACL) and is widely used nowadays, based on
a model that was introduced in 1972 by Graham-Denning [95]. The model was later
improved by Harrison, Russo and Ullman in 1976 for operating system protection
[97].
2.3 Security Policy Languages
To present a concrete policy especially suited for its automated enforcement, a lan-
guage representation is needed. As has been mentioned above, security policy lan-
guages require an environment in which to function. In addition to security policy
languages, there are other components that need to closely interact and co-operate
with each other in order to ensure the security of a domain. Often, the combination
of all these components that interact and co-operate together is called the Security
Policy Server. There exists several security policy languages that are closely cou-
pled with the security mechanisms that enforce security policies in a domain.
Perhaps visualisation of these components of security policy servers would be
a good starting point. However, as it has already been noted, a variety of security
policy languages (and security policy servers) exist, each of which comes with dif-
ferent levels of functionalities, modules, components and indeed their own methods
of policy enforcement. As a result, it is almost impossible to provide a unique archi-
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tectural model of a security policy server that precisely illustrates the way that their
components interact with their environment. Having said that, Figure 2.3 has been
presented for illustration purposes in order to have a common vocabulary through-
out this document.
Figure 2.3: An Architectural Model of Security Policy Server [23]
In the picture provided above, the specified functional components are as fol-
lows:
• Policy Decision Point (PDP) is a system entity that evaluates applicable pol-
icy and provides an authorisation decision. This term corresponds to Access
Decision Function (ADF) in ISO10181-3 [104]. For trust domain requests,
PDP evaluates which trust domain should be assigned to. For access requests,
PDP evaluates whether or not a device can be accessed by requester based on
the current policy.
• Policy Enforcement Point (PEP) is a system entity that performs access
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control by making decision requests and enforcing authorisation decisions.
This term corresponds to Access Enforcement Function (AEF) in ISO10181-
3 [104]. For trust domain requests, PEP assigns a trust domain to a particular
web application; for access requests, PEP allows or prevents access to device
[23].
• Policy Information Point (PIP) is the system entity that acts as a source of
attribute values. PIP gathers information that is used by the PDP to evalu-
ate a trust domain or an access control request. For trust domain requests,
it collects the subject attributes (for example, how the web application was
identified and its associated security attributes), whereas, for access requests,
it collects resource attributes (i.e. which device is being requested and using
which parameters) and environment attributes (i.e. status of the device) [23].
• Policy Administration Point (PAP) is the authority that defines the policy.
It could be a network operator, a terminal manufacturer, a web runtime de-
veloper, an enterprise or a user at runtime. Policies can be provided by the
PAP in different ways, for instance using a pre-loaded file or data structure or
a remote management mechanism. The research interoperability framework
will be connected to PAP.
• Subject is an actor that requires access to resources. Examples of subjects
are: websites and widgets. Subject is an entity that may attempt security-
relevant actions and corresponds to a single identity.
• Subject Attribute, Every subject is associated with a set of attributes. Sub-
ject attributes allow the identification of the requester that is attempting access
to resources capabilities. The identified requester is then assigned a trust do-
main according to the appropriate trust policy (for trust domain requests of
course). Subject attributes include specific attributes that represent the iden-
tity of the requester attempting access to a resource. As an example, validity
of a requester can be examined by the URI for the requester e.g. widgets and
the URL for websites (in case of web applications) [23].
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• Resource is the entity(ies) that subjects may request access to. A document,
a specific page in a website, a printer, a firewall all these can be presented as
resources to the infrastructure.
• Resource Attribute Every resource is associated with a set of attributes. Re-
source attributes include an identifier. Other attributes may be associated with
a resource and these can include specific parameters that are specified as a part
of the request when attempting access. Resource attributes serve as an input
to access control policies [23].
• Environment is a set of attributes that are relevant to an authorisation deci-
sion and are independent of a particular subject, resource or action.
• Environment Attributes are a collection of environment status and/or con-
text attributes that may be relevant to the circumstances of a resource access
attempt, but are not directly associated with either the subject or resource. For
example, environment attributes can include terminal charging, network con-
nection status, etc. Environment attributes serve as an input of access control
policies. Attributes of the environment capture contextual information relat-
ing to the device or any other circumstances of the access attempt [23].
Taking these definitions into account, the model operates by the steps as de-
scribed below:
1. PAP writes policies and policy sets and makes them available to the PDP.
These policies or policy sets represent the complete policy for a specified
target.
2. The access requester sends a request for access to the PEP.
3. The PEP sends the request for access to the context handler in its native re-
quest format optionally including attributes of the subjects, resource, action
and environment.
4. The context handler constructs a request context and sends it to the PDP.
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5. The PDP requests any additional subject, resource, action and environment
attributes from the context handler.
6. The context handler requests the attributes from a PIP.
7. The PIP obtains the requested attributes.
8. The PIP returns the requested attributes to the context handler.
9. Optionally, the context handler includes the resource in the context.
10. The context handler sends the requested attributes and (optionally) the re-
source to the PDP.
11. The PDP evaluates the policy.
12. The PDP returns the response context (including the authorisation decision)
to the context handler.
13. The context handler translates the response context to the native response
format of the PEP. The context handler returns the response to the PEP.
14. The PEP fulfils the obligations (if any).
15. If access is permitted, then the PEP permits access (or trusts the peer in case
of trust negotiation) to the resource; otherwise, it denies the request [23].
It would be beneficial to look at this research contribution and its impact on the
above architecture whilst examining the infrastructure of security policy languages.
The proposed framework of this research only focuses on the policy administration
point. This is the point at which security administrators write the security policies
using different languages. The proposed framework connects to the PAP and acts as
an abstract layer that encourages security policy language users to use a standard,
abstract language instead.
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2.4 Related Works
As mentioned in section 1.2, lack of standard for security policy languages has been
noted before. Research such as, SecPal [44], aimed to address this issue accord-
ingly. In this section, however, few research that was conducted to provide security
users with a framework for security policy languages will be reviewed.
2.4.1 A Framework for Multi-Policy Environment
Kuhn et al. presented a fascinating framework for supporting security policies in
a multi-policy distributed environment back in 1995 [113]. In their definition, the
framework is literally a policy library that facilitates policy implementation by using
mechanisms which have been defined for policy separation, policy persistency and
policy reusability. The framework also provides a platform for policy reasoning and
conflict.
The paper starts by categorising security policies into three different family
models, namely the: Algebraic Family, the Lattice Family and the Expert Sys-
tem Family. In their framework, a policy implementation is a formal representation
of that model (family) consisting of a high-level semantic description and model
implementation code.
The Algebra family represents those security models which are presentable us-
ing an algebraic model. The algebraic model itself defines syntax specification of a
policy. In addition, the algebraic family provides modules for specification of ab-
stract data type, type independent specification of abstract data-type like array and
list and inheritance of complete security policies.
The Lattice family maps the access-control model, which is widely used within
the field of computer security. In this family, all of the entities that are governed
by policies are attributed. The attributes are used to map the flow of information
security throughout the system. The paper claims that every access-control based
security policy that utilises attributes can be rewritten in the form of this family.
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The last and final family is the Expert family, which effectively maps those
policies that are written in terms of rules and facts. Such a model can be useful for
the security policies which require rapid changing and evolution that can be directly
be applied onto the rules and facts of the model.
Unlike other papers that have been reviewed as part of this research, Kuhn et
al.’s paper provides algebra that supports policy comparisons and synthesis. The
paper claims that such algebra would assure the co-existence, reuse and implemen-
tation of security policies, in addition to defining inter-policy relationships in multi-
policy environments.
The paper then provides more information about the algebra, its operators and
the way that the algebra presents a policy. It also briefly shows how a security
policy can be mapped to a model and how a custodian paradigm will be used for
implementation [98]. Finally, the paper provides a real world policy example that
is using a Chinese Wall model and shows how the framework can be used to model
and implement such a policy.
As mentioned, Kuhn et al.’s paper was written about 20 years ago, and yet
it covers the majority of concepts that are utilised in the most up-to-date security
policy models and security policy languages. So from that point of view, this is
a fantastic piece of work that undoubtedly helped a wide range of researchers to
continue their research on security policies into the present day. In fact, this paper
was the basis for the use of an algebra in the present research in order to introduce
even a more acceptable and presentable framework for security policy languages.
2.4.2 Representing OWL Based Security Policies
Unlike the standard for security policy languages, the lack of an interoperability
framework for security policy languages has received limited attention previously.
Clemente et al. presented a solution for this business requirement in [61]. In order
to explore Clemente’s proposed solution in more detail, it is necessary to be more
familiar with the following concepts:
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• Ontology Web Language (OWL) is a set of markup languages designed to
be used by applications that are required to process the content of information
in addition to presenting information to humans. OWL has more facilities for
expressing meaning and semantics than XML, thus OWL goes beyond similar
markup languages in its ability to represent machine interpretable content on
the Web [38].
• Common Information Model (CIM) provides a common definition of man-
agement information for systems, networks, applications and services and al-
lows for vendor extensions. CIM’s common definitions enable vendors to ex-
change semantically rich management information between systems through-
out a network. CIM is a standard proposed by the Distributed Management
Task Force [6].
The Clemente et al.’s paper for the proposed solution starts by defining the re-
quirement for a framework for security policy languages and then describes the
advantages of semantic policy languages. In addition, the paper continues by se-
lecting a limited number of policy languages namely KAoS [148], Rei [107] and
SWRL [103] and then proposes the solution by utilising CIM.
The Clemente et al. paper is also considered as a well-defined and well-presented
piece of work. In fact, this paper was the basis for the use of generic platform in the
present research in order to reduce the cost and delivery time of the project.
2.4.3 Identified Areas for Improvements
Despite the fact the two papers discussed above have had their influences in cur-
rent research, but reviewing these papers with current knowledge of security policy
models and languages in mind indicated that the papers can be improved in the
following areas:
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• Restricted Approaches: Both papers provide readers with solutions that sat-
isfy their users to a great extent but none of these approaches can be consid-
ered as generic approach to be adopted at any given time.
For instance, Kuhn and co-workers used two simple models (in addition to
one abstract model) to prototype security policies. The provided models seem
to be adequate to prototype security policies that existed at the time, but the
fact that computer science and particularly computer networking has been
revolutionised during the last decade implies that the models provided by the
paper more likely will not be sufficient to describe complex security policies
that are written and in use currently.
In addition to that, the Clemente et al.’s paper came to a conclusion to choose
semantic policy languages over non-semantic languages after comparing these
two in the paper. The main reasons were - extensibility at runtime and the
adaptability of semantic policy languages. The above mentioned advantages
of semantic policy languages are undeniable, but a quick research shows that
only a small portion of the available policy languages and the frameworks
used in industry and research are based on semantic languages like OWL
[24]. Despite the fact that there is no limitation on the use of non-semantic
security policy languages with CIM, the proposed solution focuses only on
semantic security policy languages to operate over the framework. By impos-
ing such a constraint, a large number of policy languages will not be able to
use the proposed solution.
We will describe in the following chapters that the solution provided by this
research is not restricted unlike the related works. The frameworks that is
presented as a result of this research will be able to learn, evolve and expand
when that is necessary over the time. That makes the framework independent
of time, technologies involved or even security policy languages used.
• Unrepresented Evidences: Although these two papers have been introduced
as an abstract of the research/development conducted, both fail to answer the
questions that may have been raised by curious readers.
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The Clemente et al.’s paper for example, does not pay attention to the for-
malism of security policy languages. Despite the fact that KAoS and Rei
both come with strong underlying formalism, the paper fails to demonstrate
the possibility of translation of security policy languages using their formal
specifications.
On the other hand, the Kuhn et al.’s paper provides readers with formalism to
a large extent but does not provide any implementation example. The paper
refers to other work that describes the custodian paradigm [98]. However,
having reviewed the papers, how the framework breaks down a policy and
how the custodian paradigm transits that to an usable piece of code is not
readily apparent. Even when the authors show how precisely the framework’s
algebra is applied to a real world example (the Chinese wall) and divide it
down to few sub-models, they do not show how the model gets translated into
actual code by the custodian paradigm.
The current research, however, starts with a generic algebra that formally de-
scribes security policy languages. Then it presents the readers with a step-by-
step development process of the framework. Such an approach A) will satisfy
curious readers that conversion of security policy languages is an achievable
goal (by means of algebra and security policy languages formalism) and B)
present readers with a detailed guidance that can be used for further develop-
ment and researches.
• Security Concerns: It is undeniable that security is a vulnerable subject.
Every security aspects of a system (in the current research the framework)
must be known and challenged against possible threats. Having the above fact
in mind it seems that these two papers do not pay attention to this subject.
The solution that is provided by the Clemente et al.’s paper uses CIM as
the medium between policy languages. It then describes how to map and
convert CIM to OWL in order to convert security policies between different
languages. Considering that the complexity of CIM to OWL conversion has
already been proven in [99] this complexity could lead to instability of frame-
32
2.4. Related Works
work when it comes to converting complicated and large security policies.
In addition to the above, it must be borne in mind that CIM aims to expand the
coverage of information interchange between a wide range of products and
vendors through a series of ongoing improvements. Although CIM claims
the standard can be used to exchange security information, this definition has
not been specifically tailored for this purpose. Hence, a great deal of atten-
tion is required when CIM is chosen as an interchange platform for security
policy languages in a multi-dimensional organisation. Failure to do so may
compromise the security of the system.
• The Kuhn et al.’s paper on the other hand shows how the two models defined
in the paper can be applied to a single policy (Chinese Wall) that can then
be translated by a custodian paradigm (without showing how the implemen-
tation works). However, the paper does not show how the two models can
and should interact with each other. In fact, the paper claims that when a pol-
icy uses more than one model, a decision has to be made as to which model
should be used for implementation. Such an approach could have been suf-
ficient for the policies that existed at the time, but as mentioned before, not
only might there be more than three defined models in present-day policies, it
is also more likely that the implementation must be applied to all of the mod-
els as opposed to only one. In addition to that, the interaction between these
models must be studied in order to minimise the vulnerability of the system.
Unlike the presented solutions, this research does not utilise any medium or
third party application/product in order to perform the conversion. Instead,
the research presents a framework that is implemented from ground up. The
research does not rely on the security model conversions that leads to its dif-
ficulty as it has been identified in the Kuhn et al.’s paper.
• Real World Example: The concept of converting security policy written in
different languages using a framework is an interesting subject within a multi-
domain environment presumably an organisation that is already using differ-
ent forms and types of security policies. However, none of the documents
33
2.5. Summary
above have shown how their framework can be used on and above an existing
security infrastructure.
In following chapters, however, the research shows (in a great extent) how a
real world example of a security policy written in a generic security policy
language can be converted to different security policy languages.
2.5 Summary
2.5.1 Chapter Summary
In this chapter, security policies were examined in more detail, including the history
of security policy models, security policy languages and the way that security policy
languages have been introduced to the industry. A typical architecture of a security
policy language was explored in detail to learn how they react to a request initiated
from outside and query access to resources.
In addition to the above, few other related researches conducted in the same area
as this research were also reviewed and critically examined from different perspec-
tives. It has also been shown the area that these works can be improved and detailed
and how the current research will address these issues in coming chapters.
2.5.2 Research Contributions of the Chapter
Other related research in the same area as this research have been identified and
reviewed. Then with the goal of improving these research in mind, they were looked
at from different angles. Possible areas in which those papers could be improved
were identified. These areas will be addressed throughout this research.
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Chapter 3
The Framework Overview and
Design Challenges
In this chapter, the research presents :
• The requirements of the framework,
• An architectural overview of the framework,
• An overview of the abstract security policy language used by the framework,
• The current research road-map,
• The research contributions of the chapter.
3.1 The Requirements of the Framework
As a platform for security policy languages, the main purpose of the interoperability
framework is to enable security management of a distributed secure domain consist-
ing of few sub-domains and potentially governed by heterogeneous security policy
languages from an abstract level. The framework was designed to be a system
to meet the complex requirements of real world multi-dimensional organisations.
Having said that due to the non-existence of such a framework, its requirements
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could not be captured like other software applications by analysing the documents
or interviewing the actual users of the system. As a result, in addition to experts
refereed to at section 1.2.4 a set of 10 individuals within the industry were selected
to participate in a short survey. Their titles and justification for their selection listed
as follows:
• Solution Architects: Solution architects who design and architect software
applications have been chosen to provide their views on how different parts of
the framework should be selected and how these parts should communicate
with each other.
• Security Architects: Eventually the framework will work in a secured and
protected environment, therefore, security architects have been selected to
improve and enhance the framework’s blueprint from a security point of view.
• Senior Developers: System developer have been chosen to provide their
feedback on low-level designs of the framework. Although logically they
should have been invited to participate when the actual development of the
system started, however, decision was made to capture their valuable feed-
back at requirement gathering phase with the aim of having even smoother
development phase.
• Security Administrators: Security administrators are essentially actual users
of the framework. Their expectation of the system helped to capture even
more details on system requirements.
In order to obtain the above mentioned set of experts’ point of view on the
framework, a series of informal interviews was arranged. In addition to that, a small,
yet effective questionnaire was distributed amongst them to capture their feedback
in more formal way. A copy of this survey has been provided in Appendix D.
Gathered responses in addition to informal interviews filtered and normalised
in a way that each of these requirements abstracted to a high-level requirement.
For instance if one of the experts asked for the code-assist to be provided as part
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of the framework, such requirement categorised under supportability requirement.
In addition to that each provided sentence within the survey weighted in order to
translate the survey to system requirements more accurately. Summarising the in-
terviews and surveys would result the Non-Functional Requirements (NFR) of the
system as follows:
• Simplicity: This specific requirement is more related to Abstract Security
Policy Language (ASPL) of the framework. The ASPL should contain a num-
ber of small, orthogonal and well-represented constructs from which complex
scenarios can be coded. The simplicity should not compromise the expres-
siveness of the ASPL. The policies written in ASPL should be simple yet
comprehensible.
• Scalability: The framework as a platform for security policy language should
accept current and future security policy languages within the industry. The
framework should not be valid and useful for a trivial period of time nor
limited to number of security policy languages.
• Flexibility: Within the context of this research, scalability and flexibility are
closely coupled. While scalability that ensures future security policy lan-
guages would be able to use the framework (i.e. new generators for the frame-
work), flexibility ensures that ASPL is capable of expressing new features that
are possibly offered by the future security policy languages.
• Integrability: Concerns about the adaptability of the framework with current
and future projects. Taking the fact into account that the prime user of the
framework are multi-dimensional organisations, in simple words integrabil-
ity ensures that the framework can be easily coupled to current and future
security infrastructures.
• Supportability: It is feasible to provide user support via tools for typical
model and program management, such as creating, deleting, editing, debug-
ging and transforming policies.
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Figure 3.1: Overview of the Framework
Based on the captured information, the blueprint of the framework for security
policy languages was drawn. Figure 3.1 represents high level architecture of the
framework. In this figure:
• ASPL: ASPL is an abstract human readable language that has been designed
to allow users to communicate with the framework. The grammar and syntax
of the ASPL represents the syntax and grammar of all the security policy
languages that the framework supports.
• Semantic Model: The semantic model is the core structure of the framework.
The structure of the semantic model is independent of security policy lan-
guages. It is the perfect abstraction that decouples the input syntax-oriented
ASPL from the target security policy languages.
• Generators: Valid and parsed scripts will be transformed to language specific
scripts using generators. The generator would be responsible to generate lan-
guage specific scripts based on the populated semantic model. The generated
scripts will be sent outside the boundaries of the framework.
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Figure 3.2: Percentage of Requested Requirements (NFR) Asked by Participants
3.2 Architectural Overview of the Framework
Taking the above captured requirement of the framework into account, the architec-
tural overview of the framework is presented in Figure 3.3. The internal components
of the framework based on the presented diagram are:
• Service Requester: Services provided by the framework have to be invoked
by external entity(ies). Service requester represent them in this diagram.
Service requester communicates with the framework (possibly) via ASPL
script(s). In the first release of the framework, the service invoker could be
a system administrator using a Graphical User Interface (GUI) to code the
ASPL commands. Enhancement of the framework in the future implies that
the service invoker can also be extended to other type of invokers. Remote
service invocation via XML (e.g. SOAP) can be presented as an example.
• Aggregation Layer: Represents a layer of interfaces which are responsible
to receive ASPL scripts in different formats. The very first implementation of
the framework would only have one interface. However, as mentioned earlier,
other interfaces will be added to this layer whilst the frameworks features is
enhanced. These interfaces would have one characteristics in common: they
receive ASPL scripts in different formats.
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• Parser / Internal Components: These represent the core components of the
framework. As it has been decided, service invokers are using ASPL scripts
to communicate with the framework, therefore, a form of parser is needed
to parse the ASPL script based on an agreed and pre-defined grammar and
generate a semantic model accordingly. In addition to parser, more other
architectural components are needed. Configuration artifacts, ASPL grammar
rules and error handling framework are prime examples.
• Policy Generators: Policy generators are responsible to generate specific
security language policy scripts. These units obtain the semantic model that
is populated by the internal components of the framework. Then by traversing
the semantic model, the generators produce language specific scripts. These
scripts effectively are true representation of the ASPL script received by the
framework, in a specific security policy language.
• Interface Layer: In order to modularise and decouple the framework’s in-
ternal components from (policy) generators, interface layer has been utilised.
The layer makes the semantic model that represents the ASPL, independent
of generators.
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Figure 3.3: Architectural Overview of the Framework
3.3 Overview of the ASPL
As it appears from the name, the ASPL is an abstract language that comes with
its own language constants, operators and predicates. Unlike designing a security
policy language where the predicates, constants, special keywords are known from
the outset, ASPL is introduced with minimum number of features. The reason is
unlike other security policy languages, ASPL is a dynamic language. In simple
words, it is not a security policy language, it is a collection of all of them. It starts
with the minimum features it requires. As the framework grows, it accepts more
security policy languages. That in turn results ASPL to be mature and learns new
features.
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Taking the above definition into account, the most simple security policy written
in ASPL should support the common scenario of security policy languages using the
minimal set of operators and keywords needed to describe that scenario:
Authorise [Protect]
Target "myTarget"
for executing
Actions "action1"
on [from]
Subjects "mySubject"
Listing 3.1: A Policy Written in ASPL
Listing 3.1 presents the simplest yet most common policy (or rule) with positive
authorisation policy. Positive authorisation policies define what activities (action) a
user (subject) can perform on the set of objects (target) in the domain. In the same
sense, negative authorisation policies deny defined activities performed by certain
subjects on associated targets.
The above presented listing presents such a simple security policy that does
not even contain conditions. In order to slightly enhance the ASPL, it has been
decided that Conditions be added to the ASPL. In addition to that, most modern
policy languages with the exception of few of them ( that includes Cassandra [45]),
support Obligation Policies. Obligation policies specify the actions that must be
performed when certain events occur. The assumption here is in a secured domain,
obligation policies activities are already authorised to be performed. Therefore,
obligations can be merged to authorisation policies as detailed in listing 3.2.
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Authorise [Protect]
Target "myTarget"
for executing
Actions "action1"
on [from]
Subjects "mySubject"
under following
Subject Conditions "mySubjectCondition1"
when
Obligation Constraints "my Obligation Constraints"
met
do
Obligation Action "myObligationAction"
Listing 3.2: Enhanced Policy Written in ASPL
3.4 The Next Steps
Two major steps have to be taken before the current research considered as con-
cluded, namely:
A) Theoretical Study
In essence, the policy framework as illustrated above is responsible for provid-
ing a platform for policy languages in order to make them interoperable, which
would undoubtedly be the main contribution of this research. However, before
the system is designed in detail and as a pre-requisite to the present framework’s
design, it should be proved theoretically that such a transformation is possible.
The steps that must be considered on route to this goal can be summarised as:
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1. Policy Language Candidates
The framework including its ASPL do not support any security policy lan-
guage by default. Security policy languages must be introduced to the frame-
work gradually and in a controlled manner. On the other hand, a wide range
of security policy languages are available to choose from [24], which makes
it almost impossible to cover them all in a single project. Therefore, a hand-
ful number of security policy languages must be selected instead. As a result,
the ways that security policy languages can be classified into different cate-
gories must be identified. A policy language candidate must then be selected
from each individual group which represents the characteristics of that spe-
cific set. The result of this step will be a set of security policy language
candidates that will be input into the next step. These activities will be de-
scribed and performed in detail in Chapter 4.
2. Algebra Candidates
Logically, the most appropriate way to translate many-to-many languages is
to translate them to and from an abstract language. ASPL for instance, acts
as an abstract language which makes the security policy languages interop-
erable. Algebra is chosen as the abstract framework, whilst on the subject to
theoretically prove transformation of security policy languages is achievable.
Therefore, the research must identify and utilise an appropriate algebra for
security policy languages.
The algebra selected should be capable of expressing different scenarios
written in possibly heterogeneous policy languages. Hence, a few scenarios
should be evaluated against the chosen policy language candidates (step1).
Finally, research should identify any existing weakness of the selected alge-
bra and formulate a solution to address that accordingly. Chapter 5 describes
the steps that have been taken to choose, evaluate and enhance an algebra.
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B) Experimental Tests
The framework has to be tested by real users and their interaction with the sys-
tem has to be observed. In order to achieve the goal, the following steps have to
be taken respectively:
1. Framework Design The framework has to be designed in accordance with
the software development best practices governed by an appropriate software
development methodology. Every decision taken during this step has to be
justified and mapped to the framework’s requirements or software develop-
ment best practice. Chapter 6 describes design of the framework in detail.
2. Framework Implementation and Evaluation Prototyping of the frame-
work is considered as the next step. Implementation of the prototype should
also be governed by an appropriate software development methodology. The
result of implementation phase that represents the framework with limited
functions and features will be tested by real users. Their feedback will be
captured and used to enhanced the framework accordingly.
The road-map of the research is illustrated in Figure 3.4.
3.5 Summary
3.5.1 Chapter Summary
In this chapter, the requirements of the framework surveyed and analysed. By
analysing the requirements of the framework the blueprint of the framework was
drawn. Then different components of the proposed architecture is explored in de-
tails.
In addition to the proposed design, the abstract language of the framework,
ASPL, have been introduced. Few simple policies that are supported by ASPL
are presented and explained in detail. Finally, road-map of the research, including
steps that will be taken at each stage is presented and explained.
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Figure 3.4: The Road-map of this Research
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3.5.2 Research Contributions of the Chapter
Due to the non-existence of an interoperability framework for security policy lan-
guages, gathering up the requirements for such a framework is considered as a chal-
lenging task. In this chapter, it has been shown how in such circumstances these
information can be captured by utilising surveys and interviews. Also, it has been
detailed how different level of expertise provided by different set of specialists in
different areas can be used to obtain the framework’s requirements.
In addition, the architectural view of the framework which is considered as the
main contribution of the research, proposed and each components of the design is
explained in details. One of the main components of the framework is its abstract
security policy languages, ASPL, which is explained in this chapter.
As stated before, policy languages come with different levels of formalism, ex-
pressiveness and functionality to address different business usage and demands.
Variation of security policy languages makes it almost impossible to be able to de-
sign and develop a framework that satisfies all security policy languages. Thus, the
first step in the present approach to theoretically prove the translation of security
policy languages would be to select a subset of available security policy languages.
Indeed, the best and most logical way to categorise and select this candidate subset
would be to compare these languages in detail. In the next chapter, the way that
was considered for comparing security policy languages and how security policy
language candidates were selected for this research will be described.
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Security Policy Languages
In this chapter, the research presents:
• The necessity of comparison of security policy languages,
• A literature review of comparisons made of security policy languages,
• Requirements for choosing security policy languages,
• The overview of selected security policy languages for the research,
• The research contributions of the chapter.
4.1 Comparison of Security Policy Languages
Due to the availability of broad range of security policy languages, somehow we
need to narrow them down to a specific set and continue our research against those
security policy language candidates. No doubt the most logical way to be able to
choose an appropriate set of security policy language is to compare them in detail.
Although variation of these security policy languages in terms of formalism,
expressiveness, functionality etc., can be considered as their advantages, the bound-
aries between these languages are neither black and white nor crystal clear. Hence,
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security policy languages often overlap with each other. Usually, newly introduced
policy languages are intended to address issues that were identified previously,
in addition to expanding their comprehensive coverage within the security arena.
This makes choosing the right and correct security policy language for a particular
project an even more challenging task.
As a result, policy languages have occasionally been compared from time to
time by researchers. The main goal of these comparison reports is to typically
compare the abilities of different policy languages for the work of other research.
These comparison reports of security policy languages often help network architects
to customise their security infrastructures and choose the correct security policy
language.
What really must be borne in mind is that these comparisons have often focused
on a small number of policy languages in order to be able to provide their readers
with a precise and clear answer. That, in turn, has produced a number of security
policy languages comparisons over the last decade or so. Knowing that the IT in-
dustry is continuously evolving at a rapid pace, these reports are usually outdated
quickly as time goes by. From the number of surveys regarding security policy
languages reviewed in this research, the following reports, which compared these
languages from different perspectives have been utilised.
4.1.1 Requirement-Based Comparison
Seamons et al. focused on policy languages with trust negotiation capability in
[139]. As it appears from the report’s title, Requirement for Policy Languages for
Trust Negotiations, the paper is dedicated to comparison of security policy lan-
guages with trust negotiation capability but before they conduct the comparison,
Seamons et al. clearly defined the requirements of security policy languages in
general terms. This clear definition has been used by other researchers over time
and has had an impact on other researches.
In a nutshell, Seamons et al. defined the requirements for security policy lan-
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guages with trust negotiation capability as follows:
• Well-Defined Semantics: That requires the language to be simple and com-
pact with mathematically defined semantics such as: logic programs and re-
lational algebra. In their definition, a well-defined semantic policy language
should be able to express security policies independent of any particular im-
plementation feature of that language.
• Monotonicity: Monotonicity of a security policy language is implied if two
parties in a trust negotiation process succeed in achieving trust, then addi-
tional disclosure by either party should not have any impact on the trust ne-
gotiation decision.
• Credential Combinations: A security policy language with trust negotiation
capability must allow policy writers to require submission of combinations of
credentials using conjunction and disjunction.
• Constraints on Attribute Values: A security policy language should allow
policy writers to constrain submitted credentials to have a certain type and
restrict the values of any other attribute.
• Credential Chains: A policy language must provide enough expressive power
to describe and constrain chains of credentials to its users.
• Transitive Closure: Policy languages with trust negotiation capability should
allow users to define trust to be transitive under certain circumstances.
• External Functions: Policy languages should utilise well-defined external
functions for operation and comparison (e.g. Date).
• Authentication: An authentication requirement means that at runtime, the
credential submitter will have to demonstrate knowledge of the private key
associated with a public key referred to in the credential exchange process
[139].
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Following the definition of requirements for security policy languages for trust
negotiation, the report compared four policy languages with trust management ca-
pability, namely: PSPL [54], TPL [100], X-Sec [49] and KeyNote [51]. The report
then challenges each of the above mentioned policy languages against the require-
ments that it defined and presented.
Uniqueness and Areas for Improvements
Seamons et al. presented their research more than a decade ago. Knowing the
fact that the computer science is evolving at a rapid pace, most of the languages
that the report compared and indeed the comparison result itself are now outdated
and cannot be referenced anymore. A more up-to-date set of languages should
be compared using the requirements provided if trust negotiation comparison of
security policy languages is required.
The uniqueness of this report is that it pioneered the comparison of policy lan-
guages by defining the requirement for that comparison first. The paper also assisted
other researchers by clearly defining the requirement for trust negotiations. Inspired
by the Seamons et al. paper, this research will also use a set of tailored requirements
for comparing security policy languages that should work on the framework.
4.1.2 Scenario-Based Comparison
Knowing the fact that identity theft and uncontrolled exposure of sensitive infor-
mation are a growing risk for internet users, Duma et al. decided to challenge the
usefulness of security policy languages against these risks [76].
The ideology of the report is based on scenarios. To be more precise, in order
to compare policy languages, the report defines a set of criteria. Following this, for
each individual criterion which emerges from real user needs, the report presents a
scenario to evaluate the language. If the scenario can be expressed and encoded in
a language, then the language fulfils the corresponding criterion.
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The report compares six policy languages, namely: Protune [53], Rei [107],
Trust-X [33], KeyNote [51], Ponder [67] and APPEL [65]. The scenarios it uses for
evaluation are as follows:
• Minimal Information Disclosure: Objects that are least sensitive will be
selected first for disclosure.
• Mutual Exclusiveness: Control the concurrent release of data objects that
might be sensitive together.
• Type of Classification: Make sensitive objects known and express hierar-
chies of sensitive objects, semantic equivalence, relationships and more.
• Granularity of Objects: Express the granularity of sensitive objects.
• Access Control: Control to whom sensitive objects are released.
• Sensitive Policies: Control the release of policies that might themselves be
sensitive.
• Push Control: Address deadlocks due to sensitive policies that cannot be
released.
• Usage Control: Control how data should be handled by the receiving party.
At the end, the report provides a table that illustrates what each security policy
language is capable of with regards to expressing and coding each specific scenar-
ios. The result is presented in Table 3.1.
Uniqueness and Areas for Improvements
Very similar to Seamons et al., Duma et al. pioneered comparison of security poli-
cies languages by providing a set of scenario as oppose to characteristics of security
policy languages. This point of view on the comparison of policy languages makes
this report unique in its category. In fact this research also inspired by the Duma et
al. paper.
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Table 4.1: Comparison of Security Policy Languages [76]
Having said that it has been noted that one key scenario that this report fails
to evaluate is the capability of negotiation with the third parties. Negotiation is
provided by almost all modern security policy languages and should have been in-
cluded in paper’s criteria. It will be described in the next chapter that one the areas
that this research is going to cover, is negotiation.
4.1.3 Criteria-Based Comparison
De Coi et al. claimed that with their detailed and board comparison, users of se-
curity policy languages would be able to choose a correct language for their needs
[62] . To achieve this goal they rigorously analysed and compared twelve policy
languages in details over three years, with the report being concluded in 2008. The
first criterion that they considered was that the language selected must be popular
and widely used within the industry. Then they described the strongest point of each
individual policy languages and the reason why it became popular amongst secu-
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rity policy language users. The languages that they reviewed were: Cassandra [45],
EPAL [42], KAoS [148], PeerTrust [92], Ponder [67], Protune [53], PSPL [54], Rei
[107], RT [115], TPL [100], WSPL [32] and XACML [119]. De Coi et al. then
evaluated these languages by comparing two sets of criteria, namely: core policy
properties and contextual properties.
Basically, the core policy properties that have been inherited from Seamons et
al. report [139] are used to challenge a security policy language theoretically. Core
policy properties are themselves divided into four different sub-properties, the first
two of which are exactly borrowed from Seamons et al. (as stated above). The full
list of these sub-properties can be presented as follows:
• Well-Defined Semantic: The same definition as presented in Section 3.1.1,
is used here.
• Monotonicity:The same definition as presented in Section 3.1.1, is used here.
• Condition Expressiveness: A policy language must allow specification of
under which conditions the request of the user should be accomplished.
• Underlying Formalism: A good security policy language should be based
upon a well-known underlying formalism. Knowledge about the formalism
of a language would help users to understand some basic features of the lan-
guage itself.
The second set of properties called contextual properties challenges the practi-
cality of each language in details. Contextual properties are divided into 8 properties
defined below:
• Action Execution: This criterion evaluates whether a language allows the
policy writer to specify actions within a policy.
• Delegation: If a language allows policy writers to temporary delegate its
rights (mainly access rights) to others, then that security policy language ful-
fils this criterion. This criterion also challenges the chain of delegation.
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• Type of Evaluation: Languages that do not support negotiation only support
local evaluation, whereas, languages with negotiation capability support dis-
tributed evaluation (supposedly each party involved in the negotiation would
be equally entitled to break the negotiation). This property determines the
type of evaluation each security policy language support.
• Evidences: Credentials electronically signed by third parties are referred to
as evidences in this report. Determining whether a policy language is capable
of providing evidences is the main goal of this property.
• Negotiation Support: The name of the property speaks for itself. Whether a
security policy language supports negotiation is evaluated by this criterion.
• Policy Engine Decision: Although logically the decision in response to a
request can be a simple boolean object, some policy languages are capable of
providing more information to the requester, in the event that their requests
are denied by the policy. The ability to provide such an information to the
requester would be determined by this property.
• Extensibility: Extensibility is another property that speaks for itself, yet not
practically easy to determine. Almost all languages compared provide their
users with a level of extensibility.
The uniqueness of this comparison is that it has independently compared a wide
range of policy languages with different levels of expressiveness and provides a
clear view of the abilities of these languages in one go. The result of this comparison
has been provided in Appendix B.
4.1.4 More Comparison of Security Policy Languages
In addition to the above, the following comparison reports have also been studied
and reviewed as part of this research. They have been described briefly as follows:
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• A Comparison of Two Privacy Policy Languages: EPAL and XACML
[39]: This report aims to compare two industry standard security policy lan-
guages: EPAL and XACML. The report provides an in-depth comparison
these two policy languages instead of paying attention to other available secu-
rity policy languages including those that are widely accepted in the industry.
• A Survey of Privacy Policy Languages[112]: This report compared a wide
range of security policy languages (or privacy policy languages as it is termed
therein). Unlike the previous report, it tries to compare more than a dozen
languages but it fails to clearly describe how the authors have arrived at the
concluded result. They claimed to have developed a framework for compari-
son of the languages in question but, the report fails to show any information
about the framework.
• Survey on XML-Based Policy Languages for Open Environments [34]
Compared to the two surveys above, this report can be described as very well
presented, organised and provides extensive comparisons. As the name of the
report suggests, it only focuses on XML-based policy languages. The report
compares X-Author, FASTER, XACL, XACML and SPL, and satisfactorily
describes each language. In some cases, it also describes the infrastructure
and model of languages in detail, then compares these languages extensively
in 22 different categories. Without a doubt, this is a very interesting survey
and can be compared with the report from Duma et al. Its only shortcoming
with respect to the present research was that it only focuses on XML-based
security policy languages.
4.2 Requirements for Choosing Security Policy Lan-
guages
As noted above, policy languages can be evaluated and classified from different
perspectives, for instance, policies with or without negotiation capabilities or poli-
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cies with different types of evaluation, i.e. local or distributed. A wide range of
comparison reports that look at security policy languages from a different point of
view have been examined throughout this present research. Although each of these
reports were encouraging, not a single report that can be easily fitted within the
context of this research and allow choice of the desired security policy language
candidates could be found. As a result, these comparison reports were rigorously
reviewed over and over again. Then characteristics of each report were identified
in order to be used to generate ideas on how to develop a method of comparison,
which has been tailored for this research.
4.2.1 Blending All the Methods Together
Encouraged by the requirement-based comparison i.e. the Seamons et al. paper
[139], that presented readers with its own requirement for the comparison, it was
decided that the present research would have its own requirements for choosing the
security policy language candidates. The requirements must be an amalgamation of
characteristics of each comparisons reviewed by the research. The requirement that
were selected, in addition to the requirements already presented by other reports,
are described as follows:
• Underlying Formalism: As discussed in chapter 2, the research of Clemente
et al. [61] did not pay attention to the formalism of the languages they focused
on. It is intended to improve on that area with this research, hence, the policies
that will be chosen will preferably have strong underlying formalism.
• Well-Defined Implementation: As an overview of the design suggested
(please refer to chapter 3), policy language generators will be developed in
a way to directly communicate with the framework. That implies security
policy languages with a proper implementation will have a better chance to
smoothly bind with the framework and even make evaluation much easier.
• Rich Documentation: Unfortunately, not all security policy languages come
with rich and extensive documentation. Understanding the way that policy
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languages candidates work is vital to this project, hence, they should provide
users with good amount and quality of proper documentation.
• Programming Language Friendly: Being more comfortable with Java-based
policy languages and taking into account that communication with these lan-
guages at low-level will at some point be necessary, then policy languages
that are considered Java-friendly security policy languages will have priority.
• Widely Used and Accepted:The proposed framework will hopefully be the
forerunner for the use of a standard and unique security policy language by
security policy language users. If those security policy languages that are
widely used by different levels of users are targeted, the chance to promote
this framework will be better.
By applying the above defined requirements, a set of policy languages have been
shortlisted. In the next step, the requirement definition was improved by merging
the report from Decoi et al. [62] with that of Duma et al. [76] as follows:
A) From Decoi et al. a short list of those policy languages that can cover more sce-
narios was taken, bearing in mind that less featured policy languages can cover
only certain (and probably less complicated) scenarios. That in turn implies if
languages with more features are chosen and can operate over the framework,
then most probably security policy languages with less features would also be
able to use the framework.
B) From Duma et al., security policy languages with different properties were se-
lected to mix and match accordingly. For instance, if one policy language with
distributed evaluation type was selected, then one policy language with local
type of evaluation would also be chosen. This approach would guarantee the
selection of wide range of properties to work over the framework.
The top level classification that was presented by Duma et al. was adopted. It
is believed that the top level classification of policy languages, as described in their
report and which is restated here, perfectly fits within the context of this research.
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“ Policy languages are classified in three group of Standard-Oriented, Research-
Oriented or In-Between of these two mentioned groups. Standard-Oriented pol-
icy languages are well defined and widely shared within the industry. However,
they come with restricted/minimal set of features. Research-Oriented policy lan-
guages are popular amongst academics. They usually provide advance features to
their users and go beyond the boundaries that have been put in place by standard-
oriented policy languages. There is also another group of policy languages that
are neither sufficiently advanced nor fully compatible with standardisation rules to
be considered in either of the above mentioned categories. These languages are
grouped in the third category called in between.” [76]
Taking all of the above requirements and properties into account and by extend-
ing the top-level classification of Dumas et al., XACML from the Standard-Oriented
group, Ponder from the In-Between group and Protune from the Research-Oriented
group were selected for further analysis and classification.
4.3 Overview of the Selected Policy Languages
In this section, the selected policy languages will be briefly examined in order to
become more familiar with their characteristics.
4.3.1 XACML
XACML stands for eXtensible Access Control Markup Language. The standard
defines a declarative access control policy language implemented in XML and a
processing model describing how to evaluate access requests according to the rules
defined in policies.
As a published standard specification, one of the goals of XACML is to promote
common terminology and interoperability between access control implementations
by multiple vendors. XACML is primarily an Attribute Based Access Control sys-
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tem, where attributes associated with a user or action or resource are inputs into
the decision of whether a given user may access a given resource in a particular
way. Role Base Access Contorl(RBAC) can also be implemented in XACML as a
specialisation of Attribute Based Access Control [22].
Structure of Elements
XACML is structured into 3 levels of elements
• PolicySet,
• Policy,
• Rule.
A PolicySet can contain any number of Policy elements and PolicySet elements.
A Policy, in turn, can contain any number of Rule elements.
Attributes & Categories
Policies, policy sets, rules and requests all use subjects, resources, environments
and actions.
• A Subject element is the entity requesting access. A subject has one or more
Attributes.
• The Resource element is a data, service or system component. A Resource
has one or more Attributes.
• An Action element defines the type of access requested to the Resource. Ac-
tions also have one or more Attributes.
• An Environment element can optionally provide additional information [22].
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Targets
XACML provides a target, which is basically a set of simplified conditions for the
subject, resource and action that must be met for a PolicySet, Policy or Rule to
apply to a given request. Once a Policy or PolicySet is found to apply to a given
request, its rules are evaluated to determine the access decision and response.
In addition to being a way to check applicability, Target information also pro-
vides a way to index policies, which is useful if there is a need to store many policies
and then quickly shift through them to find which ones apply. Note that a Target
may also specify that it applies to any request. PolicySet, Policy and Rule can all
contain Target elements.
Conditions
Conditions only exist in rules. Conditions are essentially an advanced form of a
Target that can use a broader range of functions and more importantly, can be used
to compare two or more attributes. With conditions, it is possible to implement
segregation of duty checks or relationship-based access control.
Obligations
Within XACML, a concept called obligations can be used. An obligation is a direc-
tive from the Policy Decision Point (PDP) to the Policy Enforcement Point (PEP) on
what must be carried out before or after an access is approved. If the PEP is unable
to comply with the directive, the approved access either may or must not be realised.
The augmentation of obligations eliminates a gap between formal requirements and
policy enforcement.
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4.3.2 Ponder
Ponder was a highly successful policy environment used by many in both indus-
try and academia. Yet its design suffered from some of the same disadvantages
as existing policy-based frameworks. Their designs were dependent on centralised
infrastructure support such as: LDAP directories and CIM repositories. The de-
ployment model was often based on centralised provisioning and decision-making.
Therefore, they did not offer the means for policy execution components to interact
with each other, collaborate or federate into larger structures. Policy specification
was seen as an off-line activity and policy frameworks did not allow them to interact
easily with the managed systems. Consequently, such frameworks were difficult to
install, run and experiment with. Additionally, they usually did not scale to smaller
devices as is needed in pervasive systems. As a result, a new version of the frame-
work came into life: Ponder2.
Ponder2 comprises of self-contained, stand-alone, general-purpose object man-
agement system with message passing between the objects. It incorporates an
awareness of events and policies and implements a policy execution framework.
It has a high-level configuration and control language called PonderTalk and user-
extensible managed objects are programmed in Java.
The design and implementation of Ponder2 has been aimed to achieve the fol-
lowing goals:
• Simplicity: The design of the system should be as simple as possible and
incorporate a few built-in elements also if possible.
• Extensibility: It should be possible to dynamically extend the policy environ-
ment with new functionalities, to interface with new infrastructure services
and to manage new resources.
• Self-Containment: The policy environment should not rely on the existence
of infrastructure services and should contain everything necessary to apply
policies to managed-resources.
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• Ease-of-use: The environment must facilitate the use of policies in new envi-
ronments and prototyping of new policy systems for different applications.
• Interactivity: It must be possible for managers and developers to simply in-
teract with the policy environment and the managed objects, issue commands
to the managed objects and create new policies.
• Scalability: The policy environment must be executable on constrained re-
sources such as: PDAs and mobile phones as well as for more traditional
distributed systems’ management.
Ponder2 can interact with other software and hardware components and is being
used in environments ranging from single devices, to personal area networks, ad-
hoc networks and distributed systems. Ponder2 is configured and controlled using
PonderTalk, a high-level, object orientated language.
Ponder2 implements a Self-Managed Cell (SMC). Management services inter-
act with each other through asynchronous events propagated through a content-
based event bus. Policies provide local closed-loop adaptation, managed objects
generate events, policies respond and perform management activities on the same
set of managed objects. Everything in Ponder2 is a Managed Object. The basic
Ponder2 system comprises: Event Types, Policies, Domains and External Managed
Objects. It is up to the user to create or reuse Managed Objects for other purposes.
[79].
4.3.3 Protune
Protune, has a rich set of unique features that are currently not supported by any
other standard systems and languages. Some of these features can be individually
found in some systems (which are sometimes research prototypes).
An overview of this language can be presented as follows:
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• Flexibility Without Program Coding: Protune policies can express a variety
of static and dynamic requirements without requiring ad-hoc program code.
It supports attribute based access control where attribute values may be ex-
tracted from different kinds of evidence at different strength and deployment
cost. Protune’s software interprets the given policies and activates the right
procedures for gathering the required kind of evidence.
Protune’s policies may enforce simple obligations by linking some logical
pre-conditions (such as - event logged) to actions (implementing event log-
ging, notifications, etc.) that make the corresponding pre-condition true. Poli-
cies can declaratively specify when actions are to be executed and which are
the peers in charge of their execution. Actions can also be implemented as
shell scripts or Java method calls. Changing the policy does not necessarily
imply re-implementing actions. Actions provide also an effective integration
method for legacy software and data.
• User Awareness and Documentation: Proper policy documentation is es-
sential to raise user trust in a system. In fact, that was one of the require-
ments chosen for selecting the security policy language candidates. Having
said that, handwritten documentation is obviously very expensive, especially
as policies evolve along over time and the risk of documentation not being
aligned with the currently enforced policy becomes higher and higher during
a systems life.
Protune’s framework comprises: Protune-X, a unique second-generation ex-
planation facility that presents policies and explains access control decisions
in natural language. Since explanations are automatically derived from the ex-
ecutable policy: (i) costs are reduced, (ii) documentation is always up-to-date,
(iii) explanations can be contextualised specifically to the current transaction.
In addition to the above, Protune comes supplied with a rich level of docu-
mentation that describes how to write and use Protune policies in details.
• Policy Confidentiality: Documentation needs and co-operative enforcement
require policies to be accessible. This should be done with care, as poli-
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cies themselves may be confidential. Protune allows policy writers to assign
sensitivity levels to policy rules and predicates and restricts policy release
appropriately.
• Access Control and Usability: Policies are application-domain dependent
and so are the predicates in access control conditions. In standard frame-
works, the context is a black-box and application-specific terms are not stated
in a machine-understandable way. This prevents any support to information
exchange during authentication phases: users have to be involved because
the server cannot specify its credential requests directly to user agents. In
Protune, interoperability is enhanced by the means of a lightweight ontol-
ogy that can specify in a machine-understandable way what it means to be
authenticated to a specific system, what are the accepted credit cards, which
resources are public and so on. This enables automated support to access con-
trol procedures.This approach may significantly improve a user’s navigation
experience and harmonise usability requirements with strong and articulated
access control requirements.
• Privacy and Usability: Before using a service for the first time, a user
may wish to inspect the service’s certifications. Today, this must necessar-
ily be done manually. Protune supports this process by letting user agents
ask servers for certificates and other forms of evidence . The semantic infras-
tructure for interoperability mentioned above is well suited for automating
this task, too. Moreover, Protune enhances user privacy by supporting in-
formation release policies on the clients. The most common decisions about
releasing sensitive pieces of information (be they credentials, unsigned dec-
larations, or whatever) can be specified once and for all as a policy that the
user agent can automatically apply, thereby improving the users’ navigation
experience without sacrificing privacy.
• Low Deployment and Maintenance Costs: Protune has been designed to
reduce the cost of deployment in new application domains and subsequent
maintenance. By minimising program coding and exploiting knowledge-
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based techniques to automate a wide range of operations, the costs related
to instantiating Protune’s framework in a new domain, and the costs related
to writing and maintaining policies are significantly reduced.
4.4 Summary
4.4.1 Chapter Summary
Due to the fact that there are a wide range of security policy languages available
and taking into account that each individual security policy language would require
its users to go through a learning curve, it was essential just to select a sample set
of these security policy languages.
In order to have a better understanding of security policy languages and perhaps
defining and/or borrowing a set of requirements for the policy language candidates
in this research, it was decided to rigorously compare and review these security
policy languages. Hence, a number of existing comparison and literature review
reports were examined, and that in turn, led to a choice of an appropriate candidate
set of security policy languages. Finally, the three policy languages that were cho-
sen were briefly examined in order to be more familiar with the features that these
languages provide.
4.4.2 Research Contributions of the Chapter
Despite the fact that a number of review and comparison reports for security policy
languages exist, choosing a suitable report that perfectly fits within the context of
this research was not a trivial exercise. In this chapter, different comparison of
security policy languages were analysed to great details. Then by cross referencing
these comparison reports with each other the uniqueness of each individual report
was highlighted.
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In addition, encouraged by these reports, research, developments and compar-
isons, a specific requirement set for security policy language candidates to choose
from, was produced. How to define the requirements and how to apply them on the
set of security policy languages was shown step-by-step. The requirements set that
was developed, was specifically tailored for the purpose of this research and lead
the project to narrow down the security policy languages to a set of three languages,
namely: Protune, Ponder and XACML.
In the next chapter, algebra for security policy languages in particular will be
examined. It will be reviewed from different perspectives and the chosen one will
be evaluated against the security policy languages selected in this chapter.
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A New Algebra for Security Policy
Languages
In this chapter, the research presents:
• The usefulness of algebra to describe security policies with,
• A literature review of algebra made for security policy languages,
• The chosen algebra for the proposed framework and a step-by-step evaluation
of it,
• The way that the algebra can be expanded,
• The algebra completeness proof,
• The research contributions of the chapter.
5.1 Algebra for Security Policy Languages
Although access control or to be more specific, role-based access control as it is
known in operating systems such as, UNIX, was introduced some time ago, autho-
risation frameworks and policy languages have been significantly enhanced during
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just the last few years. The phenomenon of the internet and the concept of shared
resources have forced security architects to allow different policies to be applied on
a single resource. The assumption that all policies would be written in the same
language and monolithic rule, seemed to be sufficient initially. However, when a
combination of heterogeneous policies became vital, people realised an indepen-
dent non-trivial combination process, or algebra, for security policy languages had
to be introduced. As a result, a number of security policy language algebras have
been developed during the last decade.
Before describing the algebra for the present research in detail, in the hope of es-
tablishing a common vocabulary, the advantage of using algebra for security policy
languages will be reviewed. These can be shortlisted as follows:
• The algebra, which can also be called the composition framework, describes
policies independent of their implementation. Such a description can be used
to examine the completeness and consistency of policies.
• In addition, formal specification, which also can be called algebra, minimises
the misunderstanding and ambiguity of policies when different parties refer
to the same policy. Such confusion often leads to major security breaches
[116].
• Also, the composition framework can be used for the decentralisation of
policy descriptions where complicated and sophisticated policies are broken
down into smaller manageable and/or heterogeneous policies [151].
• A compositional framework facilitates reuse of policies that are well specified
and known to be error-free.
• In the context of this research, the policy algebra, formal specification of pol-
icy or composition framework will be used to describe policies on an abstract
level.
Considering the advantages of using algebra in conjunction with security poli-
cies as stated above, it was almost obvious from the beginning that using algebra
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in the present research is inevitable. Accordingly, a number of algebra for security
policy language have been reviewed, as listed below.
5.1.1 An Algebra for Composing Access Control Policies
Piero Bonatti is the foremost practitioner of security policy languages. No rep-
utable paper or book in relation of security policy languages can be found without
reference to Bonatti’s publications.
Bonatti, Vimercati and Samarati came up with the first algebra for modern pol-
icy languages in 2002 [52]. Their paper, which is very well organised, begins by
describing the characteristics of the composition framework, i.e. the Algebra. This
definition is used in almost all other papers. It would, therefore, be beneficial to
briefly review these characteristics from this paper.
In their definition, the algebra for security policy languages must provide:
• Support of Heterogeneous Policy Languages: The algebra as an abstract
combination mechanism should be able to express policies defined and en-
forced by different security policy languages.
• Support for Unknown Policies: In their paper, Bonnati et al. refer to this
property as Template. Templates are used to describe policies that are not
known at the time a security policy is written. For an example, one can think
of a policy that allows access of a user to a certain part of an application based
on date and time. These values, i.e. the parts of the application to be accessed,
the date and time of the request are not known until run-time. Templates are
used to describe such a scenario at an abstract level.
• Expressiveness: The algebra should be able to describe and express a wide
range of policy combinations independently.
• Support of Different Abstraction Levels: The composition language should
highlight the different components and their interplay at different levels of
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abstraction.
• Formal Semantics: The composition language i.e. algebra, should be declar-
ative, implementation independent and based on a solid formal framework.
• Controlled Interference: Algebra cannot be simply used to combine poli-
cies. The algebra should also be used as a mechanism to detect and prevent
conflicts.
Following the definition of algebra characteristics, Bonnati et al. provided the
preliminary concepts. In their definition, widely accepted and used by following
researches, a Policy is a set of ground rules (or variable free) triples of Subject,
Object and Action. The paper details policy expressions by presenting the algebra’s
functions and minimal operators that it needs to express policies. These operators,
which are described in detail, are: Addition, Conjunction, Subtraction, Closure,
Scoping Restriction, Overriding and Template. One of the characteristics of this
paper, apart from being the first paper that presented algebra for modern security
policy languages, is the definition of Template, which presents a partial evaluation
of policies. Although, the concept of templates is criticised by subsequent papers,
most contemporary algebras introduced afterwards had no choice but to use the
concept of Template in their definitions.
The paper then continues by providing a few real word scenarios and tries to
express them using the defined algebra. It then proves that the provided algebra as
defined and enhanced throughout the paper is complete (with respect to the opera-
tions as detailed above). The only criticism applicable to the presented framework
is that it explicitly does not support expressing policies with negative authorisation
[151][131]. Although they have tried to overcome this limitation by expressing the
policy using the subtract operator, this violates the abstraction of policy languages
[151].
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5.1.2 A Propositional Policy Algebra for Access Control
Shortly after Bonatti presented their algebra for security policy languages, Wije-
sekera et al. published their framework, which was effectively an extension of the
former framework [151]. In their definition, policies are relations as opposed to
functions and they non-deterministically transform permission sets assigned to the
subjects. Permission in their definition is determined by ordered actions allowed on
an object (object,± actions) and permission sets is a set of permissions. Transform-
ing permission sets to permission sets using policies is the main difference between
what they have provided and what Bonatti presented, which transforms permissions
to permissions. In their justification, Wijesekera et al. believed that using collection
of permissions allows authors to model different non-deterministic, incomplete and
inconsistent policies.
5.2 An Algebra for Fine-Grained Integration of Se-
curity Policies
Having reviewed a few algebras for security policy languages, the conclusion was
reached that the algebra introduced by Rao et al. [131] could be an appropriate
choice for this research by providing the following facts:
• Enhanced Algebra: The Algebra that is provided by the Rao et al. paper
was proposed recently, hence, it addresses issues that have been raised against
previous algebra. That also implies the algebra can cover even more security
policy languages.
• Simplicity: Mathematics and algebra to be specific often are labelled as dif-
ficult subjects. Providing simple yet effective algebra will encourage readers
and future researchers in this field. Having the above-mentioned fact in mind
it has been noted despite extensive operators and semantics that have been
provided by the algebra, it is presented in an easily readable manner.
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• Implementation: Out of all other algebras reviewed by this research, the
algebra that is provided by the Rao et al. paper is the only one that suggests
how the algebra can be implemented by a security policy language thus, the
algebra would have a better chance to be extended in order to cover all the
security policy languages that were selected in the previous section.
The algebra is first reviewed in detail and then evaluated against the languages
that were selected in the previous chapter.
5.2.1 Policy Semantics
Rao et al. have presented a simple, yet powerful, algorithm to describe XACML
policy languages in [131]. This was later extended by Zhao et al. in [155].
In their notation, a that characterises an object, subject or an environment is a
finite set of names. In the same sense, a domain defines a set of possible values for
a and is denoted by dom(a). Taking these notations into account a request is defined
as follow:
Definition 1: Let a1,a2, ...,ak be attribute names and let vi ∈ dom(ai)(1< i< k)
then r described as r ≡ {(a1,v1),(a2,v2), ,(ak,vk)} is an access request.
Using the above definition, an request allowing a PhD student to access digital
library without restriction could be described as:
r ≡ {(user, PhD student),(act, access digital library ),(time restriction, NO)}.
Assuming system denotes the field where all these entities (e.g. subjects, actions
etc.) co-exist in, then the state of system is defined as below:
Definition 2: Let S be the set of subjects, T be the set of targets, E be the set of
event triggers and C be the set of conditional constraints. Then, the system state is
defined as: ST =E×C×S×T . This definition allows a system state to be described
as: st = st(e,c,s, t) consisting of an event trigger e ∈ E, the conditional constraint
c ∈C, subject s ∈ S and target t ∈ T .
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In another word, the state of the environment is an entity that captures all the de-
tails that require certain action to be executed on a target by a subject. The previous
example could be expanded by adding more restrictions to the request as follows:
r ≡ {(user, PhD student),(source, digital library ),(time restriction, yes), (access
hours, universitys working hours), (download restriction, yes)(download per day, 5
papers)}.
Hence, the state of the environment will be determined not only based on the
subject (PhD student) and target (access to digital library) but also by taking condi-
tional constraints (time of the request) and triggers (the total number of downloads).
There are few concepts which have to be introduced before the next definition
is presented, namely: Authorisation Policies and Obligation Policies. Authorisation
policies determine whether a specific request is permitted under given conditions
and circumstances. Whereas, obligation policies define whether certain action(s)
have to be taken place assuming that specific conditions are met and fulfilled. For
example, an authorisation policy could determine whether an employee is permitted
to use certain part of a company’s system, for instance, finance system. However,
obligation policies define IF an employee is authorised to use the finance system,
then certain information has to be captured and stored for further references e.g.
time and date that the employee logged-in and perhaps the areas that he/she visited.
As it appears from the given example, the obligation policies will be executed when
the corresponding authorisation policies are fulfilled.
Both decisions are taken by authorisation policy that is denoted by da and deci-
sion taken by obligation policies denoted by do can only have one distinctive value
which will be selected from the set of {Y,N,NA}. These values present the deci-
sion made by a policy that are permitted (Y), denied (N) or not applicable (NA)
respectively. Taking these concepts into account, the security policy is defined as:
Definition 3: A security policy is defined as a request evaluation function
P : ST × A→ D , where ST is the set of system states, A represents a finite set
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of actions and D denotes the set of decision tuple for authorisation and obligation
associated with: P(Da,Do) = {(Y,Y ),(Y,NA),(N,NA),(NA,NA)}.
The function P takes a system state st ∈ ST and an action a ∈ A as input and
returns a decision tuple (da,do) determining whether a is authorised and obliged to
execute in state st. As it is obvious from the decision tuple set provided in the above
definition, the authorisation and obligation decisions support three values namely:
Y, N and NA. However, a close examination of decision tuple shows the decision set
does not include: (N,Y),(NA,Y). The reason is the obligation policies only satisfy
when the corresponding authorisation policies are satisfied in the same state of the
system.
5.2.2 Policy Constants
The policy constants that have been defined for algebra can be presented as :
Definition 4: A Permit Policy is defined as : P+ : ST ×A→ (Y,NA). P+ permits
all requests in at any state of system without considering any obligations.
Definition 5: A Deny Policy is defined as P− : ST ×A→ (N,NA). P− denies all
requests in any state of system without considering any obligations.
5.2.3 Operators Applied to Policies
In addition, assuming P1(st, a) and P2(st,a) are two policies that are going to be
combined using algebra operators and assuming Pi denotes the integrated policy. In
order to illustrates the effect of integration of different policy operators, a combina-
tion matrix will be used. On the combination matrix, the first row and column of
the matrix denotes the possible values for each policy with regards to st and a and
the rest of the cells shows the value of integrated policy at different states of the
system. Whilst on the subject, it is also assumed that Y > NA, N > NA , as both Y
and N provide more information about a request than NA.
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Taking the above definitions and assumptions into account, algebra basic oper-
ators can be presented as:
Addition (+): Integrated policy Pi would be union of P1 and P2. In other words,
Pi authorises requests which are permitted by either of policies and denies requests
which are denied by both policies. Taking the above definition into account, PI(st,a)
will be denoted as : PI(st,a) = P1(st,a)+P2(st,a). A corresponding combination
matrix for the operator has been presented in Table 5.1.
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Table 5.1: Policy Combination Matrix for Addition Operator (+)
The above table shows how operator (+) takes authorisation and obligation val-
ues and provides with the decision. Each row and column of the table denotes the
effect of P1 and P2 respectively with respect to the request r.
Intersection (&): GivenP1 and P2, PI is defined as the intersection of these
two policies, if PI returns the same decision that is agreed by two policies. More
precisely : PI(st,a) = P1(st,a)&P2(st,a).
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Table 5.2: Policy Combination Matrix for Intersection Operator (&)
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Negation ( ¬a , ¬o): ¬P1(st,a), returns PI which effectively denies and/or per-
mits every requests P1 permits and/or denies. Operator ¬a negates the result of
the evaluation of an authorisation request. It does not change the obligation eval-
uation result. Having said that, negation of ¬aP1(st,a) = {Y,Y} will give the re-
sult P1(st,a) = {N,NA} .The reason is that as per definition 3, the decision set of
{N,Y} is not permitted. Equally ¬o negates evaluation result of obligation policies.
¬o does not change authorisation policies in any case. P1(st,a) = ¬P1(st,a) where
¬ ∈ ¬a,¬o.
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Table 5.3: Policy Combination Matrix for Negation Operator (¬)
Subtraction (-): PI which denotes the result of P1(st,a)−P2(st,a) is defined
as a policy that allows through all the requests that are authorised and obliged by
P1(st,a) and are not applicable by P2(st,a). It is not hard to express the subtraction
operator only using the operators we have covered so far, namely {+,&,¬}. In
other words, PI(st,a) = (P1(st,o)+¬aP2(st,a)) & (P1(st,a)+¬oP2(st,a))
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Table 5.4: Policy Combination Matrix for Subtraction Operator (-)
Projection (Π). Taking into account the fact that the state of an environment is
determined by events, constraints, subjects and targets, as described in Definition 2,
and assuming c is a computable subset of (ST ×A), the projection operator restricts
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the policy P to requests which are satisfied by c. In other words, the projection
operator takes parameter, the domain constraints and restricts the policy only to the
set of requests identified by domain constraint. If the domain constraint are not
satisfied it retains (NA,NA).
PI(st,a)=Π
(da,do)
c(ST×A)(P(st,a))=
 {da,do} if (st,a) ∈ c(ST,A) and P(st,a) = (da,do){NA,NA} otherwise
Perhaps reviewing the following scenario will illustrate the effect of the operator
in more details. With regards to a computable state of an environment an integrated
policy PI(st,a) can return either of the policy decision mentioned before, to be more
precise : PI(Da,Do) = {(Y,Y ),(Y,NA),(N,NA),(NA,NA)}. Now consider a sce-
nario where restriction of the combination of the P1(st,a) and P2(st,a) in a way to
only return back a specific decision (for example (Y,NA)) in the computable state
of the environment is desired. In such circumstances, the projection operator will
be used to restrict the policy as described above.
PI(st,a) =Π
(Y,NA)
c(ST×A)(P1(st,a)&(P2(st,a)) (5.1)
Whilst on the subject, it would be useful to note that the projection operator is
a classic implementation of template that was introduced by Bonatti et. al (please
refer to section 5.1.1).
5.2.4 Expansion of Algebra
Definitions, operators and policy constants as described above would be able to
express the majority of policies combination for a wide range of security policy
languages defined within an environment using a set of ground, i.e. variable free,
authorisation and obligation policies. However, it is often necessary to go beyond
the boundaries of an environment.
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One of the security policy language candidates, i.e. Ponder, comes with nego-
tiation capability. Negotiation, which is a characteristic of relatively new security
policy languages certainly goes beyond the definition of an environment as each
party has no control or visibility of the environment of the other participant in the
negotiation. This characteristic of security policy languages cannot easily be fitted
into algebra as expressed above. Hence, it is necessary to know more about this
distinctive feature and expand the algebra accordingly.
The following example, which is widely shared among security policy lan-
guages with negotiation capabilities, goes beyond the concept of unilateral nego-
tiation as it is known in traditional distributed systems [106] [145]. In this scenario,
Alice, who is a police officer, would like to apply for a free language course through
an online agency. She does not mind providing information as long as it is not cat-
egorised as sensitive information.
• Step 1: Alice submits a request to the agency for access to the free language
course.
• Step 2: The agency replies by requesting that Alice shows a police identifi-
cation number issued by the state police to prove that she is a police officer,
and her driving license to prove that she is living in the same province.
• Step 3: Alice is willing to disclose her driving license to anyone, so she
sends it to the agency. However, she considers her police badge to contain
sensitive information. She negotiates with the agency and indicates that in
order to provide her police identification number, the agency must prove that
it belongs to a certain governing organisation such as, the Better Business
Bureau.
• Step 4: Fortunately, the agency has a Better Business Bureau membership
number. The card contains no sensitive information, so the agency discloses
it to Alice.
• Step 5: Alice now believes that she is safe to disclose her sensitive infor-
mation to the agency and so she provides her identification number to the
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agency.
• Step 6: The agency verifies that the identification number is valid. In addition,
it verifies that Alice lives at the same address as stated on her driving license.
Accordingly, the agency gives Alice a special discount for this transaction
and allows her to sign up free of charge for the course [126].
As is apparent from the above scenario, in simple terms, negotiations can be
divided into a series of steps. A message usually gets exchanged in each step whilst
the state of the negotiation is partially evaluated. Each evaluation leads the negoti-
ation to the next level. Messages that are exchanged at each step could come from
different roots and types. For instance, a message could be a Query message like
”Is Alice entitled to a discounted course if she provides her driving license and her
identification number?” Messages that contain credentials are called Policy Sets. In
the above example, the messages that contain Alices driving license number and
her identification number are among these messages. Messages can simply be de-
scribed as Decision Messages that indicate the end of negotiation, possibly with a
decision [55].
Expressing Negotiations with Algebra
The algebra for security policy languages as it has been described so far is incapable
of expressing the above mentioned scenario, simply because another dimension has
been added to the algebra definition, that being third parties. In the above example,
the agency’s relation with the governing organisation (Better Business Bureau, or
BBB) is simply beyond the visibility and control of Alice. Thus, the described alge-
bra is not capable of formulating the state of the environment as stated in Definition
2. It is, therefore, necessary to slightly expand the definitions to incorporate the
negotiation into it.
Definition 6 (Enhanced version of Definition 2): The state of an environment
is defined as a function that accepts ground (variable-free) and non-ground or more
appropriately, literal states. Assuming Σ denotes the ground literal states and refers
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to the set of literals that are held at the current state of the environment and Ω de-
notes the set of non-ground literal at the same state, an environment state is defined
as: ST : Σ×Ω.
Let S be the set of subjects, T be the set of targets, E be the set of event triggers
and C be the set of conditional constraints. Variable free state is defined as: Σ =
E ×C× S× T. This definition allows the state function to be described as: Σ =
st(e,c,s, t) consisting of an event trigger e ∈ E , the conditional constraint c ∈ C,
subject s ∈ S and target t ∈ T .
Ω on the other hand denotes those elements (and/or entities) that are non-deterministic,
located outside the boundaries of the environment but that would have a direct im-
pact on the state of environment which, in turn, may have its own impact on the
decision made by the policy that is operating at the state.
Taking the above definitions into account definition 3 can now be redefined as
follows:
Definition 7 (Enhanced version of Definition 3): A security policy is defined
as a request evaluation function P : Σ×Ω× A→ D, where Ω denotes the finite
set of non-ground literal, Σ is the set of system states, A represents a finite set of
actions and D denotes the set of decision tuples for authorisation and obligation
associated with: P{Da,Do}= {(Y,Y ),(Y,NA),(N,NA),(NA,NA)}. The function P
takes non-ground literal Ω, an action a and ground state literals Σ (that intuitively
specifies which ground literals must be used) as input and returns a decision tuple
(da,do) determining whether the action is authorised and obliged to execute in the
state of environment. As is obvious from decision tuple set, it does not include
(N,Y),(NA,Y) as the obligation state is satisfied with positive authorisation.
In order to tackle the challenge of providing algebraic expression for policies
that involve in a negotiation, Divide and Concur (DandC) algorithm [68] has been
used. Divide and Concur is widely used in computer science. DandC works by
dividing and breaking down the main problem into two or more sub-problems of
the same type, until these become simple enough to be solved directly [64]. Using
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DandC, a policy involved in a negotiation will be divided into different stages and
instead of dealing with one policy, a series of small and simple policies will be de-
fined for each individual stages of negotiation. Please note each stage of negotiation
will be defined and characterised by ground and non-ground literals defined at that
stage.
In addition to the above redefinitions, another operator must be introduced that
utilises both the sets of ground and non-ground literal states held at any given time.
Assuming that Σ denotes the ground literal and refers to the set of literals which are
held at the current state of environment (triggers, events, conditional constraints),
and Ω denotes the set of non-ground literals (i.e. those literals that are held beyond
boundaries of an environment), the Trace operator for policy languages with negoti-
ation capability that provides partial evaluation with regards to Σ×Ω can be defined
as follows:
Trace (H) : A Trace for policy P, which is a converging and non-ambiguous
process is defined as a set of finite sequence of policies:
Pol0
Σ,Ω→ Pol1 Σ,Ω→ . . . Σ,Ω→ Poln−1 Σ,Ω→ Poln
A Trace is complete if for the last element Poln in the sequence, there exists no
policy Polo such that
Poln
Σ,Ω→ Polo
In simple words, the Trace is complete if unchanged criteria of policy P, denoted
by Poln,Poln−1,Poln−2 . . . (with regards to Σ and Ω ) results in the policy making
the same decision every time.
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Theorem 1:
For all policies P
1. In relation to Σ and Ω policy P has no infinite complete traces.
2. All complete traces of policy P (which are defined as finite sequences of poli-
cies) with an end policy element of Poln with regards to Σ and Ω have the
same final element, that is, policy P’s decision.
Proof:
In order to prove (1) in Theorem 1 the following must be proven simultaneously:
A) Policy P cannot have a complete trace with infinite end elements and
B) Policy P cannot have infinite complete traces with finite sets of end elements.
and the proof:
A) The term complete trace used in the theorem implies that the trace must come
to an end that is, policyn (which denotes the final decision of the Policy P). In
contrast, definition 3 clearly introduces a finite set of decision tuples for any
Policy P. In other words, Policy P cannot have a set of complete traces with an
infinite set of decisions/final elements.
B) Arguably there could be an infinite number of scenarios with a finite number
of final elements. However, using the term in relation to Σ and Ω within the
theorem narrows down the number of scenarios and distinctly specifies which
set of ground and non-ground literals is used.
Taking the above into account, the first part of the theorem proves itself be-
cause based on definition 3, policy P cannot have complete traces with infinite end
elements policyn and at the same time utilising the set of Σ and Ω narrows down
83
5.2. An Algebra for Fine-Grained Integration of Security Policies
the number of scenarios, hence, policy P cannot have infinite complete traces with
regards to Σ and Ω.
In order to prove (2) in Theorem 1, again the terms Σ and Ω are used, which
implies that the second part of the theorem is referring to a specific scenario. To
prove this, one must refer to definition 7, which specifies that the final decision of a
policy is determined by three inputs: Σ×Ω×A→D. In other words, the expression
can be read as: as long as combination of Σ , Ω and A are met, policy P will make
a decision. The way in which the policy collects these inputs (i.e. Σ , Ω and A) has
no effect on the decision that is made.
Considering that Trace is a sequence of policies that individually come to a
decision and considering the fact that the order of evaluating the sub-policies has
no effect on the policy’s decision (with regard to Σ and Ω) proves that different
complete traces must have the same final element.
To make this part of the proof more tangible, consider the above mentioned
scenario in which, Alice asks for a discount on a course. If the ground and non-
ground literals of the environment are kept the same, any alteration to the sequence
of the events does not change the policys decision. In other words, if Alice asks
the agent to disclose their BBB membership number first and then she discloses her
police badge number (and perhaps her driving licence), she would still be eligible
for a discount.
So taking the newly introduced operator Trace and the new definition of the state
of the environment into account the ultimate security policy P which is whether
Alice is eligible for a free language course can be broken into a number of security
policies, each of which has to be evaluated separately. In effect, steps 2 to 5, can
each be described individually as a separate security policy (i.e. operator Trace
now is in use). Each security policies can then be evaluated using the state of the
environment at that time which brings the non-ground variables into the picture.
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5.2.5 Algebra Expressions
In practice, expressing a policy using the proposed algebra requires multiple opera-
tors to be used at the same time, so it is necessary to define an algebraic expression
as follows. An expression consists of a left associative, an operator and a right as-
sociative. Trace has the highest precedence, negation and projection have the same
priority, followed by intersection and addition respectively.
Theorem 2: Assuming P1 = P1(st,a) and P2 = P2(st,a) the algebra expressions
can be described as:
• Community: P1 +P2 = P2 +P1 , P1&P2 = P2&P1
• Associatively: (P1 +P2)+P3 = P1 +(P2 +P3) , (P1&P2)&P3 = P1&(P2&P3)
• Complementary: P+ = ¬aP− , P− = ¬aP+
• Involution: ¬(¬P1) = P1
• Idempotency: P1 +P1 = P1 , P1&P1 = P1
• Distributivity: P1&(P2 + P3) = (P1&P2) + (P1&P3),P1 + (P2&P3) = (P1 +
P2)&(P1 +P3)
Π(P1 +P2) = (ΠP1)+(ΠP2),Π(P1&P2) = (ΠP1)&(ΠP2)
H(P1 +P2) = (HP1)+(HP2), H(P1&P2) = ( HP1)&(HP2)
¬a(P1 +P2) = (¬aP1)+(¬aP2),¬a(P1&P2) = (¬aP1)&(¬aP2)
Proof:
Combination matrix is used to prove this theorem. Following proof shows how
one of these expressions, combination, was approached. The very same approach
can be used to proof other expressions.
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Assuming: P1 = P1(st,a) and P2 = P2(st,a), the effect of P1 + P2 is seen as
follows:
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Table 5.5: Policy Combination Matrix for Expression (P1 +P2)
Now if the operands are changed to read P2+P1 the combination matrix will be:
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Table 5.6: Policy Combination Matrix for Expression (P2 +P1)
Comparing the above two combination matrices simply leads to the conclusion
that the algebraic expression P1 +P2 ≡ P2 +P1 is true.
5.2.6 Algebra Completeness
The algebra completeness utilises the DandC. Hence, before the algebra complete-
ness discussion starts, it is necessary to describe DandC in more details.
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Divide-and-Conquer Algorithm
DandC was briefly explained in previous sections. Now we explain DandC in more
details in order to justify its usage in the research. As it has been mentioned in
the previous section, the divide-and-conquer algorithm provides a way to solve a
problem by:
1. Breaking it into sub-problems that are themselves smaller instances of the
same type of problem.
2. Recursively solving these sub-problems.
3. Appropriately combining their answers.
DandC is widely used within Computer Science. A number of these reasons can
be describes as follows:
• Tackling Complexity: DandC can be considered as a powerful tool that di-
vides a complex problem to manageable sub-problems and solve them ac-
cordingly. As it has been shown in previous section, the complexity of secu-
rity policies can be divided into sub-policies each of which can be dealt with
separately. DandC can be efficiently used with the negotiation policies.
• Implementation Efficiency: Within the concept of DandC, the key point is
to find a way to break the main problem to sub-problems, everything else
can be repeated. This approach can be simply implemented using recursion.
Recursion is very efficient approach using functional languages like Scala.
• Parallelism and Memory Access: Whilst on the DandC implementation sub-
ject, it should be added dividing the problem to separate and independent sub-
problem will allow developers to utilise parallelism in their code. Parallelism
is an interesting subject within the functional programming languages like
Scala.
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The other interesting fact within the implementation subject is the memory
access. Smaller problem produced by the sub-problems, would allow applica-
tion to deal with relatively smaller issues, thus, the problem can be cached and
solved before the system moves to the next one. That is the reason DandC im-
plementation using recursion is usually labelled as a non-memory-intensive
solution within the context of functional programming languages.
Algebra Completeness by Utilising DandC
Having gone through the definition part, it was shown how the algebra and its op-
erators are used to express policy integration, the proposed algebra should now be
challenged for completeness. In other words, the following simple question must be
answered: Is the proposed algebra capable of expressing all possible policy combi-
nations? Or simply, Is this algebra complete? In order to answer this question, start
from two-dimensional combinations matrix in which the algebra is used to combine
two different policies.
How a policy combination matrix could help to demonstrate the results of com-
bination for certain operators has been shown. The same matrix can be used to
show the completeness of the algebra. The matrix consists of 16 cells and each cell
has four potentially different values, namely: {Y,Y},{Y,NA},{N,NA},{NA,NA}.
Hence, the total number of combinations that can be presented by policy combina-
tion matrix is 416 = 4,294,967,296. Taking that into account, as the next step, one
of these possible available matrix combinations is selected and tested to provide the
corresponding algebraic formula for it.
Assume a policy matrix as shown in Table 5.7 has been provided and one would
like to find the corresponding policy expression.
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Table 5.7: A Combination Matrix Example
In order to tackle this challenge, again DandC algorithm has been used. Know-
ing that Pi +P{NA,NA} = Pi , one would be able to divide the given combination
matrix to a number of different sub-matrices. Each individual sub-matrix also would
have 16 cells, but only one {Y,Y} cell at the most.
Before continuing, in order to have common vocabulary, let us label each in-
dividual cells within a cell with a number starting from top left corner to bottom
right one, and assume the corresponding expression for each cell described by
ei,1 ≤ i ≤ 16 . Taking that assumption in mind the table is divided to 16 smaller
table each as one cell that results {Y,Y}. Now it is necessary to find the expression
for each {Y,Y} cell of those individual simple matrices created above by DandC. In
other words, three algebraic expressions have to be found which result {Y,Y} for
e9,e11 and e16.
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Table 5.8: Layout of Expressions Which Result {Y,Y}
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Let’s visualise this approach by considering the following tables. Assume that
the following table have been given where e2 and e11 are two algebric expressions
whose result is not {NA,NA}.
 	 	 

	 	


	 	  	 	

	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	  	
	 	 	 	 	
Table 5.9: A Generic Combination Matrix Example
Using DandC, the matrix can now be divided into two simple matrices and then
an expression found for each of them:
It is obvious that combining the above two tables using the additional operator
(+) would result in the original table. Now if it is known what could possibly result
in a {Y,Y} at the e2 and e11 then it would be simple exercise to provide the answer.
Using the algebra operators that have been defined, the algebraic expression which
results in {Y,Y} at e2 and e11 would be ΠY (P1&¬oP2) and (¬a¬oP1&¬a¬oP2) re-
spectively. Using these two formulae any other possibility of these two cells can be
formulated. Taking that into account and assuming the formula for the Table 5.9 is
called f (P1,P2), then the combination matrix can now be formulated as follows :
f (P1,P2) = e2 + e11
=ΠY (P1&¬oP2)+(¬a¬oP1&¬a¬oP2)
(5.2)
Table 5.11 shows possible algebra formula for each individual cells that results
in{Y,Y} in this two dimensional matrix.
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 	 	 

	 	


	 	  	 	

	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	

 	 	 

	 	


	 	 	 	 	

	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	  	
	 	 	 	 	

 	 	 

	 	


	 	  	 	

	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	  	
	 	 	 	 	
Table 5.10: How to Use D&C to Find Integrated Policy Expressions
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Table 5.11: Possible Expression for Individual Cells Which Results {Y,Y}
It should be noted that a great level of attention have been given to those formula
that result {Y,Y} in each individual cells. All other values which could possibly held
at each individual cells have been ignored. The reason behind this decision is, if one
could find an expression that gives the result ei = {Y,Y} for each specific cell, then
the other possible values of the very same cell i.e. {Y,NA}, {N,NA} and {NA,NA}
can be expressed using ¬ operator because ¬oei = {Y,NA},¬aei = {N,NA} and
¬a¬oei = {NA,NA}.
Going back to the example at the beginning of this section, the corresponding
policy expression can now be presented as:
fi(P1,P2) = e9 + e11 + e16
=ΠY (¬a¬oP1&P2)+(¬a¬oP1&¬a¬oP2)+(Py((P1 +P2)+P1))
(5.3)
Using the above approach, the algebra has been proven to be complete for a
two-dimensional matrix, which in turn proves that the following theorem is true:
Theorem 3 : Assuming M presents combination matrix results of P1 and P2,
there would be at least one policy expression f (P1,P2) that describes M(P1,P2) us-
ing the minimal set of operator that is f (P1,P2) = M(P1,P2).
In addition to above, the theorem can also be expanded for expressions of the
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policies that are involved in the negotiation as follows:
Theorem 4: Let Mi denote a combination matrix in sequence i of a complete
trace of a given policy P that requires partial evaluation with regards to Ω and Σ ,
then an algebraic expression exists which describes policy P.
Proof: The keywords here are Complete Trace of policy P which implies that the
number of sequences in the trace is finite that is (1≤ i<∞). So on one hand there is
a finite number of sequences and on the other hand in theorem 3 it has been already
proven that the algebra is complete. In other words, for any combination matrix
there exists an algebra expression that contains algebra operators representing that
table (policy). Hence, combining these two facts proves that that the algebra is ca-
pable of representing a policy P that is participating in a negotiation using algebraic
expressions.
What must really be taken into consideration is the fact that the minimal set of
operators needed to describe and formulate policies as above are {P+ , P−, + , - ,
& , ¬a , ¬o , Π }. The operator H (defined in section 5.2.4) is needed to describe
and divide complex policies such as, policies with negotiation capabilities into a
finite sequence of simple policies in which the above operators would be sufficient
to describe them in detail.
5.3 Summary
5.3.1 Chapter Summary
Algebra as a composition framework has been utilised since security policies have
been introduced. Using algebra it would be possible to show how policies are com-
bined whilst they retain their independence. A number of algebras with different
characteristics and formalisms have been introduced to help security policy writers
to describe their policies more precisely and indeed more efficiently.
In this chapter, some of the algebras that have been introduced during the last
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decade have been reviewed. These were examined from different perspectives, lead-
ing to the selection of the one that fits in the context of this research.
Furthermore, the selected algebra was evaluated against security policy lan-
guages that were chosen in the previous chapter and areas that need improvement
were identified and addressed accordingly.
5.3.2 Research Contributions of the Chapter
As mentioned earlier, security policy languages are changing and improving at a
rapid pace and as a result, their corresponding algebras (if there are any) are often
ignored, forgotten or cannot keep up with the pace. As an example, one of the
areas that has attracted attention in recent years is negotiation, but as it has been
discovered, there is no algebra existing to generally express this functionality in
detail.
In addition, it has been noticed, the algebra for security policy languages did
not pay that much attention to partial and conditional evaluation of security policy
languages. Thus, this characteristic of relatively new policy languages became a
prime focus of this research. In this chapter, a generic algebra was chosen that fits
partially in the context of the present research and evaluated against a negotiation
scenario. The algebra was enhanced by adding a new operator, Trace. Trace comes
into use when describing complex security policies that require partial and condi-
tional evaluation that is often unknown at compilation time, is desired. Policies with
negotiation capabilities that go beyond the boundaries of an environment is a per-
fect example of those policies that require partial evaluation. A few theorems that
utilise the newly introduced operator, Trace, were introduced and proved in turn.
Knowing that a combination framework, i.e. an algebra, that is capable of ex-
pressing complex policies proven to be functional, it can be stated with confidence
that the proposed abstract framework, which sits in the same level as the presented
algebra, would be able to operate as expected. Thus, the focus now will be on the
technical side of the framework and the step by step design of the framework from
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the next chapter.
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Chapter 6
Domain Specific Language
In this chapter, the research presents:
• The definition of domain specific language,
• The advantages, disadvantages and requirements of domain specific language,
• The domain specific language detailed implementation phases and patterns,
• The research contributions of the chapter.
6.1 How to Start the Design Phase
Previously, it has been mathematically proven that the security policy languages can
be mapped onto an abstract combination framework i.e. algebra. The next step is to
design and implement a computerised version of the combination framework. Back
in Chapter 3, whilst the overall requirements and structure of the framework was
presented, it also has been shown that the framework for security policy languages
would require the following two distinctive components:
A) Abstract Language: In essence, the framework for security policy languages
allows security officers and/or administrators to communicate with the security
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framework from single point of view, regardless of the underlying infrastructure.
In order to achieve such a goal users have to code their security policies and they
do need a medium to achieve such a goal: An Abstract Language. The grammar,
syntax, keywords and operators of the abstract language dictate how users must
write their security policies.
B) Infrastructure of the Framework: There is an array of off-the-shelf compo-
nents that need to be architecturally tied to each other using a carefully tailored
and designed, well-written code which must be started from the scratch. The
combination of all these components, modules, etc. shape the infrastructure of
the framework.
Analysing the framework and the abstract language from the users point of view
shows that framework (with the help of its abstract language) conceals the com-
plexity of the security policy languages and provides the users with a much simpler
language that works regardless of the underlying infrastructure. With that definition
in mind, if the search criterion is widened and similar approaches are reviewed, it
is evident that similar challenges have already been addressed by researchers in the
very similar fields.
A few other abstract languages with great level of similarities are reviewed rig-
orously as part of this research. As an example, a Database Administrator (DBA)
can easily query a database using a specific language called the Structured Query
Language (SQL). The DBA does not need to know anything about the underlying
database and/or the way it works. Whether the database that the DBA is utilising
is a simple open-source database such as, MySQL or whether it is a multi-tiered
database running on server farms, the DBA can execute the query.
Hyper-Text Mark-up Language (HTML) also falls in the same category. A web
designer can design a web page without being concerned with which web browser
will render the page. Despite the tools and technologies that eventually generates
and delivers the HTML page to its users, the web designer can focus on the design
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and development of the page.
There are lots of other frameworks available that can be referred to ANother
Tool for Language Recognition (ANTLR) [129], eXtendable Mark-up language
(XML) and many others can be presented as an example. Over and above all of
their benefits, each of these tools, products, frameworks, etc. hide the complexity
of the underlying infrastructure from the users. In addition, these frameworks pro-
vide an abstract language, which has been tailored to the users specific needs and
requirements as well as their domains needs. These frameworks provide their users
with a domain specific Language or DSL.
6.2 Domain Specific Language
Before exploring the DSLs in more detail, the meaning of the programming lan-
guage must be reviewed. In the context of this research, the best definition of a
programming language has been provided by [83].
“A programming language or computer language is a standardised communi-
cation technique for expressing instructions to a computer. It is a set of syntactic
and semantic rules used to define computer programs. A language enables a pro-
grammer to precisely specify what data a computer will act upon, how these data
will be stored and or transmitted, and precisely what actions to take under various
circumstances” [83]
As per the above definition, DSLs are essentially programming languages. De-
spite this, compared to GPLs, which are designed to cover a broad range of ap-
plications from business to scientific computing, DSLs are designed for a special
purpose and are usually aimed to address a very specific challenge; therefore, they
provide a limited level of expressiveness. Using DSLs facilitates the expression of
solutions for domain problems with less effort. Although DSLs are programming
languages, due to the usage nature of DSLs they are usually designed in such a way
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as to be more easily read by their users. The DSLs provide higher abstraction and
compactness and, therefore, better readability, which enables a larger group of peo-
ple with less programming knowledge to be productive. The DSLs usually have a
clearly defined domain focus.
DSLs are not a new concept. These languages have had several aliases over
time, such as: special-purpose languages, end-user languages or as Bentley [47]
called them little languages before the term domain specific language was coined by
Fowler [87]. The history of DSLs dates back to 1957 when a language for numeric
controlled machines was developed at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
(MIT), which can be considered as the first modern DSL developed [58]. The DSLs
have also been used by researchers and have assisted users for decades.
It seems that the academic definition of DSLs have changed over the past few
decades. In the context of this research, Menricks description regarding DSLs can
be used as follows:
“DSLs are languages tailored to a specific application domain. They offer sub-
stantial gains in expressiveness and ease of use compared with GPLs in their do-
main of application” [125]
However, the definition provided by Fowler [87] would perfectly fit the context
of this research:
“A computer programming language of limited expressiveness focused on a par-
ticular domain” [87]
Although this is a compact and very well-defined expression for DSLs however
it comes with four key elements which worth exploring in further detail:
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• Computer Programming Language: A DSL is used to instruct a computer
to perform task or tasks, hence, as per the definition of modern programming
language given above, it is a computer programming language which will be
executable by a computer.
• Language Nature: As DSL is a programming language, it should have a
sense of fluency where the expressiveness comes not just from individual ex-
pressions but also from the way they can be composed together.
• Limited Expressiveness: Compared to a general-purpose programming lan-
guage which provides lots of capabilities, a DSL supports a bare minimum of
features needed to support its domain.
• Domain Focus: A limited language is only useful if it has a clear focus on
a small domain. The domain focus is what makes a limited language worth-
while.
6.2.1 DSL Stakeholders
There are three typical DSL stakeholders at three different levels:
• System/Software Engineers: Who are responsible for choosing or imple-
menting an appropriate DSL. In the context of this research, software engi-
neers who would be responsible for coding the actual framework will fit into
this category.
• Customers: Who are responsible for providing feedback on descriptions pro-
duced using a DSL. Security officers who provide feedback and verify the
outcome of the DSL will be categorised into this group.
• Developers: Who are responsible for constructing and managing DSL de-
scriptions. Within the context of this research, these would be the security
administrators who are responsible for interpreting the actual security poli-
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cies to DSL scripts, running them on the framework and providing customers
with the results.
The current trend towards end-user programming suggests that in some contexts,
the roles of customer and developer may be combined [110].
6.2.2 Boundaries of DSL
When it comes to DSL, an important issue is identifying the boundary of DSL.
More specifically: what constitutes a DSL and what does not? Compared with gen-
eral purpose languages, DSLs show a tendency towards the construction of domain
concepts in more details. As a result, a DSL will more accurately represent domain
practice and will more accurately support domain analyses.
In addition to the above, typically DSLs utilise external tools and products for
different purposes as opposed to building all the components within the code. Error
handling and debugging can be presented as examples. Finally, a DSL is often
computationally incomplete [110].
Despite all the definition presented above, still the border between DSLs and
GPLs cannot be easily distinguished. For example, COBOL was considered a GPL
but also a DSL for business applications. Prolog is another example of ambiguity.
Although Prolog is a programming language, it also can be classified as a DSL for
applications specified by predicate calculus.
6.2.3 Requirement for DSLs
Similar to designing software application, prior to the discussion of the design of
the system, the requirements of the system must be defined in detail in order to
justify the use of that particular application. The DSLs are not an exception to this
rule. In this section, the requirements of DSLs will be reviewed and will be mapped
to the current research accordingly.
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Generally, some of the requirements for GPLs apply directly to DSLs. The core
requirements for DSL are as follows:
• Conformity: The language constructs must correspond to important domain
concepts.
• Orthogonality: Each construct in the language is used to represent exactly
one distinct concept in the domain.
• Integrability: The language and its tools can be used in concert with other
languages and tools with minimal effort.
• Extensibility: The DSL (and its tools) can be extended to support additional
constructs and concepts.
• Longevity: The DSL should be used and useful for a significant period of
time.
• Simplicity: The language should be as simple as possible in order to express
the concepts of interest and to support its users.
• Quality: The language should provide general mechanisms for building qual-
ity systems.
• Supportability: It is feasible to provide DSL support via tools for typical
model and program management, such as, creating, deleting, editing, debug-
ging and transforming.
In addition to above, there are optional requirements for DSLs which may not
necessarily appear on all DSL implementations. These can be presented as:
• Scalability: The language provides constructs to help manage large-scale
descriptions. Of course, some DSLs will only be used to build small systems.
• Usability: This includes requirements such as, space economy, accessibility,
desirable understandability that may be partly covered by the core require-
ments [110].
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Taking the above definition into account it would be easy to justify the use of
DSLs in the current research as follows:
• Conformity: As discussed in Chapter 1, the framework and its correspond-
ing security policy language will be designed to cover important concepts in
security aspects of multidimensional organisations.
• Orthogonality: The abstract security policy language that comes with the
framework will be designed in a way to precisely describe security policy
languages.
• Integrability: The framework will be designed in a way to easily be coupled
with legacy and new security infrastructure.
• Expandability: In addition to the above, the framework originally will be
designed to work with only three security policy languages, however, there
will be no limitation to expand to other security policy languages.
• Longevity: The usage of framework is not restricted to a period of time.
• Simplicity: The framework (with the help of its ASPL) will assist security
experts to describe their security policies with less effort.
• Supportability: Describing security policies using abstract security policy
language may not be easily achievable, therefore, the framework will be de-
signed in a way to assist users to achieve their goals.
• Usability: The usability of the framework is reviewed in detail in Section
1.3.1.
6.2.4 Advantages of DSL
Implementing a DSL is always an interesting subject and has several advantages. A
few of them are discussed below.
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• Involving Domain Experts in the Software Development Process:If prop-
erly designed, DSLs provide an opportunity to involve the domain experts in
the architecture of the software product. This does not claim that software ar-
chitects are no longer needed if DSLs are used, but, claims that DSLs extends
the range of people to be able to contribute to the architecture of the software
product [41].
• DSLs are Concise: Therefore, DSLs are easy to look at, see, think about and
show. Roam [134] calls look at, see, think about and show, the four steps to
visual thinking. The DSLs due to their limited vocabulary are often designed
in a manner similar to human language, reducing the semantic distance be-
tween the program and the problem.
• Reusability: Taking the conciseness of DLSs into account as well as the
domain fitting notation, DSLs are (to a certain degree) self-documenting. This
in turn results the embodying of domain knowledge which eases reuse and
conservation [75].
• DSL Improves Development Maintainability: Perhaps the single most im-
portant benefit of using domain specific languages is that the domain specific
knowledge is formalised at the right level of abstraction hence, modifications
are easier to make and their impact is easier to understand.
Taking that into account the longevity requirement of a DSL which indicates
DSLs should not be useful for a single period of time, DSL-based develop-
ment tends to produce a higher payoff in the long run of development life
cycle [94] [74].
• Validate at Domain Level: A general purpose language compiler does not
know anything about domain concepts, whereas, a DSL can be checked for
domain constraint during the compilation phase [63].
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6.2.5 Disadvantages of DSL
Like many other tools and products used within the IT industry, DSL usage comes
with unique disadvantages, however, majority of these disadvantages are related to
the implementation of a new language.
• Design a Language is Arduous: Technically DSL design is a language de-
sign and no matter how easy and user friendly the language is, terminology
design is a complex and difficult task. That is why instead of designing a
completely new language with its complexities, most DSLs are embedded
within a higher-level language.
• Designing DSL Could be Expensive: Designing a DSL could be expensive
as the task must be performed by experienced programmers and involves in-
tense collaboration and communication with domain experts. Design of a
DSL must be financially justified first.
• Expandability of DSLs is Challenging: The nature of DSL is to focus on a
specific problem of a domain. The DSLs are usually evolving iteratively and
independently. In an enterprise application, which usually utilises more than
one DSLs at a time, often an inevitable task comes to force, which requires
combining a few DSLs together. That certainly raises a concern because com-
bining DSLs that are independently and iteratively expanding is not easy [94].
• Language Cacophony: As mentioned, DSL is effectively another language,
hence, the language must be taught to users. That implies the learning curve
of DSL based applications could be marginally higher than expected. Addi-
tionally, the learning curve increases the overall cost of developing a DSL-
based language [94].
• Blinkered Abstraction: The uniqueness and perhaps usefulness of DSL-
based application is that it provides its users with an abstraction which allows
the expression of domain behaviour with less effort. But the danger here is
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this abstraction puts blinkers on users thinking. Blinkered abstraction prob-
lem is a general concern which applies to all abstraction but due to the fact
that DSLs provides a more comfortable way to manipulate abstraction, DSLs
make blinkered abstraction even worse [87].
• DSL performance: Often a DSL will suffer from a lower performance than
a hand written software, as it is yet another layer of indirection. As long
as performance is not critical, then the other DSL benefits will make this
a minor problem. In some cases, performance can be equal or faster due to
optimisation on high abstraction level but in most cases the potential is limited
[94].
6.3 DLS Implementation Phase and Patterns
As per any software development cycle, DSL implementation is divided into major
steps: design and development. However, as per Mernik [125], a more fine-grained
implementation of DSL can be presented by breaking down the cycle into five stages
namely: Decision, Analysis, Design, Implementation and Deployment.
Compared to bespoke software development, DSL development is not a simple
sequential process. The decision process may be influenced by preliminary analysis.
Analysis itself may have to supply answers to questions arising during design and
the design is often shaped by implementation considerations [125]. We already
covered the fact that DSL implementation is expensive, so in order to minimise
the risks, each stages of DSL implementation have to be rigorously followed and
mapped to the research.
6.3.1 Decision Phase
It has already been pointed out that due to the nature of DSL, its development is not
categorised as a cost-effective approach. The DSL investment must pay for itself in
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the long term, therefore, DSL development must be justified beforehand. In some
cases, using an existing DSL could be considered as a more appropriate approach.
In addition, adopting a new DSL requires less expertise. The drawback here could
be using an existing DSL which is not very well publicised could be too risky and
even more expensive due to its possible maintenance in the long term.
To be able to make decision on when to use domain specific languages, DSL
decision patterns are identified and listed below. Most of these patterns help end
users with less programming expertise to perform software development. Majority
of these patterns would result in the improvement of software economics.
• Notation: The availability of appropriate new or existing domain specific
notation is the main characteristic of this pattern. The two common sub-
patterns are A) transformation of a visual to a textual notion and B) add user-
friendly notation to an existing API or turn an API into a DSL. MSC [17] that
is used for telecoms system specification for system architecture design can
be presented as an example.
• AVOPT: domain specific Analysis, Verification, Optimisation, Parallelisa-
tion and Transformation (AVOPT) of an existing program written in GPL is
considered as an arduous and time-consuming task perhaps due to code com-
plexity and/or lack of documentation. However, use of an appropriate DSL
makes these operations possible. This pattern overlaps with most of the other
patterns. OWL-Light [138] used for programmable web ontology is an exam-
ple.
• Task Automation: In software development, programmers often spend too
much time to generate codes which follows the same pattern. In such a sce-
nario, a code generator driven by an appropriate DSL would ease the opera-
tions. RoTL [123] used for traffic control can be presented as an example.
• Product Line: Some software products do not exist as a single stand-alone
application. They often share common architecture and are developed from a
common set of basic elements. In such scenarios, use of an appropriate DSL
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could ease automated assembly. An example of this would be ASDL [149]
used for Language processing.
• Structure Representation: An appropriate DSL is often used to represent
structured data in more appropriate, human-readable and maintainable ways.
This category can be represented by JSON [66].
• Data Structure Traversal: Traversals over complicated data structures can
often be expressed better and more reliably in a suitable DSL such as, SQL
[124].
• System Front-End: Providing users with an appropriate DSL would often
facilitate the handling system configuration and adoption such as, Nowra [31],
which is used for software configuration.
• Interaction: Using well-defined DSL is often needed for complicated or
repetitive inputs for menu or text-based interaction with software application
for example, Microsoft excel macros.
• GUI Construction: Often GUI construction is performed by using an appro-
priate DSL. For example, XML and HTML represent domain specific lan-
guages for GUI construction.
Choosing the Appropriate Decision Pattern
In the context of this research, a few of the above mentioned patterns would come
into play simply as they match with what the research intends to implement. They
might overlap to some degrees. The ones that are not listed below are excluded due
to their incompatibility.
• Task Automation: As it has been mentioned previously, majority of scenar-
ios written in various security policy languages can be generalised using an
abstract security policy language allowing the task automation pattern above
to be applied to facilitate a more robust code generation.
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• Interaction: In addition, developers (please refer to the stakeholders def-
inition above) of security policies will be using a text-based interaction to
communicate with the framework (as described in Chapter 3), therefore, in-
teraction pattern can be chosen.
6.3.2 Analysis Phase
Assuming that the decision is made to develop a new DSL in order to extract a
great level of detail about the domain, including objects and operations which are
commonly used in that particular domain, the domain Analyse Phase must com-
mence. Inputs can be provided from different sources which have implicit and
explicit knowledge about the domain that includes but is not limited to Domain Ex-
perts Knowledge, Technical Documentation, Customer Feedback and Reviewing the
Code (most probably the existing GPL code). The output of the phase would be a
domain specific terminology and domain specific semantic in an abstract mode.
The following patterns have been identified for DSL analysis which are as fol-
lows:
• Informal Pattern: The informal pattern, which can be predicated from its
name, follow no formal domain analysis process. According to Menrik et.
al. [125], most DSL developments are done without any formal analysis.
That often leads to incomplete requirements which increases the cost of DSL
development through maintenance. It is clear that the informal analysis would
be a suitable approach for a simple domain with limited requirements.
• Formal Pattern: The analysis of the domain can be preformed using well-
defined and known methodologies. This approach is known as formal anal-
ysis. Unsurprisingly, the disadvantages of an informal pattern are addressed
by the formal pattern; using a formal pattern facilitates the prevention of the
omission of important parts of the domain and leads to more complete re-
quirements.
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There are several methodologies for domain analysis such as: FAST (Family-
Oriented Abstractions, Specification and Translation) [150] , FODA (Feature-
Oriented Domain Analysis) [154], ODE (Ontology-based Domain Engineer-
ing) [81], DSSA (domain specific Software Architectures) [142], DARE (Do-
main Analysis and Reuse Environment) [89], or ODM (Organization Domain
Modeling) [140] . It is useful to know that the majority of methodologies
that are used for formal domain analyses come from another research field
which is, Domain Engineering (DE) [118]. Domain engineering refers to the
systematic modelling of a domain [125].
Domain Driven Design (DDD) [80] which has attracted attention over the
last few years can also be presented as another methodology of DSL analysis.
DDD is a development technique which focuses on understanding the cus-
tomer’s problem and the environment in which the customer works. In this
definition, the Problem Domain refers to the problem that will be solved by
the output of DDD development. In addition to the defined problem domain,
based on the customers desires and needs, the developer builds a domain,
which can be a representative of all these concepts called Domain Model. The
model is discussed with the real users and customers and through an iterative
process, it is enhanced and refined [80].
While on the subject, it would be beneficial to talk about another concept
called Ubiquitous Language. On an enterprise software development team,
while many different Actors with different levels of responsibilities partici-
pate in the development process (e.g. developer, product owner, system cus-
tomer etc.), in order to reduce the miscommunication between the involved
parties, a language should be defined in which the key terms of the problem
domain are described in a language understandable to both the domain expert
and the developer. This language is called Ubiquitous Language. Creating a
ubiquitous language involves creating a glossary in which the key terms are
explained in a way that is understandable to both the domain expert and the
developer. This glossary is also updated throughout the project [80].
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Choosing the Appropriate Analysis Pattern
While a formal analysis of the surrounding domain of the framework would have
been an ideal approach for the project, due the scale of the DSL that will be imple-
mented as part of this research, informal and formal approaches were combined in
order to gain the advantages of both patterns. As a result, in a series of informal
interviews with the domain experts and having a DDD methodology in mind, an
ubiquitous language has been defined. The language that originally used to com-
municate with the domain experts and other parties involved, later became the base
for the ASPL. In addition to above using the ubiquitous, the domain model was
defined, modified and enhanced through a series of sessions and presented to the
actual users.
6.3.3 Design Phase
Design phase approach is highly dependent on the previous phases and chosen ap-
proaches. Having said that, often DSL designers believe that the easiest way to
design a DSL is to host it on an existing language. There are possible advantages to
adopting such an approach, such as, easier implementation due to a reduced learn-
ing curve for the development team with that particular language. In addition, some
languages such as, Scala or Ruby, provide users with tools and features that can be
used to leverage the language [125].
The six possible approaches for DSL design are listed as follows:
1) Piggyback: The piggyback structural pattern uses the capabilities of an existing
language as the base for the DSL that is to be designed. Often a DSL needs
standardised support for common linguistic elements, such as, expression han-
dling, variables, subroutines or compilation. By designing the DSL on top of an
existing language, the needed linguistic is provided for free. The piggyback pat-
tern can be used whenever the DSL shares common elements with an existing
language [141]. Possible examples of the piggyback design are: YACC [105]
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and LEX [114] processor.
2) Language Extension: The language extension pattern is used when adding new
features to an existing language. Often an existing language can serve new needs
by just adding new features to its core features. This pattern challenges the
designer to integrate the required features of DSL into existing language [141].
A DSL that follows the extension pattern is SWUL [56] which, supports the
development of Java SWING GUIs and is embedded into Java.
3) Language Specialisation: Developing a new DSL does not always mean creat-
ing something new. A more uncommon pattern is specialisation. In some cases,
the full power of an existing language may prevent its adoption for a specialised
purpose requiring the language to be reduced to meet the needs of a special do-
main. One example is, OWL-Lite [69], which is a subset of the Ontology web
language [141].
4) Source to Source Transformation: There are cases where the DSL cannot be
directly designed on top of an existing language using language extension, spe-
cialisation or the piggyback pattern. In those scenarios, it is often possible to
leverage the facilities provided by existing language tools using a source-to-
source transformation technique. Using this technique, the DSL source code is
transformed via a suitable translation process into the source code of an existing
language [141] [125].
5) Data Structure Representation: Assuming that the data structure traversal
method has been chosen during the decision phase, then the data structure rep-
resentation design pattern would be a suitable pattern to use. The data structure
representation pattern allows the declarative specification of a complex data.
Complicated structures are better expressed using a language rather than their
underlying representation such as graphs.
6) Entirely New Language: While using an existing language to create a DSL has
its own advantages and could be considered a favourite approach for develop-
ers, the DSL design and perhaps implementation will always be limited to the
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host language boundaries, severely compromising the flexibility of the DSL. If
the DSL will be used among wide range of users and will be subject to future
enhancement, modification and expansion then using a host language as a vehi-
cle for implementation may not be an appropriate approach. In such a scenario,
design and implementation of a completely new language whose design bears
no relationship to any existing language would be a suitable approach. In prac-
tice, development of this kind of DSL can be extremely difficult and the costs of
design and implementation of a new DSL can be considerably high. Consider-
ing all these facts, unless adoption of this approach is justified in advance, this
pattern will not be developers’ first choice [125].
Designing a new DSL is no different than designing a GPL and like many GPLs
its design should follow the principals, which have been followed by well-known
GPLs design criteria such as, readability, simplicity, orthogonality, etc. The design
principles listed by Brooks [48], as well as Tennents design principles [143] retain
some validity for DSLs .
Irrespective of the DSL design pattern chosen, DSL design must take into con-
sideration both the characteristic of DSLs as well as the fact that users may not be
programmers. Generally, DSL adopt established notations of the domain and the
design should suppress a tendency to improve them. As stated in Wile [152], one of
the lessons learnt from real DSL experiments is:
“Lesson T2: You are almost never designing a programming language. Most
DSL designers come from language design backgrounds. There the admirable prin-
ciples of orthogonality and economy of form are not necessarily well-applied to
DSL design. Especially in catering to the pre-existing jargon and notations of the
domain, one must be careful not to embellish or over-generalize the language. Les-
son T2 Corollary: Design only what is necessary. Learn to recognize your tendency
to over-design.” [152]
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Choosing the Appropriate Design Pattern
As previously mentioned, the flow of activities in the five stages of implementing
a DSL are not always sequential and each stage could directly and/or indirectly
influence the decision on previous steps. Taking todays modern languages, such as,
Scala or even the equivalent .Net language, would provide a wide range of features,
which makes DSL a successful, yet cost-effective task. Taking this into account
would narrow-down the design pattern dramatically. Patterns which are not fit for
the purpose of this research have been ruled out as below:
• Entirely New Language: Due to the difficulty and cost-effectiveness issues
related to this approach, its usage must be justified from the outset. In addi-
tion, this pattern targets DSL that are overcomplicated and cannot easily fit
into other options.
• Source-to-Source Transformation / Data Structure Representation: Since
this research does not deal with a complex data structure in the DSL and the
source for our DSL is not available to reuse, the above mentioned patterns are
not effective in this case.
• Language Extension: Ruling out the other patterns leaves the project with
piggyback pattern and/or its derivatives (i.e. language extension or speciali-
sation). Due to the nature of security policy languages and the scenarios that
they cover, simplicity of the to-be-developed DSL is predictable, which in
turn rules out the language extension. That is the design methodology for
complicated DSLs, which cannot be defined by the other two methods.
The chosen design methodology must be either piggyback or language special-
isation; however, at this stage, it is difficult to distinctively decide between either
of these two methods, hence, it was necessary to continue on to the next phase and
revisit the design phase later.
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6.3.4 Implementation Phase
The final step towards the creation of a DSL is implementation. Similar to other
steps, there are different patterns that must be considered and the most appropriate
one should be chosen. Although this may sound similar to previous steps, in reality
the DSL implementation is the most difficult task among all steps, which have al-
ready been covered because DSL implementation patterns are solely used for DSL
development and attract no other attentions. In addition, compared to other GPL
development patterns, they are not very well known due to the lack of documen-
tation. The implementation decision can influence the needed development efforts
and should be considered carefully. As with any decision, analysis and design have
different possible implementation patterns that have been identified and discussed
below:
• Compiler / Interpreter: Perhaps the most logical way to approach DSL im-
plementation is the very same method for GPLs; using a Compiler and/or
Interpreter. A wide range of GPLs have been implemented in this way. An
interpreter interprets the DSL code in a four stage cycle of recognise, fetch,
decode and run. Both the interpreter and compiler would have a great level of
similarity but, generally the implementation of the interpreters requires much
less effort. In addition, greater simplicity and control over the execution en-
vironment as well as easier extension can be presented as advantages of an
interpreter over a compiler
As per the other patterns, the compiler/interpreter have both its advantages
and disadvantages. Because the compiler or interpreter must recognise the
code first, using this pattern could utilise strong syntax checking and error
reporting capabilities. Besides domain specific analysis, verification, optimi-
sation, parallelisation and transformation (AVOPT) is also possible when this
pattern is in use. Generally, AVOPT would be an effective tool when the user
community is large. Finally, due to the fact that developers are in full control
of almost every step of AVOPT, DSL syntax can be close to the notations
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used by domain experts.
On the other hand, DSL implementation using this pattern requires a lot of
effort due to the fact that a complex language processor must be implemented
from the ground up. In addition, language extension is difficult mainly be-
cause most language processors are not designed with extension in mind.
• Preprocessor: Pre-processing happens before interpretation or compilation
commences. In other words, the pre-processor decouples the DSL code from
the underlying base language. That gives the developer a great level of flex-
ibility which comes in handy when developing the DSL. However, this im-
plies that syntax checking and any error reporting and error handling should
be postponed to compilation or interpretation time. There are different sub-
flavours of this pattern available, most of which map to a corresponding de-
sign pattern. These sub-patterns are detailed below:
– Lexical Pre-processors: Lexical pre-processors or in simple words macros,
are a classic example of DSL implementation using pre-processors. Macros
work by simple textual search-and-replace at the token rather than at the
character level. That usually is executed prior to any parsing performed,
according to user-defined rules. A classic use of macros is demonstrated
in the computer typesetting system LATEX and its derivatives [84].
– Source to Source: Source-to-source is another type of pre-processor
DSL implementation. Source-to-source pre-processors entirely translate
the DSL code to the base language.
– Pipeline: If the DSL code gets broken down into a set of sub-languages
and each set is processed by a different processor then the whole chain
presents the pipeline architecture for pre-processing.
• Embedding: Assuming a GPL allows the use of user-defined abstract data-
types and/or operators, then the DSL development becomes much easier by
extending the GPL, which will be known as the host language. Then de-
scribing domain specific notation using new data-type and operators would
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be possible. As the DSL code is directly embedded into the host language, it
will obtain all the capabilities of the host language for free.
• Extension: Developers usually find it easier to make domain specific changes
to a GPL. These changes will result in an embedded tailored language without
sacrificing the generality and library support of the GPL. Although such an
approach would be suitable for DSL with limited expressiveness, the solution
may not be appropriate for a more complex approach.
Although extending the language is presented as a separate pattern, in reality,
it is another form of embedding DSL constructs in a host language. While
the embedding pattern attempts to construct DSL notation by simply defin-
ing new data-types and/or operators, the extending pattern has a tendency to
do the same by full-blown DSL features. Having this in mind the best place
to start language extending would be compilers; however, compilers get de-
signed without having extension in mind, hence, the extending pattern is a
much harder approach compared to other available patterns [125].
• COTS: Commercial Out of The Shelf (COTS) approach can also be used while
implementing DSLs. In this approach, the existing tools and/or notations
are applied to a specific domain. Typically, this approach involves applying
existing functionality in a restricted way, according to domain rules.
With the rise of the Java Virtual Machine (JVM) based languages like Scala
[127] and Ruby [144], Model Driven Engineering (MDE) became an inter-
esting subject for developers and researchers [50]. The MDE approach aims
to raise the level of abstraction in program specification and increase automa-
tion in program development. The MDE approach encourages users to utilise
models at different levels of abstraction for developing systems, thereby rais-
ing the level of abstraction in program specification. Tools for MDE are often
called Model Driven Software Factories [70].
The beauty of the COTS pattern for developing DSLs is that it allows DSL
architects and developers to define DSL syntax, artifacts, editors, etc. and im-
plement the entire platform using a model driven software factory. Mendixs
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model-driven enterprise application platform [73] is targeted at the domain of
service-oriented business applications [71] and can be presented as an exam-
ple. The XML-based DSLs with board range libraries and tools, including
parsers, such as, SAX [122] or DOM [7], the analyser Xquery [27] and the
transformer XSLT [13] also fall in this category.
• Hybrid: Knowing that each single pattern has its own advantages and dis-
advantages makes choosing a single pattern to design and implement a DSL
more difficult than it appears. While analysis, verification, optimization, par-
allelization and transformation (AVOPT) seem necessary in DSL implemen-
tation and can be achieved using the compiler approach, embedding the DSL
into an host language will significantly reduce the DSL implementation ef-
forts, and while pre-processors pattern with its decoupling feature gets the
developer as closely as possible to the domain concepts, usage of COTS pat-
tern might seem a very cost-effective approach for DSL implementation.
Considering the difficulty of choosing a suitable pattern,in order to maximise
the advantages of implementing a DSL , sometimes it makes sense to com-
bine all these patterns into a single project, which leads to a final pattern, the
Hybrid. There are a number of examples provided that combine the compiler
and embedding patterns [78] [125].
Choosing the Appropriate Implementation Pattern
As discussed, choosing the appropriate pattern for DSL implementation is not easy.
As a direct consequence, the main characteristics of each pattern were compared
against the framework’s requirements in order to determine which pattern cannot
easily be adapted to the project. The results are detailed below:
• Compiler/Interpreter: Compiler and interpreters are used in DSL develop-
ment projects where AVOPT is a mandatory requirement of the DSL. Anal-
ysis and verification are a mandatory part of almost all DSLs; however, op-
timisation and parallelisation do not play a vital role in the framework DSL.
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Compiler and interpreters are more appropriate in DSL projects with a large
number of users, whereas, the community user of the framework is restricted
due to the nature of security policy languages. Hence, the compiler and inter-
preter are not a prime implementation choice for this research.
• Preprocessor: Pre-processors could have been a good DSL pattern for this
project, but due to the fact that error reporting is postponed to the compilation
time, this would impose a threat to the efficiency of the DSL. Ideally, the
users would be provided with the possible errors that have been made before
the compilation time.
• Source-to-Source Transformation / Pipeline: Source-to-Source transfor-
mation and pipeline processes do not fit in the context of this research, as
A) a source code for the DSL is not available and B) due to the nature of the
scenarios described by security policy languages, pipeline is not an effective
implementation approach; therefore, none of the above patterns can be easily
adopted in the implementation phase.
• Language Extension / COTS: Language extension has already been ruled
out in the previous section. Moreover, the efforts this pattern requires do not
fit within the project plan, thus, language extension is not appropriate. The
COTS pattern could have been a suitable approach for this project, but consid-
ering the scope of the project, COTS and especially the MDE approach could
not only over engineer the entire plan, but it is also not justified financially.
By ruling out the patterns that do not fit in the context of this research, the
embedding approach remained the only available option. A diagram that illustrates
the sequence of steps to choose an implementation pattern has been presented in
Figure 6.1.
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Figure 6.1: How to Choose a DSL Implementation Pattern
6.3.5 Exploring Embedding Pattern
Since the embedding pattern is the desired approach, the thesis will review this
pattern in more detail. Technically, there are only two sub-patterns available to
implement DSLs using the embedding pattern: Internal and External. Any other
sub-patterns are effectively another flavour of these two patterns [87]. Despite the
availability of only two patterns, choosing the right implementation is not a simple
task. These two patterns are described below briefly.
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• Internal DSLs are particular ways of using a host language to lend the host
language, the feel of a particular language. This approach has recently been
popularised by most JVM functional languages such as, Ruby [144], Groovy
[109] or Clojure [96]. A. Internal DSLs are also referred to as Embedded
DSLs or Fluent Interfaces. This pattern is the corresponding implementation
of the piggyback design pattern.
• External DSLs External DSLs have their own custom syntax and the devel-
oper must write a full parser to process them. There is a very strong tradition
of doing this in the Unix community. Many XML configurations have ended
up as external DSLs, although XMLs syntax is not suited to this purpose.
Despite the fact that the development of a external DSL must start on imple-
mentation of a full down parser, due to the evolution of JVM-based languages,
like Scala or even .Net languages like C#, currently developers are provided
with a full parser for free and as a result, external DSLs could also be hosted
on top of an existing language like internal DSLs. External DSL development
on top of an existing host language corresponds to the language specialisation
design pattern.
To summarise the embedding pattern, the advantages are discussed below:
• Host language infrastructure that includes development and debugging envi-
ronments i.e. editors, debuggers, tracers, profilers, etc. can be reused, which
in turn would reduce project effort and costs.
• Project learning curves would be significantly lower compared to other ap-
proaches because DSL developers are most likely familiar with the host lan-
guage.
• It often produces a more powerful language than other methods since many
features are available for free.
Embedding pattern comes with its own challenges which include issues such as:
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• Expressing DSL syntax using a user-defined abstract data-type written in the
host language is not always easy making syntax optimisation hard to achieve.
• Error reporting and error handling is a challenging process in this pattern, as
errors and corresponding messages generated for the host language are not
easily presentable in a DSL [94].
Internal DSL Implementation Patterns
Internal DSLs patterns themselves can also be classified into different categories.
For instance, Debasish divided internal DSLs into two different categories of Em-
bedded and Generative DSLs [94].
• Embedded DSL: In this pattern, the DSL is surrounded entirely by the host
language and DSL is embedded deeply inside the host language. Using this
pattern, the DSL will be developed in the host language and represented to
the DSL user as an entirely new language. There are a number of common
approaches which can be used on this specific pattern namely:
– Smart API: Using builders pattern [91], DSL can be developed by cod-
ing a series of smart or fluent APIs which can be glued together in a
natural sequence. As an example, please look at listing 5.1, which pro-
vides an example of a smart API written in Java:
BigInt Interest = new Interest.Builder()
.forClient("TheClient")
.atDate(today())
.atInterestRate(0.5) ;
Listing 6.1: Smart API Example in Java
Although the code is readable and has a relatively good level of expres-
siveness, it utilises a great degree of unnecessary parentheses, dots and
Java syntax, which may not be useful to the actual DSL user. In addi-
tion, using this pattern could lead to the development of lots of small
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methods that may not have any use on their own. Besides, smart API
that imposes unnecessary parentheses, dots and Java syntax to its users
might not be the prime choice for describing complicated security policy
scenarios that come with too many conditions and obligations.
– Reflective MetaProgramming: Developing a DSL is not always as
easy as the above example. There are scenarios that a DSL must take
action based on the information received during runtime. By combina-
tion of decorative pattern [91] and writing the code in a GPL this would
be achievable through Reflective MetaProgramming. In addition to that,
using Duck Typing that is provided by languages such as, Groovy, object
would be able to decide which method to invoke during runtime without
any inheritance forced by languages like Java.
– Typed Embedding: Through Meta-Programming, DSL coders must
precisely write the interfaces based on the rules that the domain en-
forces. However, in more complex DSL, statically typed language such
as Scala [127] could help developers. Using statically typed languages
DSL coders would be able to define different characteristics of a do-
main as aType and expose the users in an appropriate manner in order to
model the domain.
• Generative DSL Patterns: Unlike Embedded DSL pattern, where the DSL
is embedded deeply into the host language, through generative DSL pattern
utilising a generic code and /or configuration files, a great portion of DSL
code gets generated either through the compile time or runtime.
– Runtime Meta-Programming. There are languages available which
expose their runtime infrastructure as meta-objects to their users. Ruby
and Groovy can be presented as an example of host languages with Run-
time Meta-Programming capability.
– Compile-Time Meta-Programming. Very similar to Runtime Meta-
Programming by practising Compile-Time Meta-Programming approach,
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a user interacts with the compiler during the compilation phase to gen-
erate the code. LISP is the pioneer in this category. Clojure is another
JVM based language which has been invented in a manner that provides
the same level of syntax that LISP provides, while it can easily integrate
with Java and JVM based languages.
External DSL Implementation Patterns
Unlike internal DSLs, there are not many patterns available for external DSLs sim-
ply because everything must be implemented from scratch. Despite that, in an archi-
tectural respect regarding external DSLs, a DSL consists of a script and a black-box
which is responsible for parsing the scripts and acting accordingly. The way that
the DSL developers structure the black-box can identify the pattern they have used
to implement the DSL. The main and most important component of the black box is
the parser. This paper will explore the different types of parsers that can be utilised
and integrated into a project.
Parsers : The first and the most important component of the external DSL is
a parser. In order to develop a parser, two main activities need to be performed
beforehand:
A) A context-free grammar for the DSL should be noted. There are two techniques
which can be adopted to achieve this: Backus Normal Form [43] or Van Wi-
jngaarden [108]. BNF grammar or any of its derivatives are used in almost all
modern parsers. Van Wijngaarden was defined and used in the development of
Algol68 [130].
B) Code the parser in accordance to the rules dictated by the grammar.
Unfortunately, writing a parser from scratch for a DSL is a time-consuming
process as every single detail of the DSL grammar must be coded deeply into the
host language. As a result, using a highly configurable parser like ANTLR [129]
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and configuring it for a specific projects requirements is recommended by experts.
Even though there is a list of parsers available to choose from, each comes with
specific characteristics that must be known to the users before utilising them in
their projects. A brief description of these characteristics has been listed here:
• Top-Down Parsers: These are the parsers that start parsing the tree of objects
from the top and parse the branches and leaves by first parsing the leftmost
derivation of the input stream. While the parser recursively traverses across
the tree, it has two choices for processing the tree:
A) To parse the tokens (leaves) left to right and to Look-ahead only one
token. These parsers are called LL(1) parsers, which are usually simple
and easy to use. The simplicity of the parsers would imply that they
come with their very own issues.
B) To parse the tokens (leaves) Left to right and to Look-ahead and fetch
k tokens. These parsers are called LL(k) parsers. These are advanced
parsers which can be used in a wide range of scenarios. These parsers
can be extended to memorising parsers or predicated parsers. The ANTLR
belongs to LL(k) Top-down parser group.
• Bottom-Up Parsers: As the name suggests, Bottom-Up Parsers start their
processes from the leaves and end it on the root. An LR(k) parser is consid-
ered the most efficient bottom-up parser[94].
Utilising a parser, whether it is top-down or bottom-up is not the only task in-
volved in implementing an external DSL, but choosing the right and appropriate
parser for an external DSL is the most important decision that must be made. Con-
sidering this, it seems there is now enough information available regarding DSL
implementation patterns to choose the most suitable one.
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6.3.6 Internal or External DSL
When it comes to software design, no universally applicable choice is available.
Each different approach can be justified individually, as each has its own advan-
tages and disadvantages. The DSL embedding design and development is not an
exception.
In the approach to designing the framework, the external DSL design pattern
was chosen. This is justified as follows:
A) Expressiveness: Although the scenarios that are covered by security policy
languages are limited, each can become extremely complicated. As a result, the
DSL should be flexible enough to cope with such requirements. Taking that into
account, internal DSLs may not be a good approach simply because exposing
a limited level of the functionality of the host language to DSL users while
covering a complicated scenario may not be easily achievable using internal
DSLs. As mentioned, usually in such scenarios, the expressiveness of DSL is
compromised.
B) Lack of Codebase: Internal DSLs are often used in scenarios where infrastruc-
ture and the knowledge base of a system exist; hence, the DSL can reuse the
majority of the existing code and/or infrastructure. The DSLs that are usually
written to engage domain experts to test the software in a DDD approach are
one example. Although the security policy languages will play an important
role in this framework, their codebase is not reused in the framework.
C) Design Freedom: In this framework, a new abstract language will be designed.
Such a language would be a standard security policy language, which will work
on top of the framework; thus, the language will need to be tailored in such a
way that it is more appropriate to this project. Such a luxury is not available
when internal DSLs are in use.
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6.4 External DSL Implementation
In the previous section, DSLs were reviewed from different perspectives in detail,
including the DSL concepts, advantages and disadvantage, different phases needed
for DSL design, appropriate DSL implementation patterns in accordance to this
project and the decision to use an external DSL pattern for the framework. In this
section, various external DSL implementation patterns are discussed in detail.
6.4.1 Anatomy of External DSL
External DSL design and implementation lifecycle follows the exact lifecycle of a
GPL. Similar to a GPL, an external DSL should receive textual input from the user,
parse and tokenise the input and eventually process the tokenised input based on
predefined business rules, which are known to the language. Figure 6.2 provides
simple illustration of the steps taken by an external DSL.
Assuming that implementation of an external DSL is desired, the parser of DSL,
which plays a significant role in an external DSL implementation, can be developed
using a pattern-matching technique. In very simple scenarios, parser output can
directly be fed into business rules and be processed without further manipulation;
however, in a majority of cases and certainly in the context of this research, the
parsed input must be modelled in a more formal way. Taking the similarity of
GPLs and external DSLs into account, the same technique used by GPLs, which is
Abstract Syntax Tree (AST), is used to model the parsed input script.
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Figure 6.2: Architectural Overview of External DSL
An abstract syntax tree or just syntax tree, is a tree representation of the abstract
syntactic structure of a source code written in a programming language. Each node
of the tree denotes a construct occurring in the source code. The syntax is abstract
and does not represent every detail appearing in the real syntax. The AST identifies
the structural representation of the language in a form that is independent of the
language syntax. Depending on the usage intention of AST, it is possible to use
AST expansion, with additional information such as object types, annotations and
other contextual notes, in the next stage of processing.
While working on an external DSL, enrichment of AST, which results in a se-
mantic model for the domain, plays a vital role in DSL implementation. In reality,
the semantic model is a data structure that is enhanced with domain semantics after
the DSL input (i.e. DSL scripts) are processed through the pipeline. Its structure is
independent of the DSL syntax and is more aligned to the application model of the
system. The semantic model would be responsible for decoupling the input syntax-
oriented scripting structure of the DSL from the target actions, as shown in Figure
6.3.
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In addition to the above, a well-designed semantic model of DSL would result
in a better testable DSL in its life-cycle.
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Figure 6.3: Boundaries of Semantic Model in External DSL
Semantic model, as described above, is not exclusive to external DSLs. In fact,
both internal and external DSLs use a semantic model. In internal DSLs, the host
language parser would be responsible for populating the semantic model, whereas
in external DSLs, the developer would be responsible for providing the DSL with a
parser to parse and process the DSL script and populate the semantic model [94].
6.4.2 External DSL Implementation Patterns in Details
Depending on the nature of the DSL and the parser that is used to design the DSL,
the external DSL implementation could vary. In addition, different people cat-
egorise external DSL implementations using different approaches. For instance
Fowler [87] categorises external DSL patterns based on the techniques which are
used in implementation while Debishesh [94] prefers to categorise them based on
their commonality. A brief description of these patterns is presented as follows:
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• Context-Driven String Manipulation: In this approach, a simple DSL script,
which cannot easily fit in any programming language (perhaps in order to use
an internal DSL implementation, as opposed to an external DSL), is parsed
by the parser and fed into an application depending on the type of the script
(delimiter or syntax-directed translation). In the delimiter-directed approach,
a delimiter, such as end-of-line or end-of-file, will be used to parse the script.
Whereas when using a syntax-delimited approach, a grammar (hierarchical
structure) with multiple levels of context must be defined beforehand, which
must be agreed upon and approved by both DSL developers and DSL users.
Almost always when context-driven approach is used, two distinctive levels
of syntactical analysis on the DSL scripts are used, namely:
A) Lexer, which is also called tokeniser or scanner and
B) Parser, While lexer is responsible for splitting the input to the tokens,
which represent more reasonable chunks of inputs, parser is responsible
for parsing and providing more in-depth and detailed information off the
DSL script.
• DSL Workbench: To recap, during external DSL implementation, popula-
tion and enrichment of AST would be a developer’s responsibility. Taking
that into account, if there is already a system available, which is capable of
maintaining the code in form of AST, that makes the development of external
DSLs much easier and faster. In addition, using such system would enable
easier transformation, manipulation and subsequent code generation of the
populated AST. Such a system would be a DSL Workbench. Eclipse Xtext
[28] and JetBrains [8] can be presented as examples of such systems which
offer external DSL (or even GPL) development.
• Parser Generators Using BNF and EBNF: Extended Backus-Naur Form
(EBNF), which is simply an extended version of Backus-Naur Form (BNF)
[43], is used to define the grammar of a programming language (including
DSLs which typically come with strong grammars). BNF was invented to de-
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scribe the Algol [132] language back in 1960s [87]. BNF grammars has been
widely used since that time to describe the syntax of programming languages
that adopt context-driven string manipulation.
DSL workbench, which was reviewed above, focuses on maintaining written
code in AST form. However, there are tools available, that generate parsers
in accordance with declaration, configuration and rule specified by the devel-
oper. These rules are defined using a syntax notation that is very similar to
EBNF. Generally, rules declare the grammar of the language. YACC [105]
and ANTLR [129] are two examples.
Unlike the previous two patterns where input scripts are processed after the
parsing is finished, in parser generator pattern, certain actions can be defined
to be embedded into the final production of the parser code. Such actions will
be triggered when certain patterns are matched by the parser.
• Parser Combinators. Working with embedded DSL code in the parser and
defining the grammar using EBNF type meta-programming cannot be cate-
gorised as the most appropriate way to implement external DSL codes.
Modern languages provide their users with a simple yet powerful tool, which
can be used to parse, express and define certain actions which must be taken
in accordance with the parsed script. The beauty of such an approach is that
while developers are in charge of generating the parser, they can simply per-
form the task by utilising the host language artifacts like classes, functions,
methods etc. Not to mention, they can achieve this using their favourite de-
velopment kit (as opposed to EBNF), which, in turn, make them more com-
fortable. Scala and C# both provide their users with parser combinators.
Certainly not every ASPL script that will be written for the framework are sim-
ple enough to fit into the Context-Driven String Manipulation pattern, hence this
pattern cannot be used for the framework. In the next chapter, implementation starts
by combining the Workbench and Parser generators using BNF and EBNF patterns.
This will be explained in details.
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6.5 Choosing a Programming Language
Irrespective of the DSL implementation approach, the development phase must be
started by coding in one programming language. However, choosing the correct
programming language was another challenge in this research. Even though most
of the available programming languages are sufficiently mature enough to satisfy a
developer in the beginning stages, the variety of these languages makes it difficult
to choose the right one.
In the beginning, it was clear that an external DSL would be created from the
outset. Such a decision had a direct impact on the available and shortlisted pro-
gramming languages which are capable of providing the tools for external DSL
development. Further research in this area revealed that the majority of modern
Java Virtual Machine (JVM) based languages are currently capable of developing
internal and external languages. However, .Net languages did not lose the battle
and remained neck and neck with JVM-based languages. For instance, the Irony
[133] framework is a parser generator framework for language implementation on
the .Net platform that can be easily compared to parser generators, which are pro-
vided by other powerful JVM languages like Scala. Admittedly, in addition to the
above criteria and facts, the knowledge base of the research team had an impact on
the language selected and diverted it to the JVM based languages.
Deciding between JVM-based or .Net languages was the least of problems that
the research had to overcome. A simple search shows that the majority of JVM-
languages (that was chosen as the base of programming language) are capable of
developing internal and external DSLs. Debasish, for instance, compares Clojure,
JRuby (or better said Ruby), Java and Scala in [94]. So the research had to ex-
plore various aspects, such as, which programming language is faster, comes with
less memory access footprint (to help the recursion) etc. As the result a number
of non-Java JVM-based languages papers were reviewed [136] [137]. Due to the
fast growth of these languages, most of these reports are out-dated. Out of those
comparisons, the comparison provided by Wing Hang Li et al. [117] fits perfectly
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within the context of this research.
They examined four non-Java JVM languages and used exploratory data anal-
ysis techniques [147] to investigate differences between these languages (in their
dynamic behaviour) to Java. They analysed a variety of programmes and their be-
haviour to draw distinctions between the different programming languages. The
languages they compared are widely chosen in DSL implementations and they are:
• Clojure: Clojure [96] is a LISP dialect, with support for advanced concur-
rency features, including actors and software transactional memory. It is a
functional language with dynamic typing.
• JRuby: JRuby [18] is a Java-based implementation of the Ruby [144] pro-
gramming language. It is a dynamic, object-oriented language.
• Jython: Jython [19] is an implementation of the Python language for the Java
platform. It is a dynamic, object-oriented language.
• Scala: Scala [127] is a functional and object-oriented programming language,
with a static typing discipline. It has advanced facilities for typing and con-
currency.
Figure 6.4 shows the data analysis techniques they applied to gain an under-
standing of the dynamic behaviour of the various programmes and languages.
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Figure 6.4: Schematic Diagram of Profiling Data Generation [117]
In this figure :
• N-gram Models: An N-gram is a sequence of N consecutive JVM byte-code
instructions within a single basic block. The authors considered the coverage
of observed N-grams in relation to the theoretical maximum.
• Principal Component Analysis (PCA): Principal Component Analysis is a
frequently used technique for dimension reduction, to aid visualisation and
comprehension. PCA works by choosing and combining dimensions that
contain the greatest variance. For each individual benchmark program, in
their report, the authors measure the relative frequency of each JVM byte-
code instruction to produce a 198-vector of values in the range [0-1] or a
39204-vector of values for 2-grams.
Boxplots, which is a convenient method of graphically depicting groups of nu-
merical data through their quartiles [3], have been used to summarise the distribu-
tions of data for measurements on methods and objects. In addition, the authors
have used Heat Maps to compare object lifetimes between the JVM languages.
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By performing static analysis on the language libraries and dynamic analysis on
a set of 75 benchmarks written in those languages and by using the above analysis
approach, they compared these languages at three levels, namely: instruction-level,
method-level and object-level, in details. They also provided users with their results.
All of their results are provided in Appendix C.
Finally, by studying the obtained results and comparing them with the other
related works, they concluded their results as follows:
• Instruction Level: At the instruction-level, non-Java benchmarks produce
N-grams not found within the Java benchmarks, suggesting they do not share
precisely the same instruction-level vocabulary as Java.
• Method Level: At the method-level, they have found Scala, in particular,
has much smaller methods than the other JVM languages. Both Clojure
and Scala applications exhibit deeper stack depths than other JVM language
benchmarks.
• Object Level: At the object-level, lifetimes of non-Java JVM languages are
generally shorter compared to Java. Especially on Clojure and Scala, object
sizes are smaller compared to Java. Finally, Wing Hang Li observed that
non-Java languages use more boxed primitive types than Java.
Although that there is no clear winner in this report, it seems that Clojure and
Scala are better performers and more enhanced among JVM-based languages, ac-
cording to the Wing Hang Li benchmarking. Considering this, these two lan-
guages were compared from different angles, demonstrating that Scala provides
much richer classes compared to Clojure, which is really limited in many ways. For
instance, Scala provides a wide range of arrays and primitives, but what Clojure
provides is not even close. Most importantly, the speeds of these two languages al-
most touch the two extremes. While Scala runs as fast as Java, Cojure users always
complain about its speed [4]. There is another fact that also remains, which turns
the table in Scala’s favour. Scala provides with a parser combinator, but this is not
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the case for Clojure. In the context of this research, this is an important fact, as it
may be necessary to design the external DSL based on the parser combinators. Due
to this, and all the other facts provided above, it was decided to use Scala as the
programming language.
6.6 Summary
6.6.1 Chapter Summary
In this chapter, different aspects of DSL design have been rigorously looked at.
The chapter started with a definition of DSL and expanded that to DSLs structure,
identified DSL stakeholders and its boundaries and continued the discussion with
the advantages and disadvantages of DSLs.
In second half of the chapter, the different phases of DSL design and develop-
ment were identified and reviewed step-by-step. The chapter concluded by carefully
exploring different DSL implementations and choosing the one that fits best in the
context of this research.
6.6.2 Research Contributions of the Chapter
Although Fowler refers to DSLs as a new name for an old idea [87], the number of
resources available in this specific arena is really limited and there are no authori-
tative documents available to demonstrate how the different stages of DSL design
and development could and should be applied to a real world scenario.
Throughout this research, as an additional contribution, it has been demon-
strated how different patterns of design and development can be adapted for a real
world DSL development scenario. In particular, in embedded DSL development,
which is currently considered a favourite DSL development approach, the lack of
a step-by-step guide to show which of the two flavours of this pattern (internal and
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external DSL development) should be adopted, is noticeable. This chapter shows
how the requirements of a project could come to the rescue, to answer the most
difficult question of embedded DSL development.
In addition, while a wide range of mature, well-documented and well-supported
programming languages with a spectrum of functionalities are available, there is
no black and white guideline that exists to explain which programming language
to choose for a DSL development. In this chapter, an easy method to illustrate
how to shortlist and filter the programming languages for DSL development, was
discussed.
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Implementation of the Framework
In this chapter, the research presents:
• The chosen methodology for the framework development,
• The framework requirements,
• The high level design of the framework,
• The framework iteration through low level deigns of the framework,
• Testing and evaluation of the framework,
• The research contributions of the chapter.
7.1 Software Methodology
The very first step that must be taken in almost all software development projects is
to choose an appropriate software development methodology. There are a number of
software methodologies that a project can utilise, the following list can be presented
as a subset:
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• Agile
• Extreme Programming
• Test driven Development
• Quick and Dirty
• KISS
Each of these methodologies comes with their own characteristics, advantages
and disadvantages. Out of the reviewed software methodologies, Agile has been
chosen for the development of the framework. The decision made can be justified
as follows:
• User Involvement: The fundamental of the Agile development is to give
the customer the highest priority. As a result, the customer is involved at
almost every step of the software development process, which results in a
more promising product at the end of the development phase. As the main
goal of a DSL in mind, that is providing an abstract language to a client,
Agile development would be a perfect match for DSL development [88].
• Cost: Cost is always an issue in the software development process. In addi-
tion, this imposes even more constraints on an academic project. Involvement
of the user in the early stages of the project implies smaller iterative changes
at early steps of the project. That prevents fundamental changes at the end of
the project, which could lead to unacceptable costs.
• Defect-Less Development: Traditional software development provides a soft-
ware to the client at the end of the software development process that must go
through the evaluation process and discover system defects. However, user
participation during Agile development suggests that the number of defects
found at the end of the development phase would be minimal.
• Shorter Development Cycle: Involvement of the end user in the software de-
velopment process also ensures an even faster software development process.
139
7.2. System Requirements
This becomes more visible when the system becomes ready for an overall test
and evaluation by the client.
• Size of the Project: Agile development may not be a prime choice for a dis-
tributed, multi-site or large-scale development team (although there are tech-
niques that can be applied to adapt even those projects with Agile develop-
ment). The small size of the present research development team also suggests
that Agile development could be considered the best software methodology
that can be adopted.
7.2 System Requirements
So far, it has been mathematically proven that the implementation of the framework
would work. In addition, an appropriate design and implementation method has
been chosen. However, the implementation phase cannot be started before a set of
detailed requirements for the system is defined. Such requirements could techni-
cally shape the implementation from the outset.
The requirements of the framework as the base for the system architecture
should ideally combine the advantages of various DSL implementation approaches,
to make it applicable to a large number of DSL scenarios. These properties (a num-
ber of them already reviewed in previous chapters) have been identified as follows.
These properties will be used to evaluate the approach and the framework towards
end of the project.
• To Reuse Host Language Infrastructure: The necessity of this property
seems obvious and can be considered as a must have on a majority if not all
embedded DSL implementations. The property includes but is not limited to
syntax, semantics and tools available for the host language.
• To Provide Well-Formed Measurements: Providing a measurement tool
to check the validity of DSL scripts against both syntactical (accordance to
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grammar) and contextual (e.g. scoping rules) restrictions would guarantee a
well-formed and valid policy as an outcome.
• Modular Semantics: Designing the DSL using modular semantics would
make it possible to benefit from reusable components that can be composed
with other semantics [102].
• To Implement a High Performance System: The property also can be con-
sidered as an obvious requirement, as this is a must have requirement for
almost all computerised applications.
• To Minimise Development Efforts: It cannot be emphasised enough that
the development of a DSL is an expensive task. Not to mention that it has
been decided to develop an external DSL for the policy framework with a
relatively more complicated development cycle compared to the internal DSL
development. Hence, the development of reusable modules, with the aim of
minimising efforts, is considered a vital requirement for the system.
In addition, it would be cost-effective if a level of automation were integrated
into the design. Model Driven Software Factories [70] (also known as Soft-
ware Workbenches [85]), which are described as a tool for Model Driven
Engineering, can be presented as an example. Software Model Driven Engi-
neering, MDE, aims to raise the level of abstraction in program specification
and increase automation in program development. The idea promoted by
MDE is to use models at different levels of abstraction for developing sys-
tems, thereby raising the level of abstraction in program specification. An
increase of automation in program development is reached using executable
model transformations. Higher-level models are transformed into lower level
models until the model can be made executable, using either code generation
or model interpretation [72].
• To Have Expandability: Expandability is the most desired feature of almost
all computerised systems and is usually requested by users. The framework of
the current research is not an exception. Knowing the fact that the framework
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will be prototyped for only candidate languages implies expandability of the
system is almost inevitable. The design should allow other policy languages
to be able to use and modify the system. More importantly, any expandability
of the system, with regards to adding new security policy languages to the
framework, most likely comes with a level of change in the grammar of the
DSL. Hence the grammar of the DSL also must be designed with the expand-
ability and flexibility in mind.
Although it may not be directly related to expandability of the system, the
design of the framework would preferably need to follow the loose coupling
approach. Loose coupling is an approach to interconnecting the components
in a computer based system design so that those components, also called el-
ements, depend on each other to the least extent practicable. The goal of a
loose coupling architecture is to reduce the risk that a change made within
one element will create unanticipated changes within other elements [135].
• To Present User-Friendly User Interface: The revelation of smartphones
and apps in recent years has exponentially raised the expectation of ordinary
users. Users often expect a clean and simple user interface which executes
their desired action(s). Simplicity in the user interface must play a significant
role in the design of framework.
• Security of the System: The other requirement that could impact the frame-
work design is the fact that the final product must work on a secured domain.
In other words, the framework, which sits next to the policy servers inside a
controlled and secured domain, should be designed in a way that imposes the
minimum security risk on the surrounding domains.
Having gone through the system requirements implies that the other stages of
implementation can be started. High Level Design (HLD) (Architecture) would be
the one to start with and then the discussion can be expanded to Low Level Design
(LLD).
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7.3 High Level Design
A HLD provides an overview of a solution, platform, system, product, service or
process. Such an overview is important in a development project to ensure that
each supporting component design will be compatible with its neighbouring com-
ponents’ designs.
The HLD also briefly describes all platforms, systems, products, services and
processes that it depends upon and includes any important changes that need to be
made. Typically HLD document would also include an High Level Architecture
(HLA) diagram visualising the components, interfaces and networks that need to be
further specified or developed [14].
With the HLD in mind, the HLA of the system can be proposed as detailed in
Figure 7.1. In this Figure, there are several components that are interacting with
each other, a list of these documents, their responsibilities and brief descriptions are
listed in the next section.
7.3.1 High Level Architecture of the Framework
One of the core requirements of the system is to minimise development efforts. As a
result, it has been decided to build the framework by utilising MDA. The discussion
on the system components continues by briefly reviewing the components that have
been used in the proposed architecture.
Eclipse
Initially originated from IBM VisualAge [36] code-base, Eclipse, which is an open
source Integrated Development Environment (IDE), has been used during the soft-
ware development phase of the current research. It contains a base workspace and
an extendable plug-in system for customising the environment. Written mostly in
Java, Eclipse can be used to develop Java applications. Eclipse may also be used to
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Figure 7.1: The Proposed HLA of the Framework
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develop applications in other programming languages by utilising necessary plug-
ins.
The Eclipse Software Development Kit (SDK), which includes the Java develop-
ment tools, is meant to be for Java developers; however, users can extend its abilities
by installing plug-ins written for the Eclipse platform, such as development toolkits
for other programming languages and can write and contribute their own plug-in
modules.
Eclipse employs plug-ins in order to provide all of its functionality on top of
(and including) the rich client platform. This plug-in mechanism is a lightweight
software framework. The plug-in architecture supports writing any desired exten-
sion to the environment. The key to the seamless integration of tools with Eclipse
is the plug-in. With the exception of a small run-time kernel, everything in Eclipse
is a plug-in [11].
EMF / EMF(Core)
The Eclipse Modelling Framework (EMF) project is a modelling framework and
code generation facility for building tools and other applications based on a struc-
tured data model. From a model specification described in XML, EMF provides
tools and runtime support to produce a set of Java classes for the model, along
with a set of adaptor classes that enable viewing and command-based editing of the
model and a basic editor.
EMF consists of three fundamental pieces:
• EMF(Core): The core EMF framework includes a meta model, which is
called ECore and is used for describing models and providing run-time sup-
port for the models. That includes change notification, persistence support
with default XMI serialisation and a very efficient reflective API for manipu-
lating EMF objects.
• EMF(Edit): The EMF (Edit) framework includes generic reusable classes
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for building editors for EMF models.
• EMF(Codegen): The EMF code generation facility is capable of generating
everything needed to build a complete editor for an EMF model. It includes a
user interface from which generation options can be specified and generators
can be invoked. The generation facility takes advantage of the Java Develop-
ment Tooling (JDT) component of Eclipse [10].
Xtext
While external DSL implementation patterns, to be more specific, DSL benchmark-
ing, were reviewed, Xtext was briefly introduced. Due to the ease of use and flex-
ibility of Xtext, it is one of the most used products developed and provided by
openArchitectureWare (oAW), which is a leading provider of tools utilising MDA
approach. Xtext is heavily dependent on EMFCore.
In summary, Xtext is a framework for the development of programming lan-
guages. It covers all aspects of a complete language infrastructure, from parsers,
over linker, compiler, or interpreter to fully-blown IDE integration. It comes with
good defaults for all these aspects, and at the same time, every single aspect can
be tailored to the users’ needs. At the core of Xtext, there is a workflow engine al-
lowing the definition of generator/transformation workflows. A number of pre-built
workflow components can be used for reading and instantiating models, checking
them for constraint violations, transforming them into other models and then finally,
for generating code [28].
In conclusion, based on an EBNF-like notation, Xtext generates the following
artifacts:
• A parser that can read the textual syntax and returns an EMF-based AST
(model).
• A set of AST classes represented as an EMF-based meta-model.
• A number of helper artifacts to embed the parser in an oAW workflow.
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• An Eclipse editor that provides syntax highlighting, code completion, code
folding, a configurable outline view and static error checking for the given
syntax [77].
Xpand
Xpand is another subject that was also briefly reviewed while reviewing code gen-
erators in the previous chapter, under the DSL benchmarking section. Summed
up briefly, in an MDA approach with the aim of consistency across the domain, at
some point, the populated model must be transformed and synced with different
project-specific artifacts like source code. This would be the responsibility of the
generators. In addition, refactoring, specialisation and annotation also can be done
using generators.
Since Xtext populates an AST based meta-model, a generator to produce codes
on-the-fly and easily integrate with Xtext was needed. The other criteria that had to
be considered was that Scala was chosen as the programming language, therefore,
the generator should be capable of generating Scala code on-the-fly.
There was only one code generator option available to choose from: Oitok.
Oitok was the only known generator that was capable of generating Scala code by
transforming an AST-based model. Unfortunately, integration of Oitok into Xtext
was not easy and resulted in many problems. It was then decided to replace it
with another generator. Since using a non-Scala based code generator was the only
choice available, it was decided to choose a Java-based generator with the aim to
integrate the generated Java code to Scala-based framework project. As the result,
it has been decided to choose a well-known generator that comes with a good repu-
tation amongst developers; Xpand.
Xpand is a statically-typed template language featuring the following:
• Polymorphic template invocation.
• Aspect oriented programming.
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• Functional extensions.
• A flexible type system abstraction.
• Model transformation.
• Model validation.
It includes an editor, which provides features that are handy when it comes to
DSL development. A short list of these features are as follows:
• Syntax colouring.
• Error highlighting.
• Navigation.
• Refactoring.
• Code completion.
Similar to Xtext, Xpand was also developed as part of the OpenArchitecture-
Ware project, before it became a component under Eclipse [9].
Dependency Injection
By definition, Dependency Injection (DI) is a software design pattern in which one
or more dependencies are injected into a dependent object and are made part of the
client’s state. The pattern separates the creation of a client’s dependencies from its
own behaviour, which allows program designs to be loosely coupled [86].
The main advantage of DI is loosely coupling the various parts of the application
to each other. In the context of this research, there are numbers of places where
utilising such a functionality would become useful.
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• Dependency injection allows a client to remove all knowledge of a concrete
implementation that it needs to use. This specific characteristic of DI helps
different parts of the framework to remain isolated and protected from the
impact of design changes. This indeed, in turn, meets the modularity and
reusability requirements of the system.
• Dependency injection can be used to externalise a system’s configuration de-
tails into configuration files. Knowing the fact that different code generators
would eventually use the system, each of which come with their own con-
figuration, this specific feature of DI would help individual configurations
for different security policy language implementation to be written indepen-
dently.
7.3.2 HLA Components
The HLA components can be described in details as follows. Starting from the top,
these components can be seen in the diagram:
A) System Administrator: Refers to the person responsible for reading the secu-
rity policy written by the security officer (please refer to Section 2.1) and trans-
lating it to a security policy written in the abstract language known as DSL. The
administrator would need to interact with the system. This could be done via an
editor, IDE or even a browser.
B) System UI: A system UI is a user interface that allows a system administrator to
communicate with the system. The UI could utilise a variety of products from
a simple text editor to a sophisticated IDE running on an smartphone.
C) Concrete DSL: This represents the concrete semantic model of the DSL. Typ-
ically these are the DSL objects/classes that textually model the DSL (in terms
of programming). Policy generators will use the model during the next stages
of DSL transformation.
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D) DSL Properties: These represent the DSL specific configuration files that shape
the DSL, such as DSL grammar and DSL configuration files. These properties
are used by the framework to manage the DSL during runtime.
E) Framework API: In order to loosely couple the language specific part of the
policy framework from the core model of the framework, this component has
been used. The API is used to connect the external policy generators/UI to the
DSL framework.
F) Policy Generators: Policy generators are stand-alone pieces of code that are
responsible for generating security policy code (script), written in specific se-
curity policy languages. These codes are generated based on the concrete DSL
(i.e. the parsed model of the DSL) in accordance of the rules imposed and en-
forced by DSL meta-models (configurations). Output of these units will be fed
directly to security policy servers i.e. PAP (cf. Section 2.3 for more details)
G) DSL Developer: This refers to developers who are responsible for maintaining
the DSL framework as an independent, abstract code that is capable of parsing
the DSL scripts and semantically modelling the DSL in accordance with the
enforced rules and grammar.
H) Back-end Developer: This represents those developers who are responsible for
producing policy generators that are capable of analysing the modelled DSL
(based on the DSL concretes) and generating the language specific security pol-
icy code. A DSL developer and back-end developer must work in collabora-
tion, as sometimes plugging more security policy languages into the framework
implies manipulating the DSL grammar and meta-model accordingly. As an
example, assume that a new policy is added to the framework that provides a
feature, which is not offered by other policies. If that is the case, then the DSL
grammar must be modified in a way that incorporates the new functionality into
the system, to be used by the newly added policy language. This would require
collaboration between the back-end developer and DSL developer.
I) TMF: Textual Modelling Framework (TMF) framework represents a black box
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that reads the input DSL scripts and provide users with a model. The black box
consists of the following internal components:
• Meta-Model Abstraction Layer: This represents a meta-model of a parsed
DSL script based on the rules dictated by the DSL properties. Such a
meta-model will be used by other parts of the TMF (such as Model to text
(M2T)) to produce a fine-grained model.
• Parser Generators: This is a parser that reads the textual representation
of the model and instantiates the corresponding final model.
• AST: This stands as the representative of the final model, which is de-
scribed as the output of the TMF framework.
7.4 Low Level Design
By utilising Xtext, a low level architecture of the framework can be presented as in
Figure 7.2.
Starting from the TMF framework, which is in the middle of the framework
going outward, the following components can be identified:
1) TMF Framework: Xtext has been used as the TMF framework in this archi-
tecture. Knowing the fact that it is heavily dependent on Eclipse, the following
components have been delivered to the project without any cost, as the result of
Xtext usage. This satisfies the requirement of the framework, which necessitate
minimal development costs and efforts.
a) System UI: A feature-rich Eclipse editor (based on the Eclipse text editor
infrastructure) that is aware of the concrete syntax specified. The editor sup-
ports syntax highlighting, code completion, navigation (hyperlinks), hovers,
folding, outline, and other features known from Eclipse text editors.
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Figure 7.2: The Proposed Low Level Architecture of the Framework
b) Parser Generator: Xtext provides users with an ANTLR-based parser gen-
erator, which reads the input scripts and parses it based on the DSL properties
and grammar and provides users with the corresponding model.
c) Abstract Syntax Tree: As previously mentioned, Xtext utilises an ECore-
based AST. To recap, ECore is one of the main three components of the
Eclipse Modelling Framework.
d) M2T Transformer: Initially, the Oitok framework was used as code genera-
tor (Transformer) because it produced Scala-based textual representatives of
the model. Unfortunately, due to the many issues encountered during incor-
porating Oitok into Xtext, it was decided to replace it with Xpand. Xpand
produces Java classes, helpers etc. by traversing through the ECore model.
e) Xtext: Xtext sits in the middle of the architecture and plays a significant
role in design. It glues the different components of the architecture together.
Briefly put, when using Xtext, the language rules (or in case of this research,
the DSL grammar rules) first need to be defined in EBNF syntax. Xtext then
uses that and utilises ANTLR to build an ECore semantic AST model out of
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the input DSL script.
2) DSL Properties: DSL properties in this architecture consist of two parts:
a ) DSL Grammar: Xtext uses an EBNF notation style for the representation
of DSL grammar.
b ) DSL Configuration: There are two different types of configurations avail-
able in this architecture, global and localised configurations. Global con-
figurations are properties that are valid across the project, for instance, the
output directory of the language specific policies generated by the frame-
work. Localised configurations, however, focus on each policy generators
and their specific configurations. The naming conventions used in specific
security policy language generators is an example.
c ) Dependency Injection: DI plays a significant role in the design of enter-
prise applications to make different parts of the application independent, yet
configurable from a single point of view. In order to deliver a configuration
to each individual policy generator code, the Spring Inversion of Control
(IOC) (equivalent to DI) [25] has been used.
The Spring framework provides many modules and its core has IOC con-
tainer. Spring’s IOC container is light-weight and it manages the dependency
between objects using configurations. Based on the configuration manged by
users, Spring IOC links the related objects together, instantiates and supplies
them to the code.
7.4.1 Design Review Round 1
During the design and implementation phase, a User Centric Design (UCD) ap-
proach has been adopted. The user centric design is a process that is mainly focused
on the user interface design of the system, which pays extensive attention to user’s
needs, wants and limitations of the end-users product, service or process at each
stage of the design process. The UCD may not be fully restricted to interfaces or
technologies used to develop the end user product [121].
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In order to obtain end user’s feedback, that includes system administrator and
DSL developer (please refer to Section 6.3.2.), in a more realistic and enhanced
way, PoC approach have been adopted through the implementation phase. A PoC is
a realisation of a certain method or idea to demonstrate its feasibility, whose purpose
is to verify that some concept has the potential for use. A PoC is usually small and
may or may not be complete.
Considering this, a PoC version of the design has been implemented. The prod-
uct implemented the design, which was presented in a previous section and was
made available to system administrators with the aim of obtaining their feedback.
Also, the very same PoC has been shared among DSL-developers and other inde-
pendent developers, in order to capture their points of view as well. The PoC, as
described above, is also used to demonstrate that the chosen technologies and prod-
ucts, which are closely tied together, are capable of communicating with each other
in order to produce the final result.
7.4.2 Capturing Feedback
System administrators, end users and DSL developers’ feedback have been captured
through a series of interviews, observation of behaviour and a simple questionnaire.
The results of all these activities are detailed below.
A) End User’s Point of View
Users had three major issues with the design provided, which are listed below:
1. Security Concerns: The low level design that utilises textual to model frame-
work was heavily dependent on the Eclipse platform. That implied that two
individual components had to be installed on the end users’ computers in or-
der to make the framework functional. These two component were the Java
development kit (JDK) and the Eclipse platform.
Although installing these two components take a fraction of an hour and
seemed a minor change, this raised a major concern to the end user. It
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should be noted that the framework’s end users are security administrators
of secured domains and their computer systems are sitting behind a layer of
tight protections. Although none of the above products (i.e. Java and the
Eclipse platform) considered harmful software, regardless of type and ven-
dor of a software product, installing the products in a secured domain raises
questions and will not be considered as trivial exercise.
2. Usability: Dependency of the interoperability framework was under ques-
tion, as each and every system administrator computers that wanted to use
the framework also had to install these two products (i.e., the JDK and the
Eclipse platform). Although this could be considered an acceptable ap-
proach, because only certain people would be able to access the security
policy servers. However, changing system administrator computers, per-
haps due to a fault or an upgrade, implies that the above mentioned software
needed to be installed again on those computers. Otherwise, system admin-
istrators could not manage the security servers through the framework.
3. Look and Feel: While concerns that arose above were correct and reason-
able, the main reason that the design was rejected by the end user was the
look and feel of the framework and to be more precise, the Eclipse IDE. The
Eclipse IDE is designed for development and comes with too many features,
which are all useful to main user of the IDE (i.e., developers and program-
mers). However, that is not the case for the end users of the framework, who
are non-technical individuals (in terms of programming and using IDE). The
look and feel of the Eclipse IDE was not described as user-friendly by the
users; therefore, they rejected the design concept. Figure 7.3 shows a snap-
shot of the Eclipse IDE, which was generated by the Xtext framework.
B) Developer’s Point of View
The PoC was also shared with developers. Generally, the feedback received
from experienced developers was positive, but they also questioned the user-
friendliness of the architecture. Xtext uses EBNF style grammar notation, which
dictates the overall grammar of the DSL. The developers did not welcome using
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Figure 7.3: A Snapshot of Xtext (Eclipse) Environment
such an abstract language in the design (Language Cacophony). The reason can
be presented as:
• The EBNF is effectively another language. The DSL developers should
learn and understand how to code EBNF, before they can maintain the
DSL through its evolution. The framework should be able to accept more
and more security policy languages as time goes by, hence the EBNF rules,
which shape the DSL, are subject to change and modification. That implies
that the DSL developers must know the EBNF abstract language inside
out. The learning curve would definitely have an effect on the timeline of
a project. In addition, it increases the costs of a project as the result of
extended timelines.
• Generally, developers are always open to understanding and learning new
technologies and languages. However, that may not be the case for EBNF,
as EBNF is an abstract language, with unique requirements. It is not com-
parable to a general-purpose programming language. The projects, sce-
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narios and occasions that such an abstract language can be used are only
a handful, hence, there would be no motivation for developers to learn the
language.
C) Overall Expandability of the System
In addition to using Xtext, which has been built around EBNF, there are few
other limitations:
• Initially Xtext was designed to accommodate the development of simple
languages and DSLs. Although the Xtext framework itself has been en-
hanced over the time, the above characteristic was passed down to the new
versions of Xtext. Hence, it only should be considered for development of
simple DSLs.
• The EBNF itself is inadequate for defining complex forms of grammar.
In other words, it cannot easily be used to define and enforce complex
scenarios. That could cause a major impact on the framework presented by
this research, when it comes to defining and producing complex security
policies [30]. Not to mention, the EBNF is a linear language and that may
not be a prime choice for describing security policy languages.
Due to the limitations and feedback received from end users and experienced
developers, it was decided to enhance the design by dropping Xtext and using
an alternative solution in the way that the following two requirements remain
intact:
A) The architecture of the framework should not change fundamentally and
B) The overall development costs and efforts of the framework should not in-
crease significantly.
Figure 7.4 visualises the issues raised by users, based on the framework non-
functional requirements defined in Chapter 3. A snapshot of the questioner that
have been used to capture participants’ opinion on the provided PoC is provided in
Appendix E.
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Figure 7.4: Percentage of Complaints/Issues Grouped by Framework Requirements
7.5 Restructure of the Design
Using Xtext in the middle of the design has helped to achieve a few system require-
ments as explained in the previous section, namely, reducing the cost by applying
an MDA design, reducing development efforts and reusing the host language infras-
tructure. However, using Xtext imposes a level of restriction and discomfort to the
end user of the framework. As a result, it was decided to use other alternatives to
replace components offered by Xtext.
Preferably, the alternative solution should also provide the two advantages of
Xtext, a low cost, low effort solution. Due to the removal of Xtext, the majority of
its components had to be rewritten from scratch. Although that could be considered
as a disadvantage of the new design, it could also add to the overall flexibility of
the framework. Such an approach would put the developers in control of the code
to the greatest extent. Rewriting these components implies the code would be more
maintainable and expandable, compared to the architecture that utilised Xtext.
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7.5.1 Parser Combinators
The first component (which was replaced) was the parser. Scala, as a host language,
provides a unique functionality called the Parser Combinator, which was explained
briefly in the previous chapter. In functional programming, a parser combinator is
a higher-order function, which accepts several parsers as input and returns a new
parser as output. It follows the Pipe-Line design pattern, as described in detail
in Section 5.3.3. A parser combinator provides users with a level of comfort that
includes easy construction, readable code, a modular approach, a well-structured
parser and an easily maintainable project. They have been used extensively in the
prototyping of compilers and processors for DSLs [94].
The history of parser combinators goes back to late 1980s, when R. Frost and J.
Launchbury demonstrated the use of a parser combinator to construct a natural lan-
guage interpreter in 1989 [59]. They have been in use since then and most recently,
Frost, Hafiz and Callaghan described a set of parser combinators in Haskell to solve
the long-standing problem of accommodating left recursion [90]. In Scala, parsers
are implemented as monads, hence defining combinators for parsers is just monadic
transformations, alternation or any other composition operations [93].
Using parser combinators facilitated meeting a few of the design requirements:
there was a reduction in the effort and cost of the project and reuse of the host lan-
guage infrastructure. Using a parser generator has other advantages that are detailed
below.
• Developing the framework’s parser using combinators is easy, well docu-
mented and almost comparable with Xtext with regards to cost and devel-
opment efforts.
• There are abstract data types available in Scala to generates AST using parser
combinators.
• It comes with a great pattern-matching engine, which enables dealing with
complex security policies [93].
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• Unlike Xtext, using a combinator does not require any extra languages to be
taught to the developers. In fact, they would be able to pick up the concept
easily, because the final product of the parser combinator would be in Scala
code.
In addition to the Parser Combinator that replaced the ANTLR-based Xtext
parser in the architecture, the following components were enhanced, replaced or
added to the HLD:
• Semantic Model: The other free component that had to be replaced, as the
result of abandoning Xtext, was the semantic model which comes with it.
Usually populating the AST-based model by Xtext happens beyond user’s
control. However, in the new system architecture, that luxury vanished and
everything had to be rewritten from the ground up.
As a result, a customised AST tree in Scala was written and joined with the
newly written and configured parser combinators, so that the AST could be
populated on-the-fly by the parser. The AST has been revolutionised through-
out the development process in order to accommodate more branches and
present a more realistic view of the parsed tree.
• User Interface: Using Xtext implies that the user would be able to use an
Eclipse editor free of charge. Although that could be considered a huge ben-
efit for using Xtext, in the case of the current research, the complexity of the
IDE increased the end user’s discomfort; therefore, in the new design, it was
decided to use an alternative solution that should preferably address a few
issues raised by the Eclipse editor:
A) The replacement solution should be simple and fit for purpose.
B) It should add to the usability of the framework.
C) The usability should not compromise the performance of the system.
In response to these requirements, it was decided that a browser would be
used in order to interact with the framework. Using http for communication
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with the framework would definitely increase the usability of the system and
would meet the other requirements, which are listed above. However, using
the browser implies that an embedded browser-based editor must be incor-
porated into the system. A number of browser embedded editors were re-
viewed, including CodeMirror [5], Ace [15], CodePress [120], EditArea [12]
and Ymacs [1]. After reviewing these editors in detail and considering the
functionalities provided, it was decided that Ace, a JavaScript editor, would
be an editor fit for the purpose.
Ace is a standalone JavaScript code editor that is specifically designed to
work as browser-based code editor that matches and extends the features,
usability and performance of existing native editors, such as TextMate, Vim
or Eclipse. Ace can be easily embedded in any webpage and JavaScript-based
applications.
Features and advantages of Ace editor are:
– Syntax highlighting.
– Automatic indent and out-dent.
– An optional command line.
– Can handle huge documents.
– Fully customisable key bindings including VI and Emacs modes.
– Provided with different themes to choose from.
• Syntax Provider and Validation Engine: The other two components that
have been written from the scratch are the syntax provider and the validation
engine. The syntax provider is in charge of defining the DSL syntax. The
DSL syntax orchestrates the parser combinator’s behaviour. In addition, it
was used as an input to the validation engine.
The validation engine has two distinctive responsibilities. It communicates
with syntax provider on both of the following scenarios:
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A) The validation engine will be used to validate and approve the parsed
DSL script in accordance with the defined grammar rules provided by
syntax provider and present users with appropriate message(s) should
the validation fail.
B) It will also be invoked by the UI to provide users with syntax errors and
or automatic code completion, while users are typing DSL scripts within
the user interface.
• Dependency Injection: We reviewed the Spring IOC previously. There are
contradictory views available on Spring IOC. Some believe that Spring IOC
is a fantastic piece of code, which helps readability, maintainability, and ex-
pandability of the system. On the other hand, some believe the opposite.
However, a majority of these two sets of reviewers believe that Spring IOC is
a heavyweight tool. Such a tool with a multitude of features, functionalities
and abilities is a must have component for enterprise and multi-level applica-
tions, but for standalone applications, Spring IOC could be considered a tool
that over-engineers the whole design.
By removing Xtext, the framework became a pure Scala project and after
reviewing the Spring IOC, a different DI for Scala applications was chosen,
namely, Cake.
There are a number of ways to perform DI in Scala without adding a frame-
work. The cake pattern is one popular approach. This pattern was first ex-
plained in Odersky’s paper, Scalable Component Abstractions [128], as the
way he and his team structured the Scala compiler. It works based on Scala
traits [127] that are very similar to the interfaces in Java, but unlike Java,
Scala allows partial implementation of the traits.
Figure 7.4 shows the enhanced architecture of the framework, as detailed above.
There’s one last important note before the discussion of the design enhancement
is ended. It was decided that a browser-based editor approach would be used on this
framework. That implies that the requests coming from the user must be captured
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Figure 7.5: The Restructured Architecture of the Framework
and passed to the framework. In web based application architecture, that would be
the responsibility of a webserver. As a result, PlayFramework [16], a Scala-based
web server was installed and surrounded the framework in order to achieve the goal;
however, installing, tuning and maintaining the web server was considered out of
the research’s scope.
7.6 Detailed Design
So far, a few concepts which have attracted developers in recent years have been
reviewed in detail, namely, Domain Driven Design and Domain Specific Language.
The other concepts that will be discussed in this chapter are: Test Driven Develop-
ment (TDD) and Behaviour Driven Development (BDD).
In a nutshell, test driven development is a software development process that re-
lies on the repetition of a very short development cycle i.e. first the developer writes
an automated test case that defines and tests a desired output of a new function, then
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the developer produces the minimum amount of code to pass that test and finally,
refactors the new code to the acceptable standards.
BDD, however, in software engineering, is a software development process that
emerged from test-driven development. BDD combines the general techniques and
principles of TDD with ideas from domain-driven design and object-oriented anal-
ysis and design, to provide software development teams with shared tools and a
shared process to collaborate on software development [2]. BDD is based on prin-
ciples of Hoare logic [101] .
BDD developments starts by defining the behaviour of a function that has to be
written. In principal, this can be achieved by a story. The story should clearly and
precisely answer the following three questions:
• Who is the main stakeholder of this specific story?
• Which output does the stakeholder want from the story?
• What business value will the stakeholder gain from the story output?
The story also should describes the condition(s) (including event triggers) that
expected to be true when the story is commenced. Describing more stories using
BDD approach would gradually results a Ubiquitous Language which is shared
amongst different parties who are participating in software development (Please
refer to Section 6.3.2 that describes DDD in details). The listing 7.1 describes one
single scenario (story) which is described in BDD.
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AS A: System Administrator.
I WANT TO: Add time constraint to the system.
In ORDER TO: Restrict user access to the system outside
working hours.
GIVEN: A system that is secured by a security policy,
AND: A user who is allowed to use the system,
WHEN: His/her access to the system should be restricted to
the working hours by the policy,
THEN: Any violation of the policy should be logged into the
security log-file.
Listing 7.1: Example of BDD Story
The example provided in listing 7.1 provides stakeholder of the story, desired
output of the story and its business value to the environment. Using the ubiquitous
language, the above story is modelled and the following DSL script is derived from
it.
Protect
Target "mySystem"
for executing
Actions "access"
from
Subjects "systemUser"
under following
Subject Conditions "8:00 < time < 17:30"
do
Obligation Action "LogViolation"
Listing 7.2: Example of DSL Script
Listing 7.2 shows the DSL script which has been generated from the story that
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is described in BDD. In the next step, the parser combinator which is responsible
for parsing and populating the semantic model (AST) must be developed. Listing
7.3 and 7.4 show part of the parser combinator which reads and parses the above
script and the AST model of the script, respectively.
lazy val policyType : Parser[PolicyType]=
"Protect" ^^^ Protect | "Allow" ^^^ Allow
lazy val targets : Parser[Targets] =
"Targets" ~> rep1sep(target, "AND") ^^ Targets
lazy val target : Parser[Target] = stringLit ^^ Target
lazy val subjects : Parser[Subjects] =
"from" ~> "Subjects" ~> rep1sep(subject, "AND") ^^ Subjects
lazy val subject : Parser[Subject] = stringLit ^^ Subject
lazy val actions : Parser[Actions] =
"for" ~> "executing" ~> "Actions" ~> rep1sep(action, "AND")
^^ Actions
lazy val action : Parser[Action] = stringLit ^^ Action
Listing 7.3: Parser Combinator Written in Scala
By adopting the procedure detailed above and through an iterative agile ap-
proach, the framework has been gradually taught different features and functions
provided by different security policy languages candidates.
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7.7 Enhancing the Framework
There were two features requested by the users, which have been accommodated
in the high level design, but their implementation was considered outside the scope
of the project; both have been categorised for further work. These two features are
described below:
trait BaseTarget
case class Target(identifier : String) extends BaseTarget
case class Targets (list: Seq[Target])
trait BaseAction
case class Action(identifier : String)extends BaseAction
case class Actions (list: Seq[Action])
case class Condition(lineCondition : String)
case class ConditionList (colList: Seq[Condition])
trait BaseObligation
case class Obligation(identifier : String) extends
BaseObligation
case class Obligations (list: Seq[Obligation])
case class Policy ( policyType : PolicyType,
targets : Targets,
subjects : Subjects,
conList : ConditionList,
actions : Actions,
obligations : Obligations
)
Listing 7.4: AST Model Written in Scala
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7.7.1 Limitation of Access to the System
In order to improve usability, it was decided that a browser-based approach would
be used to interact with the framework. This addresses the usability concern, which
was raised by users when they reviewed the framework; however, it creates another
level of threat to the framework: Unauthorised Access. This can be categorised as
an internal threat (please refer to Section 2.1). Using the browser-based approach,
an unauthorised user inside the secured domain can access the system. Although
this level of threat is considered internal and it has a lower risk compared to external
threats, yet the issue must be resolved. There are a number of ways that unautho-
rised access can be prevented. The methods are categorised by their level of impact
on the provided solution as follows:
A) Adding a Database to the System: Perhaps adding a database to the system
would be the simplest yet most effective way to secure the framework against
unauthorised access, without over-engineering the entire architecture. By adding
a database, which could be an open source database like MySQL, the users of
the framework will be provided with a username and password. User creden-
tials will then be encrypted using an encryption algorithm appropriate to the
database. Encryption of the user credentials in the database would protect the
framework from internal threats, in case authorised access to the database is
compromised. That also would add to the overall security of the system.
An advantage of such an approach is the simplicity of the solution. A disad-
vantage, however, is that a new component must be added to the architecture.
Although such a component (i.e. the database) can be used for other purposes
(covered in the next section), that implies more functionality must be added to
the system. As an example, a back-office page must be written in order to man-
age and maintain the system users (e.g., adding, removing and/or deleting the
users). Other functionalities, such as a forgotten password or reset password,
must be added to the system in order to maintain the usability of the system.
B) Restricting Users’ Access to the System by IP/Mac Address: Knowing the fact
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that the framework is located inside a secure domain, access to the server that
hosts the framework can be limited using the IP address and/or Media Access
Control (MAC) address of the requester. Such restrictions can be accomplished
by adding authorised IP or MAC addresses to the surrounding firewalls that
protect the system.
This approach would eliminate the necessity of an extra component for the
system, but again, a level of administration is needed to protect the system by
means of adding and removing addresses that can access the framework. The
security of the system would be entirely dependent on the firewalls and the
firewall administrators. A combination of A and B would be the most secure
approach.
C) Restricting User’s Access to the System by Token. As it has been mentioned
within the introduction of the research, the main users of the framework will
be multi-domain organisations, which generally utilise layers of protection in
their organisations; for example, large-scale financial institutes like banks have
additional precautions. Knowing that many organisations are currently using
one-time tokens to allow their users to access different parts of the network, the
framework can be connected into the security infrastructure of the organisation.
By taking this approach, a few pages must be added to the framework in order
to challenge users and capture their one-time token password in addition to
their credentials. Also, an extra piece of code must be written to send the
captured information to the central token validation centre, which is responsible
for validating the tokens. The same piece of code would be responsible for
receiving the response back from the validation unit and allowing or denying a
requester’s access to the framework.
This approach does not need any extra components and the security of the sys-
tem remains within the boundaries; however, the solution assumes the existence
of the one-time token password generators and a validation server.
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7.7.2 Increasing the Accuracy of the Framework by Reasoning
The second feature which has been requested by the end user was improving the
accuracy of the framework. It has been mentioned before that majority of security
policies use a simple yet effective pattern: who can access what under which cir-
cumstances. On the other hand, users are provided with an abstract language to code
the policies. Taking these two facts into account shows that even such an abstract
language like DSL can be optimised over the time. More usage of the system will
reveal the best way to describe a specific security policy using the DSL.
Considering that there might be a possibility of adding a database to the overall
architecture of the system, the accuracy of the system can be enhanced by adding
a reasoning manager. The reasoning manager would walk through the populated
AST of the parsed input DSL script and collect certain keywords that have been
used within the scripts. Then, it queries the database for best-practised policies
written using the abstract language and feeds the found best practice(s) back to the
user via the UI.
Figure 7.5 reveals the enhanced architecture of the framework, as detailed above.
7.8 Testing and Evaluation
Testing and evaluation of the application has been divided into three distinctive tasks
as follows:
• Assessing the framework against requirement.
• Assessing the framework against acceptance criteria.
• Assessing by evaluation of the framework.
Combination of the above tasks validated the approach taken to implement the
framework.
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Figure 7.6: The Enhanced Architecture of the Framework
7.8.1 Evaluation the Framework Against Software Requirements
Requirements of the system were discussed back in the Chapter 3 and at the begin-
ning of this chapter. Just to recap, the requirements of the system were a mixture of
experts’ opinion on how the framework should operate and the advantage of DSL
implementation pattern that has been adopted. In this section, the framework’s re-
quirements will be assessed against the proposed architecture and its requirements.
• To Reuse Host Language Infrastructure: It has been decided to implement
the framework by adopting an embedding pattern. That would imply reuse
of the host language infrastructure. The second design of the framework, in
particular, is purely based on Scala and the features provided by the language.
• To Provide Well-formed Measurements: Both the first and second designs
of the system provide code-completion and syntax check to the users. Such
facilities ensure the validity of written DSL script against both syntactical
(accordance to grammar) and contextual (e.g. scoping rules) restrictions.
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• Modular Semantics: In Section 7.5.1, it has been shown how a feature of the
host language can be used as a reusable component that can be put together
to make a chain of parsers. Using parser combinators, a pipeline of parser
components have been designed and implemented that has been utilised by
the framework to parse the DSL scripts.
• To Implement a High Performance System: The framework has gone through
different stages of testing in order to ensure reliability and accuracy of the sys-
tem. A detailed list of these tests, all of which passed with a great level of
confidence, will be provided in the next section.
• To Minimise Development Efforts: Knowing the fact that the development
of a DSL is an expensive task, a great level of attention has been paid to
minimise the development efforts in both stages of design. MDE, in particu-
lar, has been adopted during the first phase to satisfy this requirement of the
framework. During the second round, parser combinators have been used to
minimise development costs of a performant parser from ground up.
• To Have Expandability: The way that the framework was designed and
tested using features provided by security policy language candidates, proved
that expandability is an achievable target within the scope of the project. Util-
ising decoupling technique, in addition to designing a DSL language that is
independent of underlying security policy languages, ensures expandability
of the system in future.
• To Present User-Friendly UI: Simplicity is the most desired requirement of
the system. In fact, the main reason that the first round of design rejected by
users was directly related to this requirement of the system. As the result, a
bespoke user interface has been designed for the framework that is simple yet
powerful, to satisfy and meet the expectation of the users in many ways.
• Security of the System: Security was also another reason that enforced the
design review within the life cycle of this project. It was known from out-
set that this framework will be used within boundaries of a secured environ-
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ment. Although a few assumptions were made that potentially compromised
the security of the system (e.g. installing Eclispe on system administrators’
computer), these issues have been dealt with during system test. In addition
to that, a few test scenarios have been executed in order to ensure overall
security of the system. Details of these tests will follow in next section.
7.8.2 Evaluation the Framework Against Acceptance Criteria
In addition to evaluation of the framework against its requirements, it should have
been rigorously tested against the predefined criteria that were expected to exist
when the framework implementation is completed. Those tests usually are auto-
mated in software development life-cycle.
Unfortunately, tool support for automated testing of DSLs is not comparable
to the like-to-like tools that are provided for GPLs, such as Java and even .Net
languages. To be more precise, support for automated testing of a DSL is non-
existent [153]. This limits the tester’s ability to discover the existence of software
errors in a DSL program in the same way that they approach for code written in
GPLs.
In the context of this research, there were other challenges, which resulted in
using an alternative approach, that are listed here:
• The Framework Is Not a Complete System: To be more precise, the output
of the framework, which will be policies written in different security policy
languages, must be connected to the PAP (please refer to Section 2.3), those
policies must be executed on that specific policy server and the results must
be examined. In other words, the validity of the output cannot be verified at
the point where the code generators produce the policies.
• Tight Security: PAPs were not designed to provide online/on-time informa-
tion. They were designed to capture administrator commands and enforce
those to the servers. The PAPs, which would be the point where the frame-
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work will be connected to, do not have the capability to send the results to the
outside world.
• Failing Does Not Always Mean Failing: There are too many parameters that
have to be taken to consideration, before a test scenario declared as failed. A
test scenario could fail as a result of an invalid DSL script, incomplete genera-
tor or even incompatible policy server that receives the generated policy. The
key point here is that, unlike GPLs where a failure of a test scenario indicates
an error in the code, the failure of a test scenario cannot easily identify where
an issue is located. A level of human interaction and investigation must be
added to the process.
Taking the above into account, a decision was made to abandon the fully au-
tomated test strategy and take an alternative approach as described below, which
perfectly blends with BDD.
Verify a valid
Scenario 
Code the 
Scenario in 
DSL
Execute
DSL script
Test the 
Framework
Output
Tune
DSL
Tune
Framework
Figure 7.7: The Proposed Testing Procedure for the Framework
In this approach, that was performed by three Capgemini UK testers (one for
each language), a transcript has been executed with five different scenarios against
each security policy language candidates (i.e. the transcript executed 15 times at
each round). The output of each iteration was then sent back to the developers to
modify the code/DSL in order to address the issue accordingly. The result of these
iterations are presented in this section.
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• Verify a Valid Scenario: At this stage, a valid scenario with an expected
result from all security policy languages must be verified prior to performing
the test. It should be stressed that the scenario must be valid, but that does not
mean that all the policy languages would be able to code the scenario. If the
scenario cannot be coded using a specific security policy language, that must
be known before the test cycle commences.
• Code the Scenario in DSL: As the next step, the verified scenario must be
coded in an abstract policy language (i.e. the DSL). The task must be per-
formed in accordance with the predefined grammar of the DSL.
• Tune the DSL: Introducing a new language is an iterative process. The DSL
of the current research framework is not an exception. The DSL must be
evolved while the framework is constantly tested. During this iterative pro-
cess, unidentified items will be highlighted and must be added, modified or
amended accordingly. Language features, grammars syntax, functionalities
which have not been thought of and introduced before can be presented as
examples. In these cases, the DSL must be tuned in a way that accommo-
dates/modifies the functionalities and provides them to the framework users.
The cycle must be reiterated until all functionalities, features and grammar
syntax of a specific scenario have been marked as fit for the purpose of the
DSL.
• Execute the DSL Script: As the next step, the DSL script must be fed to
the framework. Assuming that the corresponding valuation engine, grammar
configuration files etc. have been modified accordingly in the previous steps,
there should be no issues with the execution of the DSL script by the frame-
work.
• Test the Framework: The output of the framework must be checked against
the expected result, which was defined at step 1. That must be done separately
for every individual security policy language. Specific pattern matching and
text comparison codes can be written to fully automate the process; how-
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ever, in order to semi-automate the step, Specs2, a BDD library for Scala,
was used [146]. Using Specs2 , a small acceptance code (Listing 7.5) was
written to check the output of the code generators. Irrespective of the level
of confidence, the process must be controlled by the developers to ensure the
accuracy of the framework and the output of the code generators.
• Tune the Framework: There will be cases that result in unexpected be-
haviour of the framework. In such a scenario, the individual security policy
language generator must be modified in a way that produces the expected re-
sults. This iterative cycle is continued until either the expected results are
generated by the framework or it is determined that this is not achievable un-
less further changes at other parts of the framework are made. This implies
more code changes, which could have their own effect on the framework en-
tirely.
class GenereatedPolicySpecs extends Specification {
def is = s2
To test the generated policies against expected results
The generated policy should
XACML generated policy must match $e1
Ponder generated policy must match $e2
Protune generated policy must match $e3
def e1 = XacmlGeneratedPolicyFile must
haveSameLinesAs(AccpetdXacmlPolicyFile)
def e2 = PonderGeneratedPolicyFile
must haveSameLinesAs(AccpetdPondrerPolicyFile)
def e3 = ProtuneGeneratedPolicyFile
must haveSameLinesAs(AccpetdProtunePolicyFile)
}
Listing 7.5: Test Script Example Written in SPECS2 (Acceptance Testing)
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The cycle described above must be reiterated over and over again, until enough
confidence is gained by the DSL and back-end developers.
<Policy PolicyId="myPolicy" RuleCombiningAlgId="urn:oasis:
names:tc:xacml:1.0:rule-combining-algorithm:first-applicable"
xmlns="urn:oasis:names:
tc:xacml:1.0:policy" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/
XMLSchema-instance">
<Description>This is a Auto generated policy.</Description>
<Target>
<Subjects>
<Subject>
<SubjectMatch MatchId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:
function:string-equal">
<AttributeValue DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/
XMLSchema#string">mySubject</AttributeValue>
<SubjectAttributeDesignator AttributeId="ubdRole"
MustBePresent="false"
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string"/>
</SubjectMatch>
</Subject>
</Subjects>
<Resources>
<ResourceMatch MatchId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function
:string-equal">
<ResourceAttributeDesignator AttributeId="ubd:resource:Type"
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string"/>
<AttributeValue DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#
string">MyTarget</AttributeValue>
</ResourceMatch>
</Resource>
</Resources>
<Actions>
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<Action>
<ActionMatch MatchId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:
string-equal">
<AttributeValue DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#
string">Action1</AttributeValue>
<ActionAttributeDesignator AttributeId="ubd:action:type"
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string"/>
</ActionMatch>
</Action>
</Actions>
</Target>
<Rule RuleId="rul_own_record" Effect="Permit">
<Condition>
<Apply FunctionId=
"urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-equal">
<SubjectAttributeDesignator DataType=
"http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">
mySubjectCondition1
</SubjectAttributeDesignator>
</Apply>
</Condition>
</Rule>
</Policy>
Listing 7.6: Example of XACML Policy Generated by Framework
execute(denyMyAction(myTarget,MySubject)) :-
currentRequester(mySubject).
currentRequester(mySubject)->type:provisional.
currentRequester(mySubject)->ontology:{l3s:Dummy_Action}.
denyMyAction(myTarget,MySubject)->type:provisional.
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denyMyAction(myTarget,MySubject)->ontology:{l3s:Dummy_Action
}.
denyMyAction(myTarget,MySubject)->actor:self.
Listing 7.7: Example of Protune Policy Generated by Framework
While on the subject of testing the application, it would be worth mentioning
that, in addition, the following test strategies have been applied to the system in
order to test the integrity of the framework thoroughly. The strategies were:
• Endurance Test/Stability Test
Definition: This tests a given condition over an extended period of time to
ensure application availability and sustained performance. Essentially, this
test can be described as a load test, where a scenario with a key specification
can be run for an extended period of time at a constant load.
Serious endurance testing can take a week or more, but given the timescales
applicable, two hours was the longest practical test duration experienced by
the project. Response times and other system metrics, including memory
usage (measured by customised log files and print commands) were observed
for any indication of system performance degradation over time. The task was
mainly executed to determine any possible memory leaks or other problems
that may show up after the framework has been live for an extended period.
Usually, these tests are most important for high availability 24/7 applications.
During this test, a specific valid security scenario was fed to the framework
and its output has been closely monitored. Although the result was satisfac-
tory, it was noticed that, for extremely large DSL scripts, the session time-out
of the webserver that surrounds the framework had to be increased accord-
ingly. Due to the fact that the application should operate on an environment
with tight security, the increase of the session time-out could lead to other
security breaches (e.g. unauthorised access to the framework, if the admin-
istrator forgets to close his/her browser). After a few attempts with different
settings, a three-minute session time-out was chosen as an appropriate amount
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of time that a session could continue with user inactivity. This provides a good
balance between security and performance of the system.
• Sanity Check
Definition: Highly focused tests intended to identify the specific issues of the
main functionality of the application. It gives a measure of confidence that
the system works as expected, prior to a more exhaustive round of testing.
A great level of attention was given to the security of the system. As a result,
one of the features that was added to the system was the framework to mark
any sensitive information provided by the user that must be logged for testing
or audit purposes. Such a feature will ensure that the security of the whole
domain remain intact, even if human errors occur. A series of scenarios were
written to ensure that this feature works under various circumstances. Frame-
work outputs, including log files, were closely monitored as a result. No
action was taken, as the framework was designed and coded as to not log/s-
tore any sensitive data under any circumstances. Any sensitive information,
such as a username that needs to be logged for auditing purposes, was ob-
scured partially to add to the overall security of the system. An example of
the output commands can be presented as follows:
2014-02-20 10:02:24,267 INFO [STDOUT]
(10.57.115.120-8080-4) About to perform specified Action
2014-02-20 10:02:24,267 INFO [STDOUT]
(10.57.115.120-8080-4) User Amir***ST logged into the system
2014-02-20 10:03:40,932 INFO [STDOUT]
(10.57.115.120-8080-4) Execute the \gls{DSL} was chosen by
user
2014-02-20 10:03:40,932 INFO [STDOUT]
(ajp-10.57.115.120-8080-4) Going to populate the page
Listing 7.8: Example of Obscured Logged Information
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7.8.3 Evaluation of the Framework by Capturing Experts’ Opin-
ion
Last but not the least, the system has been demonstrated to experts and their opin-
ions were captured. During these sessions, the main features of the system have
been demonstrated to the experts (mainly the ones who helped the project to start.
A list of these individual features are presented in Chapter 1). The following fea-
tures have been presented to experts:
• The ways that the framework operates .
• The framework’s features (please refer to system requirements at Chapter 3).
• The way that the framework can learn new semantics (i.e. framework’s ex-
tendability).
• Overall security of the framework.
• Architecture of the framework.
A Question and Answer session was conducted following the presentation and
experts’ views on the framework have been captured. All experts who have attended
the presentation were satisfied with framework, however, they have suggested a
few enhancements to the framework. These have already been discussed in the
enhancement section of this chapter.
7.9 Analysis of The Framework
Back in chapter 4, it has been justified why evaluation of a limited number of secu-
rity policy languages against the framework is desired. Hence, adding more security
policy languages to the framework is inevitable in future. As a result, this section
analyses behaviour of the framework against changes those are required to intro-
duce a new security policy language to the system. This has been analysed as per
the languages feature and after a set of features has been added to the framework.
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As it has been mentioned before, the software methodology that has been se-
lected for the development of the framework was/is Agile. The process had a short
span of the development i.e. two weeks to implement different features for each
specific security policy language. At the end of each sprint, the developed features
delivered to testers to test it based on the predefined acceptance criteria. Reported
issues then were sent back to developers to address them accordingly. The develop-
ment iterations then continued to the point that it passed all the pre-defined criteria.
The number of issues that have been found by testers per languages was different
per features, per sprint. The complexity of the feature and how common the feature
was amongst three security policy languages had a direct impact on the number of
issues that have been found by the testers. For instance obligation that is supported
by all languages was more difficult to implement in a way to satisfy all languages,
rather than features like negotiation that is supported only by one language.
Figure 7.8 presents the number of issues that has been found against one particu-
lar feature that was added to the framework. As suggested by the graph, the number
of the issues at the end of the first iteration is always more compared to the consec-
utive sprints. Also it has been noted that the Xacml that is a XML-based security
policy language needed more attention than the other two languages. Development
of Protune-based security policies created fewer issues (bugs) as it is very close to
human language.
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Figure 7.8: Example of Issues Found for a New Feature per Sprint
Figure 7.9 however, presents other aspects of the development. Adding features
to framework requires a level of modification to the ASPL in order to allow the
system administrators to code the new future via the abstract language. Changing
the ASPL in turn forces the semantic model of the framework to be modified to
accommodate the new futures that is dictated by the script i.e. ASPL. Figure 7.9
provides the number of changes that were required to add different features to the
framework.
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Figure 7.9: Required Changes on Semantic Model per Feature
The figure reveals an interesting fact about the framework. The figure proves
that irrespective of the required changes enforced by the first feature, the number
of changes on the semantic model in the second round of development (i.e. sec-
ond feature) is always more than the first feature. The reason behind this fact is
adding features do have impact on the ASL, however the first feature always can be
developed without any constraints enforced by the semantic model. The first fea-
ture can be added to the framework freely. But, that is not the case for the second
feature onwards, which is added to the framework. The second feature is bound to
the constraints already been introduced (that may not be fit for purpose) by the first
feature. Hence, the number of changes required to be applied to the semantic model
on second feature is always more than the first feature. As more features are added
to the framework, ASPL and in turn, the semantic model gradually matures. These
findings are in line with the definition of DSL and its properties that were discussed
back in Chapter 6 where it has been mentioned that DSL like human languages
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evolve and stabilises over a period of time.
Fig 7.9 provides the number of changes that were required to be applied on the
semantic model during framework development. As can be discovered from the
figure 7.9, Xacml that is a XML-based langue required more changes than human
language look alike language e.g. Protune.
7.10 Summary
7.10.1 Chapter Summary
In this chapter, the software methodology for the implementation of the project
was chosen and justified. Then, the system requirements that were built upon were
detailed, explained and blended with the software methodology.
Then, the chapter presented the high level design of the framework, which was
proposed based on the system requirements. The high level architecture was then
justified by outlining the advantages of the design. In addition, the detailed design
(based on HLA) was presented to the readers. The way that a user’s feedback was
captured and fed back to the system design was explained in detail. That resulted in
the second version of the HLA and its corresponding detail design. Implementation
of the system was also discussed to a great extent, to show how different parts of
the system tie to each other. In addition, it has been discussed how the framework
can be enhanced in future.
Finally, it has been shown how the framework and outline details can be effec-
tively tested. This enabled the system to be more robust and secure in the future.
7.10.2 Research Contributions of the Chapter
To some extent, the entire chapter can be presented as the research’s contribution.
Ultimate objective of this research was/is to provide a framework for security policy
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language, which was presented it in details in this chapter.
Whilst there is no black and white way to decide between different External
DSL implementation patterns, it was shown how to determine project specific re-
quirements and how to use that as a filter, to narrow down different possible design
approaches.
Different software development methodologies like Agile and user-centric de-
sign, that can help to achieve the project’s goal with more accuracy, were shown.
Additionally, it was demonstrated how test strategies can be utilised to evolve a DSL
project in an iterative way.
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Conclusion and Future work
In this chapter, the research presents:
• The conclusion of the project,
• Measuring the defined objectives,
• The future work for the project.
8.1 Conclusion
Novel contribution of this project started with the investigation around security pol-
icy languages, which resulted in identifying the necessity of a framework for se-
curity policy languages. The advantages that individuals would gain from such a
framework, if presented to the industry, were also discussed.
Failure is an acceptable concept in the IT arena. This has been measured by
research conducted in the past, including a report compiled by the Standish Group
in 1995 that demonstrated that only 16% of the software projects were successful,
53% were challenged and 31% were cancelled. Moreover, the research showed that
the average software project runs 222% late, 189% over budget and delivers only
61% of the specified functions. Evidence suggests little has changed since then.
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Due to this, it was decided to theoretically prove that the project will be suc-
cessful when it comes to life. In order to achieve the goal, the following steps have
been identified and taken, respectively:
1. The high level requirements of the framework, along with the overview of its
abstract security policy language, which will be delivered with the framework,
were discussed. That outlined the road-map of the project.
2. The history of security policies, their origins and their models were reviewed in
detail. That also included their detailed components and the way they that they
work in a secured environment.
3. Then, a literature review of security policy languages was conducted. The review
led the research to select a subset of security policy languages to work on the
framework as candidates.
4. As the next step, a literature review of security policy language algebras and
their characteristics, formalisms and specifications was performed. As a result,
one algebra was chosen as a candidate and evaluated against the security policy
languages selected in step three.
5. Finally, the areas for improvement in the selected algebra were identified and
appropriate solutions to address them were provided by the project.
After it was mathematically proven that the development of the framework is
achievable, the design and implementation phases of the project started. Having
researched different available best software design and development practises and
mapping them to the requirements of this project, it was noted that the design and
development of the project could perfectly match the concept of DSLs. As a result,
research on the subject was conducted. It was noted that for various reasons, the
development of DSLs is an expensive task. In order to control the costs, efforts and
the project plan, the design must be performed in a controlled manner; so, it was
decided to design and implement the project in stages. Implementation phases have
been broken down as follows:
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1. Decision Phase: The type of DSL was specified at this stage.
2. Analysis Phase: Aimed to analyse the domain for which the project is imple-
menting a specific language.
3. Design Phase: By analysing different design patterns, it was determined which
of the existing design patterns could be fit for the purposes of this research.
4. Implementation Phase: Different implementation patterns were reviewed and
an appropriate pattern that fits in the context of the research was chosen during
this step.
Finally, in an iterative Agile-based approach, the DSL of the project evolved in
a way that becomes capable of producing security policies for the security policy
language candidates. Lastly, a testing strategy that helped to test the framework
from different perspectives was selected and executed at the end of the project.
Now, it is mandatory to go through the research objectives that have been de-
fined at earlier stages, with the aim of evaluating the research accordingly.
Objective One
To define the project specific criteria for shortlisting the security policy languages.
The task will be executed following the literature review of security policy languages
from different perspectives and categorise them accordingly.
In Chapter 4, different comparison reports on security policy languages that cat-
egorise them from different points of view were reviewed in detail. Their unique-
ness and characteristics of each individual report were discussed and outlined. Hav-
ing reviewed these reports in detail, a custom requirement for the research was tai-
lored for the project and applied to the list of available of security policy languages.
That resulted in choosing a subset consisting of three security policy languages.
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Objective Two
To provide formalism for the framework and evaluate it against security policy lan-
guage candidates. The task will be executed following the literature review of cur-
rent algebra for security policy languages.
Steps taken to research algebra for security policy languages were outlined in
Chapter 5. The algebras, which have evolved over the last decade and the majority
of which were published by well-known authors and presented in reputable confer-
ences and journals, have been reviewed and compared.
Advantages and disadvantages of each individual algebra were also discussed
and backed up by acceptable evidence. In addition, an algebra was selected and
the area for improvement and enhancement on the selected algebra that fits within
the context of this research was identified. The chapter continued by providing the
solution and proof to address the identified areas accordingly. Lastly, in the same
chapter, completeness of the enhanced algebra was provided.
Objective Three
To design a framework for security policy languages using appropriate software
development methodologies.
This objective can be considered the ultimate aim of this research; therefore it
was discussed across two chapters, (i.e. Chapter 6 and Chapter 7). In Chapter 6,
it was demonstrated that the best software development practice for developing the
framework for security policy languages fits perfectly in the context of domain spe-
cific languages. In the same chapter, different phases for design and development of
a DSL were discussed in detail. As a result of the discussion, the most appropriate
design and development pattern for the predefined requirements of the framework
was chosen.
In the same chapter, choosing different possible host languages was discussed in
detail. Scala chosen as the programming language for the project and its suitability
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was outlined.
Objective Four
To implement a Proof of Concept (PoC) using open source components according
to software development best practice.
The discussion on implementation of the framework continued in Chapter 7
by providing the high-level design and low-level design of the framework. It was
demonstrated how adopting Agile and a user-centric design could rescue a project at
its early stages. In addition, it was shown how user feedback and input to the project
could affect the HLA and LLD of the project. Also, an outline of how the design
can be enhanced and how users can benefit from these was featured by adding more
components to the framework.
Objective Five
To design, develop and enhance an abstract security policy language for the frame-
work.
A step-by-step demonstration of the design, development and enhancement of
our DSL, which is considered to be an abstract security policy language, using
Scalas parser combinators was shown in Chapter 7.
Objective Six
To evaluate the framework in accordance with well-known test strategies.
Finally, the difficulty in fully automated testing strategy for a DSL-based appli-
cation was discussed. That led the project to overcome the issue by combining a
few appropriate testing strategies together and execute them against the project.
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8.2 Further Work
Although as part of this research, a novel framework for security policy languages
was developed and laboratory studies and a programmatic evaluation process (de-
tailed in previous chapters) satisfied the acceptance criteria of the research, there
are still steps that need to be taken, in order to address certain concerns with regards
to the framework.
8.2.1 Expansion
In Chapter 4, security policy languages from different perspectives were reviewed
and that resulted in tailored requirements for selecting security policy languages.
Applying the requirements on the list of well-known and available security policy
languages led the project to choose three language candidates. This subset of lan-
guages was considered a suitable list of languages, which were then used to evaluate
the framework throughout the project.
Although it was proven that the framework, as designed, is capable of trans-
forming the abstract DSL language to a specific security policy language, that does
not necessary mean that the framework will be capable of transforming the DSL
language to other security policy languages.
There are a number of security policy languages available in the market. It is
almost impossible for a single development team to come up with a solution to cover
them all; inevitably, the best way to expand the project to other languages, beyond
the ones already chosen, would be to make the framework available to other experts
who work in the same area and ask for their participation, collaboration and input
on the project. Providing the code to the public as open source will also help the
framework grow, while others will benefit from its usage.
Assuming such a decision was made, the following steps must be taken before
the code is released to the public.
192
8.2. Further Work
The framework must be properly backed up by a good level of documentation.
In other words:
1. The code must be well-documented. That includes inline comments to describe
certain parts of the code in detail. Also, the code should come with an extended
low-level and high-level design (i.e. extend what has been described in this
document) to describe the framework inside and out.
2. A step-by-step document should be provided to show how to develop a plug-in
policy generator. The document should also demonstrate that there is possibility
that policy code generators could change the top level DSL. In such scenar-
ios, the document also preferably should provide guidance to show how such a
change in the top level DSL should be tested to ensure the integrity of the entire
framework.
3. A user manual should also be provided. The manual should show how a pol-
icy developer (end user) could interact with the framework. It can also provide
users with a troubleshooting section to guide them in how to take certain actions,
should something go wrong during the interaction with the framework.
8.2.2 Security
Security must have a high level of attention during further development of the sys-
tem. Assuming the decision was made to incorporate a database into the framework,
proper steps must be taken to ensure that sensitive information is excluded from
storage in the database. Assuming storing sensitive information in the database is
inevitable, then some further steps must be taken to ensure that the sensitive data
is properly encrypted before being stored in the database, to reduce the risk of an
internal attack.
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8.3 The Future of the Framework
Most likely the framework will be used within the application that utilise Micorser-
vices in the future. To justify such a claim the Microservice architecture should be
looked at in more detail.
8.3.1 Microservices
Microservices is an approach to develop a single application as a suite of small
services, each running in its own process and communicating with each other, often
over HTTP resource API. These services are built around business capabilities and
independently deployed by continues automated deployment. Microservices are the
bare minimum of centralised management of these services, which may be written
in different programming languages and use different data storage technologies and
located on different domains as well. Microservices usually publish their endpoints
that are usually RESTful APIs [20].
REST that is stand for REpresentational State Transfer, is an architectural style,
and an approach to communications that is often used in the development of Web
services. The use of REST is often preferred over the more heavyweight SOAP.
REST is often used in mobile applications, and social networking applications. The
REST style emphasises that interactions between clients and services is enhanced
by having a limited number of operations. Flexibility is provided by assigning re-
sources their own unique URIs [26].
Taking the fact that Microservices are communicating over HTTP using REST-
ful APIs, and the fact that micro services can be located in different domains, the
implication is that those Microservices can be protected using features that are pro-
vided by security policy languages.
Now, in a multi-dimensional organisation where different domains have their
own micro services and have their own security policy languages, the security man-
agement of the domain becomes very challenging if not impossible. This is where
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An Interoperability Framework for Security Policy Languages (i.e. the output of
this thesis) can be certainly useful.
195
A. List of Open Source Software Used
Appendices
A List of Open Source Software Used
Software Version
Java Development Kit 1.6
Scala development Kit 2.10
Play Framework 2.1
Oitok -
Eclipse 4.0
Xtext 2.2
Xpand 2.0
Ace Editor 1.1.5
Xacml 3.0
Ponder2 2.3
Protune -
Specs2 2.3
Spring (IoC) 4.0
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B Policy Language Comparison
Following is the result of policy languages comparison performed by De Coi et al..
[62]
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Figure 1: Policy Languages Comparison
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C JVM Language Comparison
Following is the result of JVM languages comparison performed by Wing Hang Li
et al..
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Figure 2: JVM Languages Comparison
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D Requirement Gathering Questioner
Following is a snapshot of questioner used to capture functional and non-functional
requirements of the framework.
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Figure 3: Requirement Gathering Questioner
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Following is a snapshot of survey used to capture user’s opinion after a PoC of the
framework presented to them.
203
E. Survey Questioner
 	 
	 	

	








  !
"




"
!
"



#


#!
"


"

#!
$%"&
"





'()  !
$%"&
"


"*

#!
$%"&
"



"+
#!
"


"


#!
"

,
"



$&+$&"

 
*
-
.
"
  


"#-
/
012
3
012
4
012
2
012

012
0
012
1
012
%5 
6#


 

*
-
7
 
"



  
 #"
-

  
"

*
-

##



"-
8
 



			
012
Figure 4: Survey Questioner
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